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ABSTRACT 
Ukwangali district is located in the western part of the Kavango region approximately 70 
kilometers west of the regional town Rundu. This thesis explores and documents the local 
political dimensions which prevailed in the uKwangali district of Namibia between 1966-1989. 
The study seeks to find out why the uKwangali district became a war zone outside of the main 
theatre of war in nearby Ovamboland, and how its residents became part of the Namibian armed 
liberation struggle. In 1964 the Odendaal Commission led to the division of South West Africa 
into ten designated areas, including Kavango. The region was implicated in the armed struggle 
from 1966, right through to the most intense phase of the struggle in the late 1980s. The South 
African regime’s strategies in uKwangali district were part of its military campaign to break 
down the influence of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO). This included 
Administration General Proclamation AG 9 Act of 1977 which allowed arrest and detention 
without any warrant or offence. Through the (Recce) Reconnaissance Unit the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) also used to disguise themselves as People’s Liberation Army of 
Namibia (PLAN) cadres in order to deceive the local civilians in Namibia.  
The strategy of using secret informers ‘spies’ created additional tension, mistrust and 
misunderstanding among civilians themselves and with PLAN cadres. Thus the social and 
political impact of the South African military occupation and colonial administration on the life 
of the local inhabitants is central to this enquiry, especially in the context of conventional and 
unconventional warfare.  
Though PLAN cadres did commit occasional targeted assassinations, their primary mode 
of gaining support was through political education among villagers which addressed the 
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inequalities of the racist South African regime in Namibia.  Against this background, civilians 
were caught between the two military forces which operated in uKwangali district; during the 
day civilians had to deal with the SADF and Koevoet looking for PLAN combatants, while at 
night PLAN cadres would visit for food and logistical support.  
  The cease-fire agreement of 1984 in Lusaka Zambia marked the beginning of the 
transition period which led to Namibia’s first democratic elections in 1989. United Nations’ 
Resolution 435 of 1988 established UNTAG to supervise the withdrawal of South African troops 
from Namibia and the repatriation of refugees and the assembly of PLAN combatants prior to 
elections. During this transition period, SWAPO campaigned successfully in Ukwangali district 
as a political party and the election results for Kavango show the support which the liberation 
movement had gained during the war years, despite South African pressures on the civilian 
population. My research therefore examines the social and political impact of the armed 
liberation struggle against the South African regime had, and the contributions of the inhabitants 
of Ukwangali during the war years and the decisive elections of 1989, which has hitherto been 
neglected in the national historiography. In this context, the study looks at what it means to be a 
forgotten war zone in the Namibian liberation struggle.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 Historical background   
 South West Africa (Namibia) was a mandated territory under South Africa from 1921, 
up to Namibia’s first democratic election in November 1989. Under the mandate system, 
South Africa was expected to promote the material and moral wellbeing of the 
inhabitants of the territory. The Odendaal Plan of 1962 was aimed at separate 
development on ethnic grounds. It was one of the colonial strategies used to control the 
local inhabitants in each region, which affected the Kavango region and the uKwangali 
district as well, the site of this study. The Commission was required to make 
recommendation for the developments of the various African people inside and outside 
their designated areas. 
         The outcome of the Commission was the division of South West Africa (Namibia) 
into ten designated areas for the various ‘native nations’.1 These areas later became the 
homelands for the Africans in South West Africa (Namibia).  After 1970, three northern 
homelands were granted self-government.2 The Kavango Legislative Council was one of 
the Legislative Councils established by the Development of Self-Government for Native 
Nations of South West Africa Act No 54 of 1968, to administer one of the ‘native 
nations’, the Kavango. The Kavango legislative structure under the apartheid regime of 
                                                             
1 The Act set the following areas for the exclusive occupations of the different native nations, Damaraland 
(Damaras), Hereroland (Hereros), Kaokoland (Himbas), Kavangoland (Kavango) Eastern Caprivi 
(Caprivians), Ovamboland  (Owambo) and any other area reserved and set apart for the exclusive use of 
and occupation by natives as recognized by the South African State President, See  the Development of 
Self-Government for Native Nations of South West Africa Act No 54 of 1968,pp 831-832, National Library 
of Namibia, Windhoek. 
2 The three northern homelands were Ovamboland, Kavangoland and Eastern Caprivi. 
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South Africa had a political impact where the local people were used to serve the 
interests of South Africa. 
 The uKwangali district is situated in the western part of the Kavango region, 
approximately 70 kilometers west of the regional town Rundu. This study is limited to 
one specific area in Kavango region, that of uKwangali district. The focus on one specific 
area allows the researcher to closely document and analyse the micro-political role of 
individuals in the selected area, in the independence struggle between 1966-1989. The 
selection of the western part of the region was due to the fact that uKwangali district 
shares a regional border with Ovamboland in the west of the district, which was the main 
war theatre during the selected period.3 Another motive for selecting this area was the 
increasing concentration of South African military bases in the area.   
 The mini-thesis aims to explore how and why the uKwangali district became 
involved in the armed liberation struggle. The study aims to trace the political dimensions 
of the main struggle period (1976-89), but including the 1960s in Kavango and in 
uKwangali in particular. This is a significant omission in the historiography of Namibia, 
because the liberation struggle in Namibia was mainly fought in the northern and 
northeastern parts of the country where uKwangali district is situated geographically, and 
yet the latter has to date not been sufficiently researched. Thus the documentation and the 
unpacking of the living memories of the inhabitants of uKwangali district  in this context 
is aimed at filling the gap in the national historiography of Namibia, so as to include the 
                                                             
3 J.B. Diescho, ‘A critical evaluation of the Odendaal commission of enquiry into South West Africa affairs 
1962-63’ (MA dissertation, University Fort Hare, 1983), p.12.   
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previously unexplored micro-politics, experiences and contributions of the people of this 
area during the Namibian armed struggle for independence.  
 I966 marked the beginning of the People’s Liberation of Namibia (PLAN) 
infiltration in Kavango region. The declaration of Ovamboland, Kavango and Caprivi in 
the 1970s as “security districts” under the control of the SADF (South African Defence 
Force) military rule resulted in the clearance of a 1000 metre wide “no man’s land” 
intended to prevent SWAPO infiltration from Angola into Namibia.4 The inclusion of the 
selected research area in the border war zone from the 1970s therefore means that there is 
a need to document and analyse what happened not only in the Kavango region, but the 
uKwangali district in particular.5  The independence of Angola in 1975 offered SWAPO 
the chance to establish military bases in southern Angola. The opening of the Angolan 
border allowed many Namibians to flee the oppression of the South African regime and a 
number of Namibians including those in the research area of the study went into exile in 
Angola during this period to join the armed struggle.6 
  Scholtz indicates that because they were able to utilize Southern Angola, PLAN 
cadres were in a position to infiltrate large bands of guerillas into Kavango as well as in 
the geographical centre of Ovamboland, thereby stretching the operational area to a great 
extent and threatening to overstretch the security forces deployed to counter them.7 Cliffe 
and his co-authors argued that uKwangali district was one area in which PLAN guerillas 
                                                             
4  International Defence Aid fund (IDAF), Apartheid Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military 
occupation (London, IDAF, 1982), p.41. 
5 The South African military force had four bases in the UKwangali area, namely Musese (905 Battalion), 
Nepara (55 SAI), Nkure-Nkuru Base and Maun (906 Battalion). 
6 P.H. Katjavivi, A history of resistance in Namibia (London: UNESCO Press, 1988), p.87. 
7 S. Brown, “Diplomacy by other means”, in Leys and Saul: Namibia Liberation struggle, p.23. 
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were active coming into Kavango from the Ovambo region, and engaged in political 
education as well as in guerilla activities.8  It is therefore clear that PLAN cadres who 
came into Kavango entered the region via uKwangali district before spreading across the 
entire region.9 The infiltration of PLAN cadres into Kavango via uKwangali made the 
district the most influential area in Kavango in terms of the liberation movement, and 
undermined the spheres of South African influence in uKwangali. 
 
Research objectives  
This thesis aims to examine why uKwangali district in the Kavango became one of the 
declared war zones in Namibia, and how this came about. The role of the traditional 
authorities within the Legislative Council body, and the legislation passed by the Council 
will give an indication of the position of the traditional leaders in Kavango as to whether 
they resisted or co-operated with the South African regime. The study covers the period 
1966 to 1989, 23 years of the armed struggle of Namibia. The study ends in 1989-90 
when the country gained independence.  
 This part of the country’s history has received little attention especially when it 
comes to the liberation struggle of Namibia. Thus the study seeks to explore and 
document the local political dimensions which prevailed in the selected area and the 
                                                             
8 L. Cliffe et al, The transition to independence in Namibia (London: Lynne Reiner, 1994), p.295. 
9 S. Brown, “Diplomacy by other means”, in Leys and Saul: Namibia Liberation struggle, p.23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
military strategies implemented by the South African regime in uKwangali district as part 
of their broader war effort.   
 The central research question which will be addressed by this study is: did the 
South African authorities succeed in imposing their control over uKwangali district 
during the liberation war, and if so, how? The mini-thesis will give an historical overview 
of the selected research area, and portray the political activities which took place in the 
area, with special attention to the fact that the district dealt with two military forces: that 
of SWAPO (PLAN) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) with its surrogate 
named the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). The impact of the South 
African Police (SAP) counter-insurgency unit, Koevoet, on the lives of civilians will also 
be looked at in this thesis.    
 The mini-thesis aims to provide an in-depth study of the strategies which were 
imposed by the South African regime on the communities to try and break off contact 
with SWAPO. An in-depth analysis of the conventional and unconventional strategies 
used by the South African security forces will be addressed in the chapters of this thesis. 
The formation of the South West African people’s Organization (SWAPO) a political 
movement which represented the interests of the Namibian people in the 1960s sparked 
decades of guerilla warfare, mostly armed, against the South African military regime.   
 The South African system of apartheid and colonial oppression which spread 
significantly into South West Africa (Namibia), forced thousands of Namibians to desert 
the country into neighboring countries such as Angola, Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania 
for safety and better security, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Though hundreds of 
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young men and women from the Kavango region left the country especially in the 1980s, 
little is known about their fate and personal experience in Namibian historiography.10 
Whilst it is undeniable that the armed struggle in Namibia was launched by SWAPO in 
1966 after the attack of Omgulumbashe in Ovamboland by the SAP force,11 different 
parts of the country were affected militarily and politically by the guerilla warfare. The 
uKwangali district of the Kavango region was one of the areas most affected by the 
liberation struggle outside of Ovamboland.  
The chapters in this mini-thesis will critically examine the social and political 
impacts of the South African colonial administration and its military buildup between 
1966-1989 in uKwangali district of the Kavango region. The political changes which 
prevailed in the uKwangali district of Kavango region, the military strategies 
implemented by the South African regime in uKwangali area as a measure to breakdown 
the influence of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in the district are 
the key issues which will be addressed in the chapters.  
The structural intimidation embedded in the social and the ethnic political 
structure set up by the South African administration, which patronized its political 
relationship which existed with certain chiefs in the Kavango region will be examined.12 
Thus people who got jobs from the Kavango ethnic administration were caught up in a 
                                                             
10 © hmmilk “Kavango during the Namibian war of liberation,”http://kavango.info/Voito.htm. accessed on 
2007/08/07. 
11M. Wallace and T Cleaver, Namibian women in war (London: Zed Books Ltd), p.14-15. 
12L. Cliffe et al, The transition to independence in Namibia (London: Lynne Reiner, 1994), p.295. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
patron-client relationship indebted to officials, chiefs and headmen. The work of this 
mini-thesis is to explore the original contributions and involvements of the inhabitants of 
uKwangali district of the Kavango during the Namibian armed liberation struggle. My 
inspiration for this study has been instigated by my personal experience of the activities 
of the armed liberation struggle and the guerilla warfare in uKwangali as from 1980-
1989, and the inadequate representation of this area in the Namibian historiography. This 
motivated me to take up the challenge of addressing a lacuna in the published history of 
Namibia’s liberation struggle. The transition period and the United Nations supervised 
election of 1989, the political activities of SWAPO during 1989 campaign, will be looked 
at to highlight the support of the people in Kavango towards the cause of Namibian 
Independence. 
 
Research methodology  
Two complementary methods will be used in this research study, namely archival 
research and fieldwork interviews. Apart from using the relevant literature dealing with 
the armed struggle of Namibia in general, a total of twenty-four individuals mainly in 
uKwangali area will be interviewed. The categories of informants in the study ranged 
from former PLAN combatants, former members of the Kavango Legislative Council, 
ordinary members of the communities and former SADF and Koevoet members.   
The fact that very little written documentation exists on the area under research, 
means that the personal experiences of the interviewees on the Namibian armed liberation 
struggle and its impact on the district will serve as the main sources of the mini-thesis.  
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Investigating these previously undocumented living memories will enable the 
researcher to explore the involvement of the people of uKwangali district in the often 
hidden micro-politics of the Namibian armed struggle. The political dangers that the 
civilians of uKwangali district of the Kavango region were exposed to on a daily basis 
will form the basis of my argument as to why the selected district became a war zone in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Daily harassment, assaults and atrocities committed by the South 
African forces in particular Koevoet make the district a war zone, but unfortunately a 
forgotten one. 
  
Literature review 
While there is a quantity of literature dealing with the Namibian armed liberation 
struggle, little literature exists directly on the selected research area, thus oral history will 
form the major component of my research study and I will collect first hand data from 
various individuals concerning their personal experiences and involvement. A variety of 
secondary sources which deals with the liberation struggle of Namibia, are to be 
consulted in this research to support the oral data collected. Publications about the 
Namibian armed struggle and elsewhere in Southern Africa which will be useful in 
contextualizing the study in a regional framework will be consulted.   
The book by Helao Shityuwete entitled Never follow the wolf provides a historical 
background of PLAN fighters’ infiltration into Namibia across the Kavango River. His 
work provides a study of the specific period when PLAN fighters first entered the 
Kavango region in the 1960s, for surveillance purposes on the political situation in 
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Namibia. The book describes the routes PLAN fighters used to infiltrate in Kavango and 
the type of assistance given by the local contact person in Rundu. This will help the study 
to evaluate the type of difficulties experienced by PLAN cadres and the type of assistance 
rendered by the local people in Kavango, at this time.13 Shityuwete’s book is useful as it 
integrates Kavango into the history of the armed liberation struggle.  
The MA thesis by Joseph Diescho on the Odendaal Commission’s findings, 
recommendations and implementation with respect to Kavango will be useful to the 
study.14 His thesis sheds light on the formation of a political party by a Kavango SWAPO 
supporter David Ausiku called “Muzogumwe” meaning “One way forward” in Kavango 
in the sixties.15 His thesis is helpful as its reveals the earlier activities of SWAPO in 
Kavango. Thus it helps in understanding the earlier activities of SWAPO in Kavango.   
J.P. Serfontein’s book entitled Namibia is useful to the study, as it provides a 
historical account of SWAPO activities inside Namibia and abroad. However his work 
implies that the struggle was fought by a single ethnic group, which does not reflect the 
complex reality of Namibia’s armed struggle. This is the main argument which the mini-
thesis is intending to address, by looking at the position of the uKwangali district during 
the struggle.   
                                                             
13 H. Shityuwete, Never follow the wolf: The autobiography of a Namibian freedom fighter (London: 
Kliptown Books, 1999), p.119-127. 
14J. B. Diescho, ‘A critical Evaluation of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa 
Affairs 1962-1963’ (MA Dissertation, University of Fort Hare, 1983), p.48. 
15J. B. Diescho, ‘A critical Evaluation of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs 1962-1963 (MA dissertation, University of Forte Hare, 1983), p.48. 
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Serfontein’s work is also useful as he talks of the military operation of the PLAN 
during the above period where Namibia was divided into four military regions i.e. North 
and northeastern region that of Ovamboland and Kavango, Northwest region Kaokoland, 
Grootfontein district in the central region, Northern eastern region that of the Caprivi 
Strip. This in fact contradicts his own narrative where he claims that the struggle was 
fought by one ethnic group and this therefore needs clarification. This will help to 
understand as to why the selected area became a forgotten war zone in Namibia. His 
work also noted that although intimidation was applied throughout the country, it was 
mainly concentrated in Ovamboland, a point with which I disagree personally.16 Thus the 
study aims at correcting and filling the lacuna in the existing literatures. 
The book by A.T. Moleah, entitled Namibia: the struggle for liberation, also 
gives the study an historical background of the struggle in Namibia and its developments 
over time. It helps in creating an understanding of the evolution of the Ovambo People’s 
Organization (OPO) which later changed to South West African People Organization 
(SWAPO). It discusses the diverse strategies which the South African regime used to try 
and destroy SWAPO such as intimidating people from supporting the liberation 
movement.17  
The book also talks of the most notorious special force named Koevoet which was 
extremely brutal to the local people in Namibia. These units also operated within the 
western part of Kavango, the area where my research study is based. It is thus helpful to 
                                                             
16 J.H.P. Serfontein, Namibia (London: Rex collings, 1976), p.155-223. 
17A.T. Moleah, Namibia: the struggle for liberation (Wilmingtown: Dissa press, 1983), p.270. 
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understand as how the South African security forces intended to impose control over 
uKwangali district. His book also talks of people who were abducted within the selected 
area whose whereabouts are not known, even today.18 Thus Moleah’s work helps towards 
an understanding of why this area is a forgotten war zone.   
The book by Denis Herbstein and John Evenson entitled The devils are among us: 
The war for Namibia is useful as it provides the study with much detail on the forms of 
violence, assault and atrocity committed by the Koevoet unit across the north-eastern war 
zone, including uKwangali.19  
Ngavirue’s book Political parties and interest groups in South West Africa 
(Namibia) provides this study with an idea of the political debates during the selected 
period in Namibia. The book is helpful in understanding the aspects of the liberation 
struggle within the Kavango context. His work gives a clear perspective of the agenda of 
various political parties formed by that time in Namibia, their purposes, policies and 
principles. This provides the study with a clear picture of the Nationalist movements 
formed at that time in Namibia, how they operated countrywide, what they stood for and 
their political ideology towards various Namibian citizens.20  
Tony Emmet book’s entitled Popular resistance and the roots of Nationalism in 
Namibia will be relevant to the study as it gives an insight into the early development of 
nationalism in Namibia. The book talks of the resistance in Namibia and the growth of 
                                                             
18 Ibid, p.270 
19 D. Herbstein and J. Evenson, The devils are among us: The war for Namibia (London: Zed Books Ltd, 
1989), p.92. 
20 Z. Ngavirue, Political parties and interested groups in South West Africa (Namibia) a study of a plural 
society, (Basel Switzerland: Schletwein publisher, 1997), p.89. 
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nationalism and how the people started to develop a sense of nationalism for their own 
nation. Economic factors which were possible influences on the development of 
nationalism and anti-colonial resistance are also described in this book.21   
To Be Born a Nation by the SWAPO Information Department will be relevant 
here as it explains the colonial oppression, racial discrimination, impoverishment, and the 
contract labour system which the Namibian people experienced during the above 
mentioned period, including the Kavango.22  
Chronology of Namibian History by Klaus Dierks gives the chronological order 
of various historical and political events which took place in Namibia. The formation of 
the Kavango Alliance Party (KAP) which was renamed later as the National Democratic 
Unity Party (NDUP) in 1984 under the presidency of Alfons Majavero is one example. 
Other political organizations which were formed were the Kavango Action Group (KAG) 
and the Namibia National Independence Party (NNIP) under the presidency of Rudolf 
Ngondo. The NNIP was formed in 1983, aimed to oppose the Democratic Turnahalle 
Alliance (DTA) which was supported by the South African regime. His work provides 
the study with the exact dates in which different events took place in Namibia and in 
Kavango in particular.23  
 
                                                             
21T. Emmet, Popular resistance and the roots of nationalism in Namibia (Basel Switzerland: Schletwein 
publisher, 1991), p.102. 
22 SWAPO information Department, To Be Born a Nation: The liberation struggle for Namibia (London: 
Zed Press, 1981), p.57-66. 
23 K. Dierks, Chronology of Namibian history: from the pre-historical times to independence (Namibian 
Scientific Society, 1999), p.285. 
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Gerhard Totemeyer’s book Elections in Namibia describes the election process of 
1989 with all the political parties which participated in that election. His study is helpful 
as it provides a detailed summary of all the districts which participated in the election, 
despite not providing specific reference as to how each constituency performed. In 
analyzing this result it can be seen how the selected area contributed towards Namibia’s 
first democratic election. The political parties which participated in the 1989 election are 
also listed in the book e.g. CAN, CDA, DTA, FCN, NNDP, NNF, NPF, SWAPO-D, 
SWAPO, and UDF.24 The book will assist in the analysis of the extent of SWAPO 
support in Kavango, as compared to voting support for other parties.  
 Multiparty democracy in Namibia by Deborah Lebeau provides the study with the 
political developments which led to the cease-fire agreements, the implementation of 
Resolution 435 and the transition period which culminated in the United Nations 
supervised elections in 1989.     
  Lionel Cliffe’s book, The transition to Independence in Namibia, also helps the 
study with the political activities of the 1980s. His work provides an insight into the 
political conflicts which prevailed between the two main parties SWAPO and DTA 
during the 1989 general elections. His book also helps the study in understanding the 
forms of violence and intimidation orchestrated by the DTA during the election 
campaign. In addition his work provides an understanding as to how the traditional 
leaders were embedded in the patron-client relationships with the South African colonial 
                                                             
24 G. K. H. Totemeyer et al, Elections in Namibia (Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan Publisher, 1996), 
p.208-209. 
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administration. This will help to understand the complications of the position of the 
traditional leader during the political turmoil of 1980s.  
The IDAF book entitled Apartheid’s Army in Namibia: South African’s illegal 
military occupation, gives an overview of the South African military operations and the 
military strategies they used to control the activities of the People Liberation Army of 
Namibia (PLAN) in Namibia and in particular in the north-eastern part of Namibia. The 
book gives detailed features of the military bases which were established in the area of 
my research study, which will assist me in analyzing the impact of the South African 
militarization in uKwangali.25 
The Kavango local newspapers, Kavangudi, and Mupukuruli, which used to give 
the media coverage of all the political and military activities in Kavango, will be relevant 
as well. The newspaper will be useful simply because it was one of the strategies used by 
the South Africans to propagate the negative ideology against the nationalist movements 
e.g. SWAPO, that they will not serve the interest of the local people.26 It is therefore 
relevant to the study because it mainly presented state-sponsored activities in the region. 
These printed media provide an understanding of what issues were reported on and how 
these were perceived by individuals. 
The SWAPO information bulletins published in the 1980s will be relevant to the 
study as they give an insight into the nationalist movement, with its critique of the 
                                                             
25 IDAF, Apartheid’s Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation movements (London: 
IDAF, 1982), p.41. 
26 Kavangudi, No. 1. January 1975 (National Archive of Namibia), p.2-8. 
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various South African political ideologies of Apartheid and segregation between 
Namibian ethnic-groups, based on skin color, race, creed and religion. These publications 
will provide an understanding as how the nationalist movement SWAPO used its own 
arguments to oppose South Africa military rule.27 
Besides books and newspapers, legislation itself requires analysis. Act No.54 of 
1968. The Development of Self-Government for Natives in South West Africa which 
declared self rule, gives an insight into how the South African regime used its power to 
co-opt traditional leaders to serve the interests of the interim government through “Bantu 
self-rule”. The Act was one of the strategies which the South Africa regime used to 
indirectly destroy the local community in supporting the nationalist movement namely 
SWAPO during the selected period.  
While the above literature deals specifically with Namibia, a set literature dealing 
with the guerilla warfare and government counter-insurgency forces in Southern Africa, 
in particular of Zimbabwe, will be referred to in the thesis to make a comparative study 
on the strategies used by guerillas fighters and the government forces.   
Norma Kriger’s book Zimbabwe’s guerilla war. Peasant Voices provide an 
insight into the types of logistic and other support given by civilians.28 The book gives a 
detailed analysis of the interactions which existed between the civilians and guerilla 
fighters in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Her work helps the study to compare with 
                                                             
27 SWAPO Information Bulletin of September 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda: Angola), p.5. 
28N. J. Kriger, Zimbabwe Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices – African Studies Series 70 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.118. 
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the different types of logistic support provided by the civilians and the impacts such 
assistance had on the civilians caused by the government’s forces.  
The strategies used by guerilla fighters to win the mind and hearts of the civilians 
through political education lectures, singing liberation songs and by politicizing the 
community members are described in Kriger’s book. Her work will help the study to 
compare the mode of operation of the Zimbabwe People Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) 
and civilians in Zimbabwe and that of the People Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) 
who operated in Namibia and in uKwangali district in particular.   
Jocelyn Alexander and her co-authored book entitled, Violence and memory: one 
hundred years in the dark forest of Matabeleland, provides the study with a useful 
comparative analysis of the unconventional strategies used by the counter insurgency unit 
the District Security Assistance (DSA) which operated in Zimbabwe.29 This helps the 
study to asses the types of unconventional strategies used by the government forces in 
Namibia and the Koevoet unit in particular, to instill fear and confusion among the 
civilians. This work also sheds light on the strategies used by the Rhodesian forces like 
exhibiting photographs of atrocities said to be committed by the guerillas. This will help 
to understand that all these strategies were meant to discredit the guerillas’ credibility 
among the civilians who were the main source of their support. In this way the research 
study thus hopes to contribute to the existing body of literature on the Namibian armed 
liberation struggle.  
                                                             
29J. Alexander et al, Violence and memory: one hundred years in the dark forest of Matabeleland.-Social 
history of Africa (Oxford: James Curry Ltd, 2000), p.148. 
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In addition to the written sources and the oral data collected during my field 
research, my personal experience during the armed liberation struggle and the guerilla 
warfare in the district will form part of my thesis. Living in uKwangali district during the 
1980s when the struggle was very tense up until today, I can argue that the majority of 
the civilians who supported the PLAN fighters immensely are sharing the same 
experience of unhappiness and mistrust of the new dispensation for not acknowledging 
their input. The lack of recognition and acknowledgement of the civilian contribution has 
culminated in a new political shift where citizens are not participating fully in political 
activities as they did during the 1989 election campaign. A recent political party formed 
in Kavango this year 2008, eighteen years after independence, reflects that a sense of 
marginalization has been growing among the civilians of the Kavango region.  
Throughout my fieldwork, I noticed a sense of silence, disbelief, and mistrust 
developing among certain individuals interviewed. Inadequate redistribution of state 
resources are among the key aspects lacking in the district. The promised infrastructural 
development which was the gospel during the 1989 political campaign, has not yet been 
implemented and achieved. For example, the tarred road linking Rundu and Nkure-nkuru 
is the current key aspect used by political figures during the election campaign in 
uKwangali claiming that once they are voted in the office, the road will be constructed 
which has been the case since independence. These are tangible gains which some 
individuals are expecting from the state to reward their tireless contribution.  
Thus one must not forget that uKwangali was one of SWAPO’s strongholds 
(more details on this later in the chapters). As one informant said, we were well known 
and were visited on a regular basis by PLAN cadres for food and other logistic needs 
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during the period of the armed struggle. Thus he claims that their assistance was just 
needed during the difficult days. People used to sacrifice their goods and put their lives at 
risk to provide food and other basic needs, which was very dangerous. People’s lives 
were put at stake by the South African forces, some lost their property, their belongings 
and loved ones, or they were abused physically and verbally by the repressive forces in 
the process. The same informant further stated that now that “they” got what they wanted 
(Independence), we are completely forgotten.  
This revelation implies that the contribution of the inhabitants in the district 
during the selected period of the armed struggle is not rewarded. I can contend that the 
above revelation is correct simply because the district under research, though deeply 
affected by the war, has been one of the most marginalized areas in Namibia since 
Independence. Eighteen years after independence the area still uses gravel roads with few 
amenities or facilities. It can be argued that civilians in the research area are being denied 
their postcolonial citizenship rights. Thus civilians are still living with their fate of 
unrewarded deeds and memories about the warfare which took place in the district.  
Though most of the interviewees boast of their tremendous contribution 
throughout their narratives, a sense of marginalization by the SWAPO led government 
does not heal the fate of the affected civilians of uKwangali. The striking element in most 
of the accounts is that the inhabitants have been forgotten, which is why the research 
topic reads as ‘a forgotten war zone’ in the historiography of Namibia. Thus the notion of 
memory as a source of information will be relevant to this study to help fill the lacuna 
prevailing in the existing literature of the Namibian liberation struggle.   
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Chapter outline  
The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One concerning the reactions of the 
Traditional Authorities towards SWAPO and the South African regime, provides the 
geographical position of the research study. The chapter looks at the historical 
background of the Odendaal Commission that was launched on 11 September 1964, and 
outlines its recommendations in respect of Kavango. The chapter examines the 
administrative activities of the South African regime in the Kavango region as from the 
1970s, and how it aimed to impose control over the uKwangali district. The Kavango 
Legislative Council borne out of the Odendaal Commission’s recommendations will be 
looked at to determine the position of the traditional authorities of Kavango and of 
uKwangali district.  
Given the historical background of the South African colonial administration of 
Kavango, this chapter will also analyse the reactions of the Traditional Authorities 
towards SWAPO and the South African regime which imposed its colonial 
administration. The social and political impact of the South African regime and 
administration on the life of the inhabitants in Kavango will be examined in this chapter. 
 
While Chapter One deals with Odendaal Plan with its recommendations and 
implications in respect of Kavango, Chapter Two provides a historical background of 
SWAPO activities in Kavango in the late 1960s and late 1970s. A detailed analysis of the 
political dynamics between the civilians of uKwangali district and the South African 
authorities during the liberation war in the eighties, seeks to address the specific problems 
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which the local VaKwangali communities had to deal with in relation to the South 
African authorities during the liberation struggle. The security and safety of the civilians 
in the district will be looked at and how the struggle affected the inhabitants politically, 
socially and economically. Specific references will be devoted to the impact the political 
struggle had on the inhabitants, and the political conflicts which prevailed in the district 
since the people were exposed to various political and military groupings which were 
fighting for the common goal of independence.  
 
Chapter Three provides an account of the militarization of Namibia under South 
African rule from the 1970s, and of the Kavango and uKwangali in particular. The 
chapter looks at the military situation which led to the declaration of the area as a war 
zone by the South Africans, with the intensification of activities of the South West 
African Territory Forces (SWATF) and Koevoet units until 1989. The impact of the 
South African conventional and unconventional military strategy on the lives of the 
civilians will be analyzed with reference to the liberation struggle.  
 
The effects of the establishment of military bases namely Musese (905 Battalion), 
Nepara (55 Battalion) Nkure-Nkuru and Mauni (Battalion 906), in their attempt to 
combat SWAPO activities will be discussed in this chapter. The question of sexual 
violence in relation with the South African military forces towards women will be 
addressed.  In conclusion the chapter will look at both the success and failures of the 
South Africa’s military occupation of the selected territory. 
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While Chapter Three discussed more conventional military tactics in Kavango, 
this chapter explores the unconventional tactics of the SADF in particular, and the 
dynamics of the daily relationship between civilians and the security forces and civilians 
and SWAPO. This chapter seeks to analyze the political relationship which existed 
between the inhabitants of uKwangali district toward the South African military forces 
(SADF and Koevoet) and the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) with 
its military wing PLAN.  
The chapter looks at how the selected area was affected by individuals who 
collaborated with these different military forces. It describes how the people in 
uKwangali district coped with the challenges from each side and how this changed over 
time. The unconventional strategies imposed on the civilians, especially by the South 
African military forces to destroy the positive image of SWAPO, will be examined in 
detail. Chapter Four will assess the effectiveness of SWAPO’s strategies to maintain and 
extend its support base among civilians. A section dealing with the radio interviews of 
the three chiefs in Kavango on the political turmoil of 1989 will show just how 
complicated their position was in relation to the interim regime during the final period of 
the liberation struggle, as the situation intensified.  
Chapter Five looks at the transition period and the United Nations supervised 
election of 1989. The activities of SWAPO as a political party in Kavango and in 
uKwangali district will be analyzed. The chapter sheds light on the political activities 
between SWAPO, DTA and other political parties prior to the 1989 elections.  A section 
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dealing with photographs and posters as the sources of mobilization and campaign by the 
political parties form part of Chapter Five. The role of the students militants group 
NANSO which was the backbone of SWAPO during the 1989 election campaign will be 
looked at here. This chapter provides an insight into the election process of 1989 with the 
political parties which participated in the election. The final part of the chapter provides 
an analysis of the election results obtained by each political party in Kavango. 
 
Despite outlining the critical analysis of the main arguments of the mini-thesis, it 
is important in the conclusion of the study to assess the historical memories left behind 
by the Odendaal Commission. The complexities of the position of the Traditional 
Authorities, the body within the Kavango legislative structure, will determine the 
direction taken by the five oxen in Kavango. The proverb of five oxen refers to the 
inability of the five chiefs of Kavango (created by the Legislative Council) to unite 
together or take a collective stand to oppose new laws imposed on them as the situation 
intensified as the 1989 elections drew near.  
 
Finally, the impact of the armed liberation struggle and the South African military 
forces on the life of the civilians will be summarized. Conclusions will be drawn about 
their contribution towards Namibian independence, the violence imposed on them and 
their unrewarded contributions to the country’s independence, in order to highlight the 
psychological and emotional grievances of the inhabitants concerning their hitherto 
undocumented and largely unacknowledged living memories of the war. 
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                                                           CHAPTER ONE 
THE REACTION OF THE TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES TOWARDS SWAPO 
AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME 
Introduction 
Chapter One starts by sketching out the geographical position of the uKwangali district of 
the Kavango, a ‘forgotten war zone’. The chapter then looks at the administrative 
activities of the South African regime in Kavango as from the 1970s, and how it aimed to 
impose control over the uKwangali district. Given the historical background of the 
colonial administration of Kavango, Chapter One examines the position of the Traditional 
Authorities who were integrated into the Kavango Legislative Council as councilors and 
ministers. The Traditional Authorities were the chiefs, headmen and individuals who 
were co-opted on an ethnic basis between 1966-1989 to promote and serve the interest of 
the interim government in South West Africa (Namibia) in the northern declared 
homelands of Ovamboland, Kavangoland and Caprivi.  
  The chapter sheds light on the social and political implications of the Odendaal 
Plan, through which the Traditional Authorities co-opted into the Kavango Legislative 
Council were used to implement the envisaged laws and policies set by South Africa. It 
provides an in-depth analysis of the Kavango Legislative Assembly structure where 
Traditional Authorities were caught in between the South African military regime and the 
nationalist pressure, spearheaded by SWAPO, both inside and outside Kavango. The 
strategies introduced by the South African regime to counter attack PLAN guerillas 
operations in uKwangali district will be assessed. The reaction of the Traditional 
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Authorities towards the South African regime and PLAN will be analyzed as well. The 
chapter also looks at the interactions between the inhabitants of uKwangali and both the 
South African Defence Force (SADF) and PLAN. The analysis of this interaction will 
allow us to draw some conclusions concerning the political position of the Traditional 
Authority of uKwangali district. 
 
Geographical position of uKwangali district 
Geographically uKwangali30 district is situated approximately seventy 70 kilometers west 
of Rundu along the Kavango River. From the east the district shares a boundary with the 
Mbunza district. From Ntara the boundary stretches southwards up to Mururani and from 
Mururani the boundary stretches northwest up to Bravo.31 In the west, the district shares a 
regional boundary with the former Ovamboland from where the boundary stretched 
northwards up to Katwitwi, linking the district with the Kavango River which forms the 
national border dividing Namibia from Angola (see Appendix 1: Map of uKwangali).  
           The inland areas of uKwangali were less populated during the early 1970s. This 
was due to the shortage of water for human consumption. Consequently most of the 
inhabitants in uKwangali district settled along the Kavango River. During the early 
seventies there was only one sandy road network which connected the inland of 
                                                             
30 Ukwangali is a district located in the western part of the Kavango region which shares the Kavango river 
in the north as a national border with Angola and a regional boundary in the west with the former 
Ovamboland which was the main war zone as from 1966-1989. 
31 Bravo is a name of a settlement area for the San (Bushman) community in uKwangali.  
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uKwangali from Nkure-nkuru via Thinsabiz to Tsumeb. The main highway was a gravel 
road which linked Rundu and Mpungu mission station in the western Kavango. The 
infiltration of PLAN combatants in the late 1970 and early 1980s gave the impetus to 
some form of infrastructural developments like roads which linked the area with the 
former Ovamboland, enabling the South African military forces to move between 
Kavango and Ovamboland during the 1980s to execute their military operations. The 
geographical position, where Kwangali district and Kavango region are close to the main 
theatre of war without being the main centre, helps to explain why this is a ‘forgotten 
war’ in the bigger national historiography.  
 
The Odendaal Plan in Namibia 
The South African colonial administration took control over South West Africa 
(Namibia) after World War 1 in 1918. After the 1948 election victory by the National 
Party, the South African government started plans to try and annex South West Africa as  
a fifth province, but subject to the conditions of the mandate. Under the terms of the  
League of Nations mandate, the South African mandatory administration was expected to 
prepare the territory for self-determination and to promote the material well-being and 
social progress of the inhabitants.32   
The victory of the National Party in South Africa in 1948 led to the introduction 
of the homeland policy which had at its core the separation of Africans from non-
                                                             
32IDAF, Apartheids Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation (London, IDAF, 1982), p.5. 
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Africans, and Africans from Africans on ethnic lines. After the National Party election 
triumph in 1948, South Africa changed its political agenda and this saw new measures 
introduced by the elected government which were extended into South West Africa 
(Namibia). This led to the introduction of the Bantustan or homeland system for black 
inhabitants of South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia) as part of the policy of 
Apartheid.33 These territories were established for the purpose of concentrating members 
of designated ethnic groups, attempting to make each one of these territories ethnically 
homogenous as the basis for creating autonomous nation states for the different black 
ethnic groups.34 This period experienced major changes in legislation to facilitate the 
management of issues pertaining to land, political control, forced removal, segregation 
and economic control in South West Africa (Namibia).  
It should be noted that during the late 1950s traditional and national leaders in 
Namibia were sending petitions to the United Nations lobbying for the end of South 
African colonial rule. For example in 1958 Toivo Ya Toivo sent a tape recorded petition 
to Mburumba Kerina who was based in the United States, this petition caused quite a 
sensation at the United Nations.35 This was followed by the visit of Sam Nuyoma to the 
UN in 1960 to petition on the increased harassment and acts of intimidation by South 
African rule. The Ovambo People Congress (OPC) which was a labor organization 
formed by Toivo ya Toivo in 1957 was later change to the Ovamboland People’s 
Organization (OPO) in 1958. On 19 April 1966, OPO was renamed to the South West 
                                                             
33H.A. Nambadi, The Kavango Legislative Council 1970-1979: A critical analysis (MA thesis, University 
of the Western Cape, 2007), p.32. 
34H. A. Nambadi, The Kavango Legislative Council 1970-1979: A critical analysis (MA thesis University 
of the Western Cape, 2007), p.32. 
35A.T. Moleah, Namibia: the struggle for liberation (Wilmingtown: Dissa press, 1983), p.98.  
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African People’s Organization (SWAPO) which then launched the armed struggle.36 The 
central objective was that of liberating all the Namibian people from colonial oppression 
and exploitation and to that end the organization was broadened into a national united 
front.37         
The evolution of the Odendaal Commission coincided with political 
developments and tensions around SWAPO in Namibia in the 1960s, which led to 
international pressure on South African colonial rule over Namibia.38 In line with its 
policy of segregation, the South African authorities went ahead to implement their 
racially segregated policies in which a much more intensified system of indirect rule and 
migrant labour was introduced to exploit the local inhabitants for the benefit of the white 
settlers of South African and German origin in South West Africa. The Promotion of 
Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959 made provision for the extension of considerable 
powers to the different Bantustan territorial authorities of each of the African 
homelands.39 In addition, the government used the Bantustans to cater for the commuter 
migrants from the Bantustans to the working places and back. The government used the 
Bantustans as a mechanism to control and direct labour supplies.40 
 
In September 1962 the State President of South Africa appointed a Commission 
of Enquiry into South West African affairs. The Commission was specifically tasked to 
                                                             
36A.T. Moleah, Namibia: the struggle for liberation (Wilmingtown: Dissa press, 1983), p.100. 
37Ibid,p.100. 
38 K.M. Likuwa, ‘Rundu, Kavango: A case study of forced relocation in Namibia, 1954-1972’ (unpublished 
MA thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2005), p. 29. 
39Ibid, p.33. 
40Ibid, p.33. 
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‘investigate the economic, social, political and moral well beings of the South West 
Africans and to make recommendations for implementations’.41 The terms of reference of 
the Commission clearly stipulated that whatever was envisaged in the recommendations 
was in line with the South African government planned Bantustans.42 
The commission had two important terms of reference: 
1. Having regard to what has already been planned and put into practice, to enquire 
thoroughly into further promoting the material and moral welfare and the social 
progress of the inhabitants of South West Africa, and more particularly its non-
white inhabitants, and to submit a report with recommendations on a 
comprehensive five-year plan for the accelerated development of the various non-
white groups of South West Africa, inside as well as outside their own territories, 
and for the further development and building up of such native territories in South 
West Africa. 
 
2. With a view to this investigation, the attention of the Commission is particularly 
directed to the task of ascertaining–while fully taking into consideration the 
background, traditions, and habits of the Native inhabitants–how further provision 
should  be made for the social and economic advancement, effective health 
services, suitable education and training, sufficient training, sufficient 
opportunities for employment, proper agricultural, industrial and mining 
                                                             
41J. B. Diescho, ‘A critical Evaluation of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs’ 1962-1963’(MA dissertation, University of Fort Hare, 1983), p.54. 
42J.B. Diescho,‘ A critical Evaluation of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs’ 1962-1963’(MA dissertation, University of Fort Hare, 1983), p.56. 
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development in respect of their territories, and for the best form of participation 
by the Natives in the administration and management of their own interests.  
 
3. The Commission is empowered to investigate any other matter which in its 
opinion maybe of importance in this connection, including the financial 
implications and the manner in which any appropriation of funds should take 
place.43 
 
The Commission in its report recommended that the local people be divided and 
administered into ten (10) designated areas, whilst one homeland was to be allocated to 
the Rehoboth Basters, a coloured population respectively.44 These areas later became 
homelands for the Africans in South West Africa. As from 1970 onwards, three northern 
homelands were granted self-government.45 In the report, the Commission also stated that 
the Africans (excluding the whites) were initially and culturally divided into indigenous 
groups. The creation of the homelands cordoned Namibians into ethnic groups and was 
meant to prevent any unauthorized contacts with other ethnic groups.46 The division of 
the local people into ten homelands served to suit the South African policy of ‘divide and 
rule.’  
                                                             
43 J.B. Diescho,‘ A critical Evaluation of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs’ 1962-1963’(MA dissertation, University of Fort Hare, 1983), p.57. 
44The Act set the following areas for the exclusive occupation of the different native nations: Damaraland 
(Damaras), Hereroland (Hereros), Kaokoland (Himbas), Kavangoland (Kavango) Eastern Caprivi 
(Caprivians), Ovamboland (Owambo) and any other area reserved and set apart for the exclusive use of and 
occupation by natives as recognized by the South African State President, See the  National Library of 
Namibia, Windhoek, the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations of South West Africa Act 
No 54 of 1968, pp 831-832. 
45 These were Ovamboland, Kavangoland and Eastern Caprivi. 
46H. K. Angula, The two thousand days of Haimbodi Ya Haufiku (Namibia: Gamsberg MacMillan 
Publisher, 1990), p.61.  
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  The Commission also recommended that an executive council be constituted 
which would consist of all the Chiefs in the Kavango and members elected by the 
Legislative Council.47 The creation of the Legislative Council was therefore seen as a tool 
through which the South African regime would implement all the Odendaal Commission 
plans.48 In accordance with the Native Nations of South West Africa Act No 54 of 1968, 
different homelands were set up for the different native nations of South West Africa. 
 
In respect to the Kavango, the Odendaal Plan created five separate ethnic units 
namely vaKwangali, Mbunza, Sambyu, Gciriku, and Hambukushu. Each ethnic group 
had a hereditary chief in whom authority over his people was vested.49 The power of the 
five authorities in the Kavango territory was therefore vested in the five Chiefs, and in the 
reserve area in the headmen.50  The Kavango Legislative structure under the apartheid 
regime of South Africa had a political impact whereby the local people were used to 
serve the interests of South Africa. The government endorsement of the Odendaal 
Commission recommendation indicated that South Africa intended to implement its 
‘divide and rule’ policy in South West Africa. 
                                                             
47 The recommendation as summarized from the thesis of Diescho, ‘The Odendaal Commission in respect 
of Kavango”, p. 57. 
48K.M. Likuwa, Rundu, Kavango: A case study of forced relocation in Namibia, 1954-1972 (unpublished 
MA thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2005), p. 32. 
49 Recommendations of the Odendaal Commission in respect of the Kavango territory report of 1963, p.77. 
50 In 1962, The South African government appointed the Odendaal Commission to investigate the welfare 
of the South West African inhabitants. The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South 
West Africa Act No.54 of 1968 was based on the Commission’s Report and it set up the various Bantustans 
for the different ‘native peoples’ in South West Africa. The Act set up different homelands for the various 
population groups in South West Africa. The homelands were to be administered by Legislative Councils 
and all enactments made by these Legislative Councils required the approval of the State President of South 
Africa.  
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The Kavango Legislative Council  
The Kavango Legislative Council was one of the Legislative Councils established in 
accordance with the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations of South West 
Africa Act No 54 of 1968, to administer one of the ‘native nations’, in  South West 
Africa.51 Thus Kavango Homeland was declared a self-governing territory in 1970 as 
stipulated in the Act 54 of 1968.  The legislative structures which sought self-government 
in the declared homelands in particular the former Ovamboland, Caprivi and 
Okavangoland (as Kavango was previously named), had social and political implications 
where the Traditional Authorities in the homelands were used as administrators to 
implement the Acts and policies of the South African regime.   
 A clause in the Odendaal Commission recommendation which legitimized South 
Africa power to incorporate Namibia as its fifth province and reaffirmed South Africa’s 
right to administer the territory as an integral part of South Africa, aimed to prepare its 
way to apply and intensify its controversial policy of separate development in Namibia.52  
In order to legitimize these objectives, the colonial administration started to pave 
the way, establishing Legislative Councils countrywide which were pre-dominantly 
administered by the local traditional leaders who were government-paid councilors and 
ministers. The question which one needs to ask is:  were the traditional leaders who were 
co-opted to serve as councilors and ministers capable of understanding and 
comprehending the content and clauses of the Acts which were passed and discussed 
                                                             
51H. A. Nambadi, The Kavango Legislative Council 1970-1979: A critical analysis (MA thesis, University 
of the Western Cape, 2007), p. 32.  
52J. B.  Diescho, A critical Evaluation of the Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs’1962-1963(MA dissertation, University of Forte Hare, 1983), p. 54.  
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during their legislative proceedings? The incorporation of South West Africa (Namibia) 
into South Africa was aimed at minimizing the influence of SWAPO within the Kavango 
population as much as possible.  
Apart from the Ovambo Homeland which was set up in 1968 and attained its self 
governing status in May, 1, 1973, the Kavango Homeland set up in 1970 attained self-
governing status on May 9, 1973.53 This was the first step towards the territory’s self 
governance in 1973. It must also be noted that all the motions and Acts which were 
tabled and discussed during the legislative proceedings were dictated and approved by the 
South African regime in Pretoria (South Africa). The first cabinet of the Kavango 
Legislative Council comprised five ministries, for which each member was representing 
the interests of the five ethnic groups in Kavango.54 The members of the Legislative 
Council were drawn mainly from the ranks of the traditional leaders, Chiefs, and 
headmen, religious figures, ministers from the Roman Catholic and Evangelical Lutheran 
Church alike.55   
 
  The influence of SWAPO’s activities such as recruiting people from the region, 
spreading the gospel of liberating the country which started expanding nation wide are 
among the main reasons why traditional leaders who were the backbone of each 
indigenous community were co-opted preferably to serve in the interim government 
                                                             
53 H.A. Nambadi, ‘The Kavango Legislative Council 1970-1979: A critical analysis’ (MA thesis University 
of the Western Cape, 2007), p. 32. 
54M. Fumanti, ‘Youth, Elites and Distinction in a Northern Namibia Town’ (Unpublished PhD thesis 
submitted to the University of Manchester, 2003), p. 67.  
55M. Fumanti, ‘Youth, Elites and Distinction in a Northern Namibia Town’ (Unpublished PhD thesis 
submitted to the University of Manchester, 2003), p. 67. 
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under the Kavango Legislative structure, with the hope of destroying the political impact 
of SWAPO within Kavango region. The interim government was an effort by the South 
African regime to construct an internal, ethnically-based, moderate political grouping led 
in succession by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (1978-1980), the Council of 
Ministers (1980-1983) the Multi-Party Conference (1983-1985) and finally the 
Transitional Government of National Unity (1985- 1989).56 Thus the traditional leaders 
of the three northern declared homelands and in particular of the Kavango served in the 
above interim regime structures.   
  As a political strategy to break down unity among the local inhabitants, the local 
traditional leaders co-opted on an ethnic basis were used as administrators to promote the 
South African interim government in Namibia. Traditional Authorities were thus used as 
colonial tools to administer and implement developmental programs within their 
respective tribal areas. Most of the laws and Acts which were passed only served the 
interest of South African colonial rule. An example is the Group Areas Acts of 1950 that 
was meant to ensure that the different racial areas were easy to control and seal off in 
case of riot eruption.57 The Amenities Acts of 1953 was established to enforce social and 
ethnic segregation in public amenities such as transport, cinemas, restaurants and sport 
facilities.   
  As part of the South Africa ideology of divide and rule, the implementation of the 
Native Nations Act, No. 54 of 1968 was the creation of an ethnic entity whose people  
                                                             
56 L. Dobell, SWAPO’s struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: war by other means (Switzerland: P. Schlettwein 
Publishing, 2000), p.69. 
57 H. A. Nambadi, ‘The Kavango Legislative Council 1970-1979: A critical analysis’ (MA thesis, 
University of the Western Cape, 2007), p. 32. 
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would advance from ‘simple tribal administrative structure’ to self-government.58 The 
level of the political understanding of the traditional leaders which prevailed during this 
period can be one factor why the traditional leaders in the region were unable to take a 
stand as to whether to disobey the orders given by the authorities or to implement them. 
This can be attributed to the level of education among some of the traditional leaders who 
were co-opted and the structure of the proceedings which only empowered them to 
endorse and approve whatever was given to them. The most important factor was the 
Native Nations Act, No. 54 of 1968 which prohibited them from engaging in any 
politically-related matters.    
 
The social and political implications of the government based on the 
Odendaal Commission  
The social implications of the governmental decision on the Odendaal Plan were the 
separation of all the Namibian people on ethnic and racial lines. These implications also 
emerge in the development of infrastructures and agricultural sector which were 
developed on ethnic bases.  Tribal Offices and secondary schools were built in every 
tribal area of the region, and the tribal offices served as the main centre where tribal 
matters were discussed and settled. The tribal offices had a hall, court room and a cell 
where all those convicted of committing crimes were tried, punished and sentenced 
according to their offences. In each ethnic group an agricultural sector was set up which 
                                                             
58D. Soggot, Namibia: The Violent Heritage (London: Rex Collings, 1986), p. 35. 
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was the backbone of the inhabitants’ economy. This led to the establishment of the 
Agricultural Projects at Musese in uKwangali, Kapako and Sia in Mbunza, Vhungu-
Vhungu in Sambyu, Shitemo in Gciriku and Shadikongoro in Mbukushu. 
 
  In every ethnic group a secondary school was built and named after a tribal chief. 
For example Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School in uKwangali, was named after the 
late chief Kandjimi Murangi. Leevi Hakusembe School in Mbunza was named after the 
late Leevi Hakusembe, Maria Mwengere of Sambyu gave her name to a cultural centre 
and later the Secondary school in Sambyu, Linus Shashipapo School in Gciriku was 
named after the late chief Linus Shashipapo and Max Makushe Secondary School in 
Mbukushu was named after the late chief Makushe.  
 
  Although interactions among these ethnic groups used to take place, the motives 
behind these developments were that of separating ethnic groupings from interacting with 
each other and to maintain their ethnic status. Apart from Afrikaans which was a medium 
of instruction in schools, each ethnic group was encouraged to practice their culture and 
languages. This was one of the strategies to break down communication between ethnic 
groupings which were confined in their respective homelands. 
  In the Kavango region, the implications of the Odendaal Plan had ethnic 
hallmarks which can be witnessed even today. If one visits the region a sense of division 
on ethnic lines created by the Odendaal plan can be detected. This means that people in  
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uKwangali speak ruKwangali and people in Mbunza speak ruMbunza which is similar to 
ruKwangali, the Sambyu speak ruSambyu and the Gciriku speak ruGciriku while the 
Hambukushu speak Thimbukushu. These legacies of the Odendaal Plan also developed to 
an extent that even inter-marriages between these five ethnic groups to a certain degree 
were not encouraged. It was rare to get a Thimbushu speaking person who lived in 
uKwangali before independence. This means that freedom of movement and association 
were not allowed even at the ethnic level.  In most cases people were encouraged upon 
completion of their school to work in their respective tribal areas. These were all in line 
with the South African ideology of apartheid and divide and rule.   
  Apart from tribal offices and secondary schools which were built in each 
designated ethnic area, agricultural extension offices were built in each ethnic group 
which served as the centre where the inhabitants obtained information regarding 
agricultural developments. The tribal offices were used as centers where tribal leaders 
met regularly to discuss issues of tribal concern. Under this pretext tribal leaders in each 
established homeland were used as tools to apply and implement the South African 
system of administration similar to the one which was used in South Africa. 
 
The reaction of Traditional Authorities toward the South African 
regime  
Before 1970, Traditional Authorities in Kavango mainly rested with the five hereditary 
chiefs of the five ethnic units. From the data collected during my oral interviews, 
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informants narrated different accounts about the relationship which prevailed between the 
Traditional Authorities and the South African regime. Gabriel Munguya stated that some 
traditional leaders who did not have any political knowledge of South African ideology 
tended to passively implement the South African colonial rule.59 In addition because they 
were co-opted in according to the Act No.54 of 1968 to serve in the different ethnic 
Legislative Councils, some individual members of the community claimed that it was a 
means of making a living or source of income (employment) for those that were in the 
Councils, as indicated by Nathanael Sirongo. 
  The position or reaction of the traditional leaders towards the South African 
regime has to be understood in context. Firstly, the Act 54 of 1968 clearly stipulated that 
the chiefs of the different tribes were to be members of the Legislative Councils.60 
Secondly, the fact that they were members of the council had a direct impact on their 
legitimacy and self-governance. Thirdly the Legislative Councils were not allowed to 
discuss issues related to SWAPO as indicated by Kalipa: 
That issue related to SWAPO activities were not allowed to be discussed during 
our proceedings. Though some individuals had knowledge about it, there was not 
any forum were it can be discussed.  Moreover it was not part of the council task 
to discuss political matters. Their task was that of setting new laws and plans as 
                                                             
59 Interview with Gabriel Munguya, Nepara village, uKwangali district, 27July2007.  
60 For discussion see also the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa 
Act No.54 of 1968 was based on the Commission’s Report and it set up the various Bantustans for the 
different ‘native peoples’ in South West Africa. 
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how Kavango should be governed and developed. This included the construction 
of schools, hospitals and nature conservation 61     
The quote by Kalipa is a clear indication that the Acts that were implemented did not 
allow them to discuss any politically related issues especially regarding SWAPO. 
Nathanael Sirongo a retired reverend of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia 
(ELCIN) and a member of the Council in 1973 explained that:  
The political doctrine in the council was that of creating a complex division 
among ethnic group. No political agenda/motions were allowed in all our 
proceedings. Though members of the council were aware of the impacts of the 
system of administration in the legislative councils which was in line with South 
Africa policy of apartheid, they did not have any forum to raise these issues.62  
The above quotations prompted members of the council not to react negatively towards 
the South African colonial administration in the established Legislative Councils. Thus 
the nature of the proceedings forced Nathanael Sirongo to quit the council and 
concentrate on his calling as a Church leader until his retirement as a pastor. It can be 
argued that the motions which were tabled prohibited any politically related matters being 
discussed during the proceedings.63  
  Those who attempted to raise political issues were expelled from the Legislative 
Councils for reasons known to the South African representative. A practical example of 
                                                             
61 Interview with Lourenz Kalipa Haupindi, a former member of the Kavango Legislative Council Rundu, 
Safari Location, 27 December 2007. 
62Interview with Nathanael Sirongo, Mpungu village, Ukwangali district, 29 July 2007. 
63 Interview with Nathanael Sirongo, Mpungu village, uKwangali district, 29 July 2007. 
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the South African control over the Legislative Council was in 1973 when Chief Alfons 
Majavero of the Hambukushu tribe was expelled from the Legislative Council after being 
suspected of having connections with SWAPO. In addition all the proceedings were 
attended by a representative who used to fly from South Africa (Pretoria) to attend the 
proceedings. 
  However this did not stop the individual members of the Traditional Authorities 
interacting and/or assisting the SWAPO political movement. Though the traditional 
leaders in Kavango did not take a collective decision or motion against the South African 
regime, their reactions were taken according to individual capacity and decision. The 
expulsion of Alfons Majavero of the Hambukushu ethnic group from the council in 1973, 
the meeting between Kalomoh and the two traditional leaders of uKwangali, the visit of 
the chief of uKwangali abroad to meet the former head of state and the resignation of 
Nathanael Sirongo from the Legislative Council are practical examples of indirect 
reactions of the traditional leaders.  
 
  The reactions of the above figures demonstrate that although the law stated one 
thing, some people did react in opposition towards the government wishes in their 
individual capacity. Thus the decision of the chief of uKwangali to visit the former head 
of state clearly indicates that he violated the Act that was in place prohibiting the 
traditional leaders or chiefs from participating in SWAPO political activities.  
Kasoma Paulus a former Koevoet member indicated that though the traditional 
leaders in Kavango were co-opted to serve in the Legislative Council it was difficult to 
 
 
 
 
 40
tell their political affiliation. Koevoet (“crowbar”), was a special unit officially operating 
as part of the South African Police, engaged in counter-insurgency operations and acting 
as an assassination squad against suspected SWAPO supporters.64 In uKwangali Kasoma 
noted that if one analyzes the position of the chief, one can accuse him as a collaborator 
of SWAPO. This was due to the fact that if he was not exemplary, the civilians of 
uKwangali could not have rendered the necessary support to SWAPO fighters.  
 
This was unlike the traditional Queen of the Sambyu, the late Maria Mwengere, 
who used to pronounce herself on the local Kavango radio urging her people not to 
support SWAPO freedom fighters and to report their movements in her district to the 
South African Defence Force (SADF) and Koevoet, the counter-insurgency unit.65 The 
remarks by the Queen of Sambyu according to Karora Erastus prompted Kalomoh the 
PLAN commander designated in Kavango, with some PLAN cadres to visit her at her 
Palace at Sambyu where she was warned to stop destroying the image of SWAPO.66 The 
accounts by the former Koevoet member and a PLAN cadre commander suggest that the 
chief of uKwangali was a SWAPO collaborator.  
Kasoma further asserts that considering the political situation which prevailed in 
uKwangali which was a concentrated war zone, it was difficult for him (the chief) of 
                                                             
64IDAF, Apartheids Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation (London: IDAF, 
1982), p.24.  
65 Archive for Anti-Colonial Resistance and Liberations Struggle (AACRLS) Interview by Aaron Nambadi 
with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to operate in Kavango, Tutungeni, 
Rundu, 13 May 2005. 
66 Interview wit Karora Erastus former PLAN combatants born in uKwangali, Tutungeni, Rundu, 28 
October 2007.     
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uKwangali to publicly show his political affiliation. This can be attributed to the fact that 
as the chief of an ethnic group in a designated homeland, he was expected by the South 
African colonial administration to enforce the South African apartheid policy and rules as 
required by law. Thus to avoid political instability in his district, the chief conducted 
himself in his capacity as the Chief for which power was vested in him to ensure the 
safety and security of the inhabitants of his territory.67  
 
The same applies if he (the chief) could have dedicated himself to the South 
African authorities, a negative relationship could have developed between the chief and 
the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). This according to Kasoma made him 
act neutral. As a chief of a designated ethnic group he was not expected by the South 
African regime to become involved in political matters, but entrusted to lead his people to 
exercise moral and social political authority and maintain civic and social order. 
 
The political interaction between SWAPO, Traditional Authorities and 
the civilians of uKwangali district 
As the struggle for independence gained momentum in the early 1980s the uKwangali 
district became one of the most heavily infiltrated areas both by the People’s Liberation 
Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South African military forces in South West Africa.  
This resulted in South African Defence Forces (SADF) armoured vehicles and personnel 
                                                             
67 Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Donkerhoek Location, Rundu, 24 July 2007. 
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presence in uKwangali increasing tremendously in search of PLAN combatants. The 
presence of these two military forces that of the South African regime and PLAN 
combatants in uKwangali district created a situation in which the inhabitants of the 
district lived in fear every day and night. The forces created a situation were individual 
families in uKwangali had to work out ways to deal with these forces which operated in 
the same district.  
  The relationships between PLAN, traditional leaders and the inhabitants in 
uKwangali were complicated by the presence of the espionage unit called the 
Reconnaissance unit (Recce) which was trained by the South African regime as an 
intelligence services unit which operated as and pretended to be PLAN cadres. This unit 
used AK-47 rifles and uniforms similar to SWAPO’s PLAN.68 The members of this unit 
spoke Oshiwambo languages including Oshikwanyama which was a language mostly 
spoken by the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia.  
  The operation of this unit implicated the inhabitants in uKwangali because people 
were frequently unable to differentiate between the South African forces and PLAN 
cadres. Through this unit the South African army used to disguise themselves as PLAN 
cadres in order to deceive the local people in Namibia.69 Although the strategy created 
confusion among the people it was addressed by PLAN cadres who changed their 
strategy of operation and used combat names which were not known by the South 
                                                             
68 SWAPO Information Bulletin of December 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda: Angola), p.18. 
69 SWAPO Information Bulletin of December 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda: Angola), p.19. 
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African forces in most cases. This made it later easier for the villagers to distinguish 
between the real PLAN fighters and South African reconnaissance units (Recce).     
  During this period it was rare that villagers in uKwangali could spend a day or 
two without being visited by PLAN, SADF or the Koevoet units. This was simply 
because these homesteads were considered to be the only places were PLAN combatants 
were assisted with food and other logistic needs. Apart from the presence of the South 
African military forces in the district in search of their enemies the PLAN fighters, the 
relationship which existed between SWAPO, the traditional leaders and the civilians of 
the uKwangali district at large was good, although it was characterized by a number of 
factors.  
  Kalomoh Ndeulitufa the PLAN combatant who was designated with his men to 
operate in Kavango region and in uKwangali district explains that the first time they 
entered uKwangali district was in 1980 via Wiwi, a village in Mpungu. From district 
Wiwi they proceeded to Katope Komugoro where they split up into smaller units of four 
to five each. A sense of fear could be detected within the homesteads they visited 
throughout their way. He further claims because the people in Kavango region were told 
that PLAN cadres were Terrorists who came to kill them and loot all their belongings, 
this resulted in most peasants in Kavango deserting their villages and fields of mahangu 
(millet) to settle along the riverside.70  
  Kalomoh the PLAN cadres’ designated commander in Kavango region noted that 
when he arrived in uKwangali with his men, people lived in fear as they were affected by 
                                                             
70 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Tutungeni, Rundu, 13 May 2005. 
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South African propaganda that SWAPO were terrorists who came to kill civilians. This 
prompted Kalomoh to schedule a meeting with the senior headman Muranda and Chief 
Sitentu Mpasi in 1983 at Namungundo. At this meeting Kalomoh told the two traditional 
leaders to tell the people that they must not live in fear and to return to their fields and 
livestock. He emphasized that they did not come to kill innocent civilians but rather they 
had come to fight the oppressors (whites).71 The acceptance of the former members to 
attend the meeting is a clear indication that though Muranda was a member of the 
Legislative Council he collaborated with SWAPO.  
  Among the issues discussed with the two ‘traditional leaders’ was that of urging 
the  inhabitants not to live in fear, but to return to their villages and homesteads as PLAN 
cadres did not come with the intention of killing innocent civilians. The statement 
included in the blue print of SWAPO signed by the ‘Chief in Commander, Namibia 
Liberation Army, Dar-es-Salaam’ read: ‘Freedom Fighters must not attack missionaries 
or burn churches in particularly given areas unless they act in self-defence. Freedom 
fighters are strictly forbidden to attack women, children and elderly people and civilians, 
unless the situation constitutes danger and the freedom fighters have to act in self-
defence.72 The outcome of the meeting saw the people of uKwangali returning to their 
villages and starting to co-operate with PLAN cadres. Thus their support in terms of food 
and logistical support was needed for the PLAN cadres to wage their guerrilla warfare.  
The input by the two traditional leaders of uKwangali to motivate the civilians 
clearly suggests that though some of them served in the council, the relationship which 
                                                             
71 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Tutungeni, Rundu, 13 May 2005.  
72 P. Stiff, The Covert War, Koevoet Operations Namibia 1979-1989 (South Africa: Galago, 1991), p.21. 
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developed between PLAN and the traditional leaders of uKwangali was positive. 
According to Kalomoh the traditional leaders of uKwangali especially the two above 
mentioned were helpful and they had sacrificed their lives in the course of Namibia 
independence. He further explains that one has to understand that the political situation 
during this period was strictly dominated by the South African authorities and any one 
who was considering collaborating with SWAPO was arrested and subject to detention 
and torture. Despite all the political threats to which the civilians and some leaders of 
uKwangali were exposed, he (Kalomoh) claimed that these people were most helpful in 
the sense that the tribal Chief Daniel Sitentu Mpasi urged the local people to give 
logistical support.  
  The PLAN commander also noted that if the chief of uKwangali did not 
encourage his people to provide support, it would have been difficult for them (PLAN 
cadres) to execute their guerilla warfare activities in uKwangali.73 It should be 
understood that in waging guerilla warfare, guerilla fighters depended on the local 
support in terms of food and logistical needs. He noted that if the chief of uKwangali was 
in a position of collaborating with the repressive forces it would have been impossible for 
the civilians of his district to render support and would have made it difficult for the 
guerilla warfare to be effective. 
  Thus he reiterated that his men did not experience any problems with the civilians 
in uKwangali and were helped most importantly with food.74  Kalomoh, known by the 
                                                             
73 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Tutungeni, Rundu, 13 May 2005.  
74 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Tutungeni, Rundu, 13 May 2005.   
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combat name Hakushida explains that the people of uKwangali maintained a good 
relationship with PLAN cadres who operated in the district. Though some 
misunderstanding prevailed between certain individuals and PLAN cadres, this was 
addressed in good faith. The relationship which developed with the civilians helps him 
(Kalomoh) during his operation in uKwangali district to execute his plans as a 
commander. It also helped him as a commander to deploy and redeploy his guerilla 
fighters in and out of uKwangali and to execute their combat activities.  
  While Kalomoh acknowledged the support and contribution of the traditional 
leaders of uKwangali, Hilka Leevi a survivor of Cassinga massacre argued that as from 
the early sixties up to the late eighties most of the chiefs in Kavango did not associate 
themselves with political activities. She noted that only certain individual or leaders with 
political knowledge about the armed struggle were able to carry out political activities in 
secrecy. Hilka Leevi recalls that prominent SWAPO activists in the region in the sixties 
were Markus Ihemba and David Ausiku known as Lyangurungunda.75 She noted that it 
was not easy for the traditional leaders in particular the chiefs to be involved in political 
affairs because they were used by the South African colonial administration to serves as 
councilors. This made it difficult for them to collaborate with the PLAN cadres.  
  As noted earlier by Kalomoh, it should be understood that the political situation 
during this period was strictly dominated by the South African authorities and any one 
who was considering collaborating with SWAPO was arrested and subjected to detention 
and torture. Thus the account by Leevi does not mean that all the chiefs in the region 
                                                             
75 Interview with Hilka Leevi, a survivor of Cassinga massacre, Tutungeni, Rundu, 16 December 2007. 
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were unable to associate and help PLAN cadres. The decision of the chief of uKwangali 
who left the country to visit the former head of state in London and later to Zambia 
clearly indicates that some traditional leaders were able to demonstrate their political 
affiliation against the South African government wishes.  
  The decision of the chief of uKwangali who left the country during this period as 
noted above suggests that though the chiefs were used to serve in the Legislative 
Councils, some were not stooges. Thus the political order of the day during this era also 
influenced the relationship of the traditional leader towards SWAPO as a movement and 
its military wing PLAN. As indicated above, the South African forces used the 
reconnaissance counter–insurgency units as an intelligence service, and it must be noted 
that as from 1980, the South African military forces used different strategies to spread 
suspicion amongst and between civilians and against the PLAN combatants.   
For example local inhabitants in the region were bribed with money, and recruited to the 
Army and the Koevoet units to serve as soldiers. The recruitment of the local civilians in 
the above mentioned forces was aimed to created hatred among the civilians themselves 
and to pave the way so that the South African forces could destroy their relationship with 
the PLAN combatants.76 The South African security forces, especially the Koevoet 
members, recruited individual informers in the villages who provided them with 
information about PLAN combatants’ operations and movements in the district, with 
names of individuals who collaborated with PLAN cadres.  
                                                             
76 Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
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According to Kasoma, the South African military strategy of using secret 
informants who were known as ‘spies’ or ‘informers’ who received allowances from their 
employers created tension, mistrust and misunderstanding between PLAN cadres, the 
civilians and the traditional leaders. In most cases those identified as spies were 
discouraged by the PLAN cadres from engaging in such practices and those who did not 
co-operate were assassinated by the PLAN cadres. This led to the assassination of Olavi 
Munango in 1984 at Mpungu village who worked for the Kavango Radio which 
broadcast anti-SWAPO propaganda.77   
As with the spies, individuals who got involved in this practice did not know the 
impact it had on individual lives or the family at large. Those who associated themselves 
were enticed with money by the South African forces to provide information. In most 
cases some individuals got involved to achieve their personal motives and gains. Some 
informers acted in a dual role, whenever the PLAN cadres were within the village they 
connived with PLAN cadres accusing other people of collaborating with South African 
forces. If the SADF forces were in the villages the same individuals were victims of daily 
arrest and detention. In some instances these individuals were apprehended for a day or 
two to give a certain impression to the villagers, while they were in fact informers (spies).  
The implication of being a spy was that once the PLAN cadres learned that one is 
involved in these activities, the possibility of assassination was high. This created fear 
among individuals and pressure to refrain from this service. With children, the Koevoet 
forces used to entice them with sweets, chocolates and biscuits in exchange for 
                                                             
77 © hmmilk “Kavango during the Namibian war of liberation,”http://kavango.info/Voito.htm. accessed on 
2008/03/09. 
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information. This practice is something I experienced and those who did not provide 
information were not given anything. On this basis parents used to know that those who 
were given sweets and biscuits were involved in spying on the PLAN cadres’ movements 
and were discouraged by the parents from engaging in these activities.  
The main implication of informers was that they confined PLAN combatants’ 
collaborators in a difficult situation, making it hard to provide help to PLAN guerillas at 
their own risk. To the Koevoet forces the informers enabled them to crack down on all 
SWAPO supporters and collaborators in the district. Since the informers were well 
trained to execute these dirty practices, when visited by the PLAN fighters they pretended 
to be sympathizers and accused others of being collaborators of the South African 
forces.78 This strategy used by the South African security forces encouraged the PLAN 
combatants to assassinate those caught collaborating with the South African forces.  
 Hence Kasoma known as “Njege” explains that the relationship between 
the traditional leaders of uKwangali and the PLAN combatants who operated in 
uKwangali was good.79 Thus he claims that the influence of the traditional leaders of 
uKwangali over the civilians enabled the PLAN cadres’ presence in the area till the late 
eighties. For the fifteen years Kasoma serve in the Koevoet forces most of their military 
contacts were carried out in uKwangali. On this basis the former Koevoet man argues 
that though some individuals connived with South African forces as spies, the civilians of 
uKwangali and their leaders collaborated with PLAN cadres he believes.  
                                                             
78 Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Donkerhoek Location, Rundu, 24 July 2007. 
79 Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Donkerhoek Location, Rundu, 24 July 2007. 
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In addition Kasoma noted that although the chief of uKwangali acted neutrally, 
one could tell that the chief and his followers in uKwangali were pro-SWAPO 
collaborators. The chief of uKwangali according to Kasoma really sacrificed his life for 
his people.  For example if a person was beaten or his/her crops were destroyed by the 
Koevoet forces, he was not afraid to confront the Koevoet forces and tell them to refrain 
from abusing and mistreating the ordinary civilians.80 The reaction of the traditional 
leaders of uKwangali district clearly suggests that although they were co-opted to serve 
the South African interest, they were not collaborators of the South African regime. The 
chief used to convene meetings at the tribal office at Kahenge with the senior South 
African military forces telling them to stop harassing and intimidating civilians.  
  Though the traditional leaders in Kavango region fell directly under the Bantu 
administration in South Africa, the Chief of uKwangali district demonstrated his political 
status towards SWAPO during this period of the armed struggle. During this period the 
chief of uKwangali took a stand to mobilize the inhabitants in his district to provide 
support of any kind to the PLAN fighters. This support included food, information, 
shelter, medication and any related basic needs.  
  Gabriel Munguya, a nurse at Nepara, noted that the political relationship which 
developed between the traditional leaders of uKwangali and PLAN cadres was in his 
view what motivated the chief of uKwangali to visit the former head of state of Namibia, 
Dr. Sam Nuyoma, to brief him about the political developments in uKwangali and the 
problems his people were experiencing from the South African military forces especially 
                                                             
80Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
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the Koevoet units.81 The decision of the chief to leave the country during the period of 
the armed struggle for Namibia independence demonstrated his political will and loyalty 
towards SWAPO as a political movement.82 
  The visit of Chief Daniel Sitentu Mpasi to Nuyoma abroad contributed to the 
extensive military control of the South African regime in uKwangali. The increased 
infiltration of PLAN combatants in uKwangali in the early eighties had led to the 
establishment of temporary and mobile military bases, apart from the two major bases 
Musese and Nepara, to crack down on PLAN combatants’ infiltration from southern 
Angola into the district.  
  The account by Kalomoh shows that though the people in the Kavango region 
were influenced by the South African propaganda, the people were very helpful and co-
operated with the PLAN combatants. The revelation by the PLAN commander, who 
operated in the area, reflects that the people of uKwangali district under the leadership of 
Chiefs Daniel Sitentu Mpasi conducted themselves in a positive way towards the 
nationalist movement during this period. In this time of hardship some civilians lost their 
lives and property, and some even resigned from teaching for example Eric Hausiku a 
teacher at Gava resigned after being accused by the South African forces of helping 
SWAPO fighters.    
          Kalomoh stated that the visit of the Chief of uKwangali to London and then to 
Zambia defined his position and loyalty to SWAPO.83 The resignation of Reverend 
                                                             
81 Interview with Gabriel Munguya, Nepara village, uKwangali district, 27 July 2007. 
82 Interview with Gabriel Munguya, Nepara village, uKwangali district, 27 July 2007. 
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Nathanael Sirongo from the Legislative Council who was the vice chairperson of the 
proceedings in 1973 suggests that though the position of the members of the Council was 
complicated, some traditional leaders reacted differently and established a good 
relationship with PLAN cadres who operated in the district.  The PLAN cadres were 
treated and perceived as the sons and daughters of the country, as many youths who went 
in exile were mainly from the Mpungu, Simanya and Nkure-nkuru areas in uKwangali. 
 
Conclusion  
South West Africa (Namibia) was a mandated territory under South Africa from 1921, up 
to Namibia’s first democratic election in November 1989.  The Odendaal Plan of 1962 
was aimed at separate development on ethnic grounds. The Odendaal Commission was 
one of the colonial strategies used to control the local inhabitants in each region, which 
affected the uKwangali district as well. Though the Odendaal Plan was developmental 
programme, the Commission did not achieve its intended objective as envisaged by the 
South African colonial administration. The Kavango legislative structure established 
under the apartheid regime in accordance with the Native Act No 54 of 1968 of South 
Africa had a political impact where the local people were used to serve the interest of 
South Africa.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
83Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Tutungeni, Rundu, 13 May 2005.   
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The power invested in the elected and nominated traditional leaders to run the 
political affairs in their territories under the guidance of the South African State President 
and the government was meant to impose direct control over the Legislative Council. The 
rules and laws which were instituted by the Union of South Africa to avoid unauthorized 
matters in the Legislative Council which were deemed to destabilize peace and stability 
were used to neutralize the relationship between the traditional leaders and South African 
regime in the designated homeland. The reactions of the traditional leaders were affected 
by the power of the Native Act 54 of 1968. The act prohibited the traditional leaders from 
discussing any SWAPO related matters. 
  The political developments of the late seventies and eighties in Kavango created a 
vacuum in which the traditional leaders were caught up in between of the two military 
forces, that of SADF and SWAPO in uKwangali district. The infiltration of PLAN cadres 
in uKwangali in the eighties made the district one of the most heavily concentrated areas 
of militarization by the South African forces.   
 The operation of the recce unit complicated the relationship between PLAN 
cadres and the civilians.  This resulted in the presence of these two military forces in 
uKwangali district and created a situation in which the inhabitants of the district lived in 
fear every day and night. Though some traditional leaders were passively persuaded to 
promote the interests of the South African interim government, some leaders reacted 
radically towards the South African envisaged pseudo political agenda. The vulnerability 
of some traditional leaders however meant that their reaction towards the SADF and 
SWAPO varied.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE CIVILIANS OF UKWANGALI 
DISTRICT, SWAPO AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES DURING 
THE EARLY STAGES OF THE LIBERATION WAR  
 
Introduction 
While Chapter One deals with the Odendaal Plan, with its recommendations and 
implications in respect of Kavango, Chapter Two provides a historical background of 
SWAPO activities in Kavango in the 1960s and late 1970s. A detailed analysis of the 
political dynamics of SWAPO which prevailed in Kavango region in general and in 
uKwangali district in particular during the 1980s will be looked in this chapter. The 
impact of the Namibian armed liberation struggle on the district will be analyzed in close 
detail in this chapter. The precarious situation and safety of the inhabitants will be 
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explored to determine the extent to which the struggle affected them socially and 
politically.  
The political dimensions in Kavango region and in uKwangali district 
1966-1989 
From the oral data collected, Nestor Mufenda explains that the activities of the South 
West African People Organization (SWAPO) in Kavango started in the sixties and during 
this period the majority of the people who left the country to join the armed liberation 
struggle were from Ovamboland via Kavango by foot.84 It should be understood that this 
route via uKwangali in Kavango into exile was very long. Thus these people used to pass 
through some community members’ homesteads where they used to be helped with food 
and water, even to stay over until it was safe to travel. During this period contract labor 
used to be recruited at Nkure-nkuru.  
 The migrant labour centre at Nkure-nkuru was the route through which many job 
seekers from Ovambo and Kavango were recruited to work as laborers in the mines in 
Johannesburg.85 This was an opportunity which most of those leaving for exile used. In 
some instances it used to take them a month and days before they went through the 
Nkure-nkuru recruitment centre. It should be understood that during this period the South 
African police were aware of SWAPO activities of recruiting people into exile.  
Thus Mufenda noted that many of the people who left for exile used this route. 
Among those who left the country via this routes whom Mufenda can recall is the late Dr. 
Alpo Mauno Mbamba, in his group he was with Nangolo Mbumba, Nahas Angula the 
                                                             
84 Interview with Nestor Mufenda, Rundu, Kavango Regional Council, 28 December 2007. 
85 Interview with Nestor Mufenda, Rundu, Kavango Regional Council, 28 December 2007. 
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current Prime Minister with others who were from Oshigambo High School in 
Ovamboland. From Rundu this group travelled with migrant labour transport via 
Francistown in Botswana but instead of going to work as migrant workers these people 
opted for exile in neighbouring Zambia and Tanzania.86 The account by Mufenda 
suggests that Kavango area had been a springboard for people journeying to exile during 
the sixties. 
Reading the autobiography of Shityuwete, I966 marked the beginning of the People’s 
Liberation of Namibia (PLAN) infiltration in Kavango region.87 The lack of political 
knowledge of SWAPO among some civilians in Kavango led to the arrest of the PLAN 
cadres who entered Kavango via Rundu, who were later taken to Robben Island as 
political prisoners.  
 
During this period the PLAN cadres’ infiltration in the Kavango took place on a 
secret basis. This was merely due to the fact that only a few people in the district knew 
them, and most did not have any broader political knowledge of SWAPO and its military 
wing PLAN. In addition the thesis by Diescho indicates that in the late sixties a Kavango 
SWAPO supporter and a business man, David Ausiku, nicknamed Lyangurungunda, 
started organizing a political party called “Muzogumwe” meaning “One way forward”.88 
Though the movement was clamped down by the South African police, this marked the 
beginning of political activities of SWAPO in the Kavango. 
                                                             
86Interview with Nestor Mufenda, Rundu, Kavango Regional Council, 28 December 2007.    
87 H. Shityuwete, Never follow the wolf: The autobiography of a Namibian freedom fighter (London: 
Kliptown Books, 1990), p.119-127. 
88 J.B. Diescho, ‘A critical Evaluation of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs’ 1962-1963’ (MA dissertation, University of Forte Hare, 1983), p.48. 
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The question which seeks clarity is why did SWAPO activities in Kavango 
emerge at a smaller scale during the1960s? In answering this question, the following 
aspects need to be considered. Though 1966 mark the beginning of PLAN cadres’ 
infiltration into Kavango their activities were not effective due to the presence of the 
South African security forces in Kavango, the Bantustan homeland policy and the Pass 
Law system operating in Namibia during the period of study.89  
 
The pass laws created a division where people in the Kavango region were unable 
to interact with other people from different ethnic homelands in particular of the North 
and the South where people were highly politically conscious concerning their rights and 
independence. Thus the tight measures of the South African security forces during the 
sixties made it initially difficult for PLAN cadres to penetrate and execute the guerilla 
warfare activities effectively in Kavango. With the Independence of Angola in 1975, this 
resulted in PLAN cadres changing to a new route and starting to infiltrate into the 
Kavango region from Ovambo. 
 
The political movements which started the civil war in Angola in 1975 in which 
the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s military wing, the 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
(FNLA), complicated by the involvement of South Africa and Cuba in the civil war in 
                                                             
89J.B. Diescho, ‘A critical Evaluation of the Odendaal Commission of Enquiry into South West African 
Affairs’  
1962-1963’ (MA dissertation, University of Forte Hare, 1983), p.45. 
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Angola, were among the factors which made it difficult for the local people of Kavango 
to differentiate between SWAPO and the various military forces.90   
The influence of the South African regime’s propaganda about the social 
consequences of communism also contributed to this mistrust towards SWAPO. The 
propaganda by the South African regime referring to SWAPO as a movement not 
representing the entire nation but only that of one ethnic group, the Ovambo, was one of 
the major factors used by the South African regime to influence the inhabitants of 
Kavango.  
The most effective strategy used by the South African regime to spread their 
propaganda to the local people was that of circulating leaflets and cartoons at schools, 
portraying the military inability and weakness of SWAPO leaders in exile to wage 
successful military warfare. The anti-SWAPO, pro-Turnahalle propaganda cartoons and 
images, circulated by the apartheid regime in Namibia during the mid 1980s, were meant 
to destroy the image of SWAPO and its military wing PLAN amongst civilians.91  
 
Karangane Florry, military Force No.87819900,92 explains that the distribution of 
anti-SWAPO leaflets was a measure taken by the South African forces and intelligence 
services to influence the perception of civilians against SWAPO. The former SADF 
member said that this strategy was effective in the sense that it broke down individuals’ 
                                                             
90 M. Fumanti, ‘Youth, Elites and Distinction in a Northern Namibia Town’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
submitted to the University of Manchester, 2003), p.68. 
91 S. Nuyoma, Where others wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nuyoma (London: Panaf Books, 2001), 
p.301-303. 
92 Force No. 8781900, was the identification number which was given to every soldier recruited by the 
South African military regime for identification if one is missing n the battle.   
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hope and morale towards SWAPO.93 A glance at these propaganda leaflets shows how 
SWAPO leaders in exile are portrayed as struggling to get help and war material support 
from the international community, namely Cuba. The most common leaflets which were 
circulated were the ones which show how the former president of SWAPO was begging 
for war materials from Cuba. It can be argued that the politics behind the cartoons was 
that creating confusion among the local civilians to believe that SWAPO was not 
recognized world-wide and did not have any support.  
 
Selima Kadiva, a teacher at Gava, vividly recalls that at first most of the people 
thought that PLAN cadres were FNLA forces from Southern Angola who infiltrated into 
Namibia due to the war which broke out in 1975.94  This was in line with the period when 
the Portuguese deserted Fort Cuangar in Southern Angola opposite Nkure-nkuru in 
uKwangali, when the Portuguese government was toppled by a coup in Lisbon 
(Portugal).95 The arrival of PLAN cadres brought a new political atmosphere among the 
inhabitants of uKwangali district.  
 
During this period the first group of PLAN combatants entered the uKwangali 
district in an unprecedented number in 1978, on a familiarization tour to see the 
geographical location of the region and whether it was suitable for guerilla warfare. The 
second group which entered the district the same year came to inform people who 
                                                             
93 Interview with Flory Karangane, a former member of the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF), 
Force No. 87879900, Otjomuise, Windhoek, 25 January 2008. 
94 Interview with Selima Wayera Kadiva, Gava village, uKwangali district, 24 July 2007. 
95IDAF, Apartheids Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation (London: IDAF, 1982), p. 
64.  
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SWAPO was and the aim of the PLAN combatants, which was that of liberating the 
country from South African colonial occupation, before returning to their military bases 
in southern Angola.96   
One must not forget that SWAPO was regarded as a communist movement and 
some local people in the region were influenced by the South African propaganda about 
the impacts of communism. As mentioned earlier, it must be noted that during this period 
very few people knew about the political objectives of SWAPO in the region, and that the 
movement was formed to represent the masses of the Namibian people.97 Karapo Robert 
who lived at Muparara village since 1973 explains that:  
The first PLAN cadres who come in uKwangali came in February 1978, on this day I 
was at my field of crops cultivating with my family, Bushmen and community 
members who came to help me. Upon learning from Leena Katumbu Mpasi who also 
deserted her house out of fear that there were unknown soldiers at my homestead, I 
left all the people at the field and went back home with one bushman called Kahenge 
to see them.98 Karapo said that upon arriving at my homestead we found a group of 
80 unknown armed men, who were scattered around the water point near my 
homestead. When I arrived at the armed man I was welcome with a question where 
they asked me whether I know them, and I told them that I think they were SWAPO. 
Among them one asked me that people referred to us as having tails, and asked ‘can 
you see it?’ Out of fear I did not respond to the question. After talking to them they 
                                                             
96 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Tutungeni, Rundu, 13 May 2005.  
97IDAF, Apartheids Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation (London: IDAF, 1982), 
p.92. 
98 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Karapo Robert, Muparara village, uKwangali district, 21May 2003. 
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asked me to give them something to eat for which I gave them (Sikundu) the 
vaKwangali traditional soft drink. Among them was one tall man who claims that 
when they used to come at the village with the church youth activities the structure of 
the dam was incomplete. While they were busy chatting, we heard a SADF soldier 
on a motor bike coming. This led the PLAN cadres to disperse for cover in the 
nearby bushes. When PLAN cadres left the scene, I also left to inform the people I 
had left at the field to come back home, upon our arrival, the whole area near my 
homestead was occupied by the SADF armed forces and this left me with no choice 
but  to pronounce myself for identification. This saved our lives otherwise they 
would have shot us.99   
 
The account by Karapo indicates that the arrival of PLAN cadres in uKwangali started as 
early as 1978 and this marked the beginning of PLAN combatant infiltration in 
uKwangali district. With the arrival of PLAN combatants in the region since 1978, the 
first thing was that of mobilizing and educating the local people about the aims and 
objectives of SWAPO as a nationalist movement and the tasks of the PLAN 
combatants.100   
 
Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the PLAN commander who operated in the Kavango region, 
explains that the inhabitants of uKwangali district showed a positive attitude towards 
SWAPO as a movement and contributed to the struggle for independence in many 
                                                             
99Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Karapo Robert, Muparara village, uKwangali district, 21 May 2003. 
100Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005. 
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ways.101 Moreover the political education which they conducted amongst the local people 
helped them to get support from members of the communities, as well as civil servants 
for example teachers, nurses, church leaders especially of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Namibia (ELCIN) which had three main church stations in uKwangali at 
Rupara, Nkure-nkuru, and Mpungu.  
 
The support provided by these people ranged from food, medication, transport 
and logistical assistance.102 This clearly suggests that though the people were influenced 
by the South African propaganda, SWAPO cadres penetrated and established a good 
relationship and interaction. The intensive political relationship and co-operation which 
developed between SWAPO cadres and the inhabitants of the uKwangali during the 
eighties led to the introduction of curfew by South African security forces as a measure to 
control people’s movements because they were regarded as harbouring PLAN 
combatants.  
 
Curfew is a regulation restricting or forbidding the public circulation of the people 
especially requiring people to remain indoors between specific hours usually at night.103 
The implementation of the curfew system had serious social and political implications 
because everyone who was caught travelling after six o’clock p.m. especially those with 
vehicles, were arrested and detained for violating the curfew law. The aim of curfew was 
                                                             
101 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
102 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
103 R. E. Allen, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of current English (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.284. 
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that of cracking down on individuals who were suspected of collaborating with PLAN 
cadres. For those who owned vehicles, once caught travelling after six o’clock, 
everybody in the car was searched and were not allowed to travel until the next day. Even 
when someone was sick people were not allowed to travel after six. If found travelling 
after six such individuals were regarded as PLAN and liable to be shot by the South 
African forces.  
Thus those who owned vehicles were always suspected of transporting and 
supplying PLAN combatants with logistical support and basic needs like food, 
information, money, clothes and batteries for their Radio for communication.104 
Moreover teachers who lived in the interior of uKwangali and owned vehicles became 
victims of the curfew law and were accused of supplying PLAN combatants with 
batteries to enable them to communicate with their military bases in southern Angola.  
In practice, curfew meant that no movement of people was allowed in the region 
after six p.m. For those who resided on the Kavango river banks, they were ordered to 
take their canoes off shore as this was the only mode of transport that was used by the 
PLAN cadres coming into Namibia, and for those leaving the country into exile in 
Angola. The political propaganda used by the South African regime, and the introduction 
of the curfew regulations, clearly illustrate the political dimensions existing in uKwangali 
district during the late 1978 and 1980s with the arrival of PLAN cadres in uKwangali. 
 
                                                             
104 Interview with Kandjimi Willem, Gava village, uKwangali district, 26 December 2007. 
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The social and political impact of the armed liberation struggle on 
civilians  
The most traumatic memories the struggle had on the civilians were the atrocities and 
brutalities committed by the South Africa Defence Force (SADF) and Koevoet members 
who operated in the district. The death of Jonas Hamukwaya a teacher at Namutuntu in 
uKwangali district who was interrogated by the Koevoet members before he died for 
hosting and collaborating with PLAN cadres signifies the worst impact that the struggle 
had on civilians.105 From the oral data collected, inhabitants of uKwangali explain that in 
terms of harassment and brutality the Koevoet members were very harsh on civilians 
using much verbal and physical abuse against civilians as compared with SADF. 
Naingwendje Isack an 80 year-old man who lives at Simanya vividly recalls:  
PLAN combatants used to visit our homestead during the night to avoid being 
seen by their enemies (the SADF and Koevoet forces). They used to tell us 
(civilians) that they come to liberate the country and we must not tell their 
enemies their whereabouts. This resulted that we have dual ways of dealing with 
these forces for example whomever come it was expected that civilians have to 
co-operate, and we always pretended to be a non-supporters of either forces.106  
The quote by Naingwendje suggests that civilians were left without any choice about 
what to do but they had to live with the nature of the situation either during the day or 
night. This resulted that most of the people who collaborated with SWAPO and provided 
                                                             
105 D. Herbstein and J. Evenson, The devils are among us: The war for Namibia (London: Zed Books Ltd, 
1989), p.92. 
106 Interview with Naingwendje Isack, Simanya, uKwangali district, 25 June 2007. 
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assistance to the PLAN combatants then experienced harsh security measures and were 
under strict surveillance and threats. Reading the account by Naingwendje an 80 year old 
man, a sense of fear is highlighted in his narration. This suggests that individuals are still 
living with their traumatic unexplored experience based on the armed struggle which 
prevailed in the district.   
As explained in Chapter One, those individuals caught by the PLAN cadres for 
collaborating with South African forces were assassinated. Though PLAN cadres 
established a good relationship and interaction with some civilians, the indifference 
which prevailed between certain individuals and PLAN cadres led to PLAN cadres 
committing atrocities amongst individual civilians. Although the action of the PLAN 
cadres can be justified in that it was possibly used for self defence purpose only, their 
brutal reaction had greater impacts on the lives of some individuals. These atrocities 
committed by PLAN cadres affected family members mentally and psychologically.  
For example the death of Haingura Surevi Hausiku, who was tied and stabbed 
with bayonets by SWAPO fighters before he died in front of his wife and children at 
Gava, portrays a more brutal strategy use by PLAN insurgents.107 This form of targeted 
violence committed by PLAN cadres was more traumatic in the sense that the victim 
throat was cut with a bayonet knife while the relatives were ordered to see how the act 
was committed. It can be argued that those individuals or next of kin who were exposed 
to these atrocities were traumatized and are still living with this violence exposed to 
                                                             
107 Interview with Flory Karangane, former member of the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF), 
Force No. 87879900, Otjomuise, Windhoek, 25 January 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 66
them. Thus individual families especially women were left with all the household 
responsibilities of looking after the family.  
The armed struggle had a social and political impact on the lives of the civilians 
of uKwangali district. The most frequent problems were the beating, harassments and 
interrogation of ordinary civilians. This led to many people to desert their homesteads, 
leaving their food, livestock, and belongings behind. It should be noted that every 
Koevoet unit which operated in uKwangali had a skilled interrogator and specialist 
exterminators for those who refused to reveal the whereabouts of PLAN fighters.108 The 
situation was that if the civilians supported SWAPO against Koevoet, they got into 
trouble with the Koevoet, and if they supported Koevoet against SWAPO, they got into 
trouble from PLAN fighters. 
Thus those who did not co-operate were subject to the threat of severe brutality 
and even physical abuse orchestrated by the Koevoet units. A sense of pain is articulated 
across all the individuals’ accounts recorded about their experience of the armed struggle 
in uKwangali. For some individuals interviewed, a glance at the photos of Koevoet 
armoured vehicles and dead corpses of PLAN combatants tied on the Casspir in the 
publication by Peter Stiff, evoked a sense of fear among civilians.109  This is in line with 
the arguments by Brison where she says that trauma always takes the person back 
through his/her past experience which was horrible, terrible, very bad or violent.110  In 
                                                             
108 D. Herbstein, & J. Evenson, The devils are among us: The war for Namibia (London: Zed Books Ltd, 
1989), p.73. 
109 P. Stiff, The Covert War, Koevoet Operations Namibia 1979-1989 (South Africa: Galago, 1999), p.138 
& 357. 
110S. J. Brison, Trauma narratives and the remaking of the self, Acts of memory cultural recall in the 
present (Hanover & London, Dartmouth college press, 1999), p.39. 
 
 
 
 
 67
these contexts the testimonies of the civilians of uKwangali give us not only a sense of 
the micro-politics of the time, but also serves as the basis upon which their voices will 
start to be integrated within the national narratives of the Namibian armed liberation 
struggle. 
Hausiku Johanna who lived at Zigizi whose daughter left the country into exile 
explains that all those suspected of collaborating with SWAPO cadres were arrested, 
blindfolded and kept in the Casspir. While blindfolded, the victim was kept in the 
Casspir, driven around wherever they were operating to disorientate him/her the whole 
day, beaten with a rifle butt and threatened to be killed if they were not co-operating.111 
Once he/she has the blindfold removed they would be interrogated by an unknown officer 
who acted very roughly.   
The strategies imposed against suspected SWAPO collaborators were very harsh 
and affected civilians’ social lives. Beatings by Koevoet were at times fatal especially 
if/when (the soldiers) discovered that PLAN guerillas had been in the vicinity of the 
village. This was a common practice by the Koevoet forces. One can conclude that they 
used to enjoy beating civilians. Intimidation, assaults and detention were the major 
strategies the Koevoet units used to extract information among civilians. 
Hausiku Johanna recalls that one day she was visited by the South African Police 
(SWAPOL) and she was told that her daughter who went into exile died in a military 
contact between South African forces and SWAPO fighters (which was not true), for 
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which they declared a mourning ceremony.112 The Koevoet and army units regularly 
patrolled villages around uKwangali visiting each homestead with their armoured 
vehicles and personnel especially during searches and raids.113 During their searches and 
raids, civilians were threatened with being shot, beaten and detained. Threats of using 
explosive devices and other forms of violence were the common practice during 
questioning of the supposed SWAPO supporters, or were just used at random.114 I can 
contend that the cruel behaviors of the Koevoet forces are something of which I have 
direct experience. As mentioned earlier civilians live with tension, fear and anxiety every 
day. 
One day I was slapped by one Koevoet member who looked drunk. On this day 
my parents were not around. Firstly when they (the Koevoet) arrived I ran to hide at the 
San (Bushman) huts nearby our homestead but I was singled out in the hut by one 
Koevoet member and taken back home where I was given some slaps before they 
departed.115 Thus most of the people who lived in the operational areas, of which 
uKwangali was one, suffered from brutal attacks and other forms of traumatic violence 
which were inflicted upon them. The most degrading and traumatic form of violence was 
that of exhibiting dead corpses of PLAN cadres to civilians by the Koevoet forces.116 
                                                             
112 Interview with Hausiku Johanna, Zigizi village, uKwangali district, 25 July 2007. 
113M.O. Hinz & N. Gevers, ‘Koevoet versus the people in Namibia’ in Journal fur Entwicklungspolitik 4, 
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114M.O. Hinz & N. Gevers, ‘Koevoet versus the people in Namibia’ in Journal fur Entwicklungspolitik 4, 
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115 Personal experience on the assaults inflicted on civilians in uKwangali district during the years 1983-
1988.   
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Bodies of PLAN insurgents killed during operations, were tied to the sides of the wheels 
and at the back of a Casspir and people were invited to “see their SWAPOs”.117   
In 1983 one PLAN cadre was killed at Ngururasi 10km east of Muparara village, 
and upon the arrival of the Koevoet at our homestead, everybody in the house was 
ordered to view the corpse. This was my first time to see a dead person, while I was still 
11years of age.118 This signifies that the way the Koevoet conducted their operations 
affected everyone irrespective of gender and age. The spectacle of exhibiting the corpse 
of a PLAN cadre killed during operations certainly had a traumatic effect on civilians. 
This event is still fresh in my memory though it happened 25 years ago when I was 11 
years of age. This exhibiting of the corpses of PLAN combatants to civilians was a 
common practice by the Koevoet forces. 
The most common assaults were beatings where a young white Koevoet member 
was typically seen humiliating an old man in front of his wife and children. These 
ruthless acts of the Koevoet forces were such that even the mere sound of an armoured 
vehicle in the vicinity of the village would scare the people with a fear of assault.  
During the Koevoet operations, these units used to drive their military vehicles 
through the fields, crushing crops and causing a loss of agricultural production.119 In 
some cases, after arriving with their armoured vehicles, the Koevoet forces would enter a 
house shouting and slapping people and referring them as collaborators of SWAPO. In 
                                                             
117 Ibid, p. 46. 
118 Personal experience of viewing a corpse of a PLAN cadres killed by the Koevoet units at Muparara 
village, 1983. 
119M.O. Hinz & N. Gevers, ‘Koevoet versus the people in Namibia’ in Journal fur Entwicklungspolitik 4, 
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this case there would be no exceptions, the young, old, pregnant and the sick were all 
subject to these beatings.120 In some instances, a Casspir was occupied by white officers 
and one indigenous officer to ensure effective communication and identification.121 These 
acts of harassment by the Koevoet units represent some important aspects of the impact 
the struggle had on the civilians of uKwangali area.  
Logistical support was one of the most important forms of assistance needed by 
the PLAN cadres. Karapo said that the arrival of Kalomoh in uKwangali district in the 
early eighties, created a situation where (he) Kalomoh used individuals who owned 
vehicles to help him to charge his batteries which Kalomoh used to communicate with to 
Luanda (Angola). The assistance of batteries provided by car owners led to the arrest of 
Karapo Robert in September 1983.122 A lack of sufficient power from the battery that was 
taken from Karapo’s homestead by the SADF saved his life and he was released from his 
detention.123 The incident of Karapo clearly demonstrated that the South African forces 
had informers or espionage who provided them with reliable information. In some 
instances PLAN cadres who were captured by the SADF or Koevoet after severe 
interrogation, used to reveal names of individuals who supported them with logistical and 
other basic needs. As a result all these collaborators were easily apprehended. 
Apart from intimidation, harassment, assaults and other forms of violence 
conducted by the South African security forces, Munguya Gabriel, a nurse at Nepara 
                                                             
120D. Herbstein, & J. Evenson, The devils are among us: The war for Namibia (London: Zed Books Ltd, 
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122 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Karapo Robert, Muparara village, uKwangali district, 21 May 2003. 
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clinic, explains that from 1980 onwards the inland road from Nepara up to Muparara was 
not safe to travel because of landmines. During this time one must not forget that this 
road was used by both civilians travelling to their villages and the South African military 
forces executing their daily military operations.  
Landmines were planted in the road by either PLAN combatants targeting their 
enemies or the SADF targeting suspected SWAPO collaborators who owned vehicles. 
This led to incidents where landmines planted in the road were detonated by the civilians 
who were on their way to their respective villages.124 The main road from Nepara village 
up to Muparara village had four landmine explosion sites. As indicated above by 
Munguya, in some instances the South African forces would plant a landmine in the road 
deliberately and once detonated by the civilians, the South Africa forces would accuse the 
PLAN combatants of planting landmines aimed at killing the innocent civilians.  
Hence Munguya asserted that the landmine which exploded near Nepara clinic 
was planted by the SADF in the main road, which was meant for the Chief of uKwangali 
who was regarded as the main SWAPO collaborator. Fortunately on the day of the 
incident, he (the chief) did not travel to his village but instead those who travelled with 
his car on that day were two of his brother’s sons, Moses Kandjimi and Pius Kandjimi, 
who landed on the landmine and it exploded.125  The explosion of the land mine saw Pius 
Kandjimi sustaining serious injury which led to the amputation of his leg.126 During the 
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eighties, the Nepara-Muparara road became very unsafe to travel especially for those 
whose children were schooling at secondary schools across the region.  
Politically those who were SWAPO activists were subjected to frequent arrest, 
detention, beating and torture.  Section 30 of the 1957 South African Defence Act granted 
absolute immunity to the members of its security forces to murder, assault and commit 
other criminal behavior for the purposes of prevention and suppression of terrorism in 
any operational area. 127 This Act had a huge impact on the inhabitants of the Kavango 
region and in uKwangali district in particular. In all the declared war zones, the security 
forces used the Administrator General proclamation AG 9 Act of 1977. The detention 
without trial which was inflicted under AG 9 of 1977, gave the South African forces the 
power to detain people suspected of helping SWAPO and hold them incommunicado for 
thirty days.128 
The AG 9 allowed South African officers to arrest people without any warrant 
and interrogate them without committing any offence.129 The proclamation AG 9, 26 of 
1977/8 (Detention for the Prevention of Political Violence and Intimidation) was used by 
the security police for putting SWAPO activists/ leaders out of their way for an indefinite 
period.130 The above Acts used by the South African forces affected civilians socially and 
politically. Apart from the anxiety and harassment suffered by civilians, schools were 
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also affected by the armed struggle in uKwangali district. Thadeus Nakare a former 
learner at Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School explains that the struggle had tremendous 
social impact in schools. He noted that in 1983 the SADF military base which was 
located close to Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School was attacked by the PLAN cadres, 
and consequently the base was moved into the school premises where the soldiers acted 
as vigilantes to protect the life of the learners and teaching personnel who were white 
South African soldiers.131 The same year a white teacher who resided in the school 
premises was killed by the PLAN combatants who threw a hand grenade in his bedroom. 
The house of Mr. W. Johnson, the principal, was also attacked the same night by the 
PLAN combatants but he just sustained minor injuries. 
Thadeus noted that during that week teaching did not take place and the situation 
in the school was very chaotic.132  He recalls that the entire school was under strict 
military control and learners were not allowed to leave the premises. Josef Kandjimi the 
first black principal in the Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School recalls that the situation 
was complicated in the sense that the control in the schools was both military and 
academic.133 He emphasises that especially in 1983, the secondary school was guarded by 
the South African soldiers who stayed in the school premises day and night.  
During the night the soldiers used to shoot throughout the night under the pretext 
of guarding learners so they would not be influenced by the PLAN combatants who 
wanted to recruit them to join the armed struggle in exile.134 The motive behind the 
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shootings was that the South African forces, based in the school, learned through their 
informers that PLAN combatants were planning to abduct all the learners in the school 
into Angola to join the armed struggle in exile. The presence of the SADF forces in the 
school premises disrupted learning as learners lived in fear most of the time. The result 
was that some learners quit school due to the situation which prevailed in the school 
during that year.  
A truck from the Department of Water Affairs that was en route to Rundu were 
attacked by PLAN cadres at Rupara in which two South African soldiers (white teachers) 
were seriously injured and one girl from Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School Hermine 
Sadwere died in this ambush.135 Immanuel Shikukumwa the first black inspector of 
education in Kavango region explains that the presence of the Koevoet units and its 
operations disrupted school activities in the region. This was due to the fact that the 
Koevoet members accused the children of clearing the PLAN combatants’ footsteps in 
the morning when they were going to school and this was against the curfew law. Thus 
out of fear some pupils used to tell false information, to avoid being beaten and this 
resulted in many parents being arrested. The retired inspector explains that though he was 
the Inspector of Education, his power was not respected at all. 136 Thus he recalls vividly 
that the Koevoet disrupted teaching process, learners were taken out of classes for 
questions and their teachers were the main victims as they were accused of teaching their 
learners communist ideology.  
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Echoing the same sentiments, Wellem Kandjimi a retired principal noted that 
teaching was disrupted. This was due to the fact that the Koevoet normally visited 
schools in the early hours of the day during which they used to spend an hour questioning 
learners and teachers. He asserted that teaching did not take place as it was supposed to 
because every day the periods were disrupted. Especially in the mid eighties, some inland 
schools closed down for example the schools at Gava, Sikarosompo, Ncungu, Ncancana 
and Kamupupu.137 The liberation war which took place in the district affected schools in 
the sense that some learners deserted their homesteads with their parents to settle along 
the Kavango River while some crossed into Angola which for some was the end of their 
school career.   
The chief of uKwangali district Daniel Sitentu Mpasi explains that the struggle 
had serious social and political impacts on the inhabitants of his territory. He noted that 
within the entire Kavango region, his tribal territory experienced many problems as 
compared to the other territories in the region. Mpasi claims that the South African 
regime knew that the majority of PLAN combatants were originally from Ovamboland 
infiltrating in Kavango region via uKwangali district. Against this military background 
the people of uKwangali district were considered as being SWAPO collaborators and 
were responsible for providing them with food. As indicated earlier in Chapter One, it 
should be understood that during this period the position of the chiefs in Kavango was 
precarious. It must be noted that during this periods, all the chiefs were members of the 
Legislative Council and were expected to serve the interest of the interim regime. Though 
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the struggle affected the chiefs, they were accorded some administrative protection. This 
was not in the case of the civilians who were affected more directly by the liberation war.     
The result was that the people in uKwangali area were subjected to daily assaults, 
arrest and taken to jail by the SADF and Koevoet forces to be detained.138 Hence the 
chief noted that while the civilians in his district were ill-treated he was very protective 
and urged the South African forces to stop mistreating innocent people. The same 
sentiment was echoed by Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member who stated that the 
Chief of uKwangali and his people were affected by the armed liberation struggle.139 The 
corroboration by the Koevoet member suggests that the inhabitants of uKwangali were 
really exposed to harsh security measures.  
Kasoma reiterated that in some instances the chief used to convene a meeting with 
the senior South African military personnel in the region at the Kahenge tribal office to 
tell them about their evil deeds (assaults and harassments) against the inhabitants of 
uKwangali.140 The major problems caused by the South African security forces especially 
the Koevoet were that of raiding in the fields of mahangu, destroying their crops, and 
burning their mahangu grains stores.  
Muzimba, a Nyemba who emigrated from Angola hopeful of escaping war, 
settled at Ngururasi in 1983. He was assaulted by the Koevoet members with his wife and 
children, who accused them of providing SWAPO cadres with food.141 His mahangu 
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grain stores were put on fire while he was watching. This led Muzimba and his family to 
return back into Angola. Thus many civilians were destitute during the armed struggle 
period in uKwangali. The act of destroying the inhabitants’ crops and food was instituted 
to force the people to desert their homestead as this would leave the PLAN combatants 
without any support such as food to eat, according to the former Koevoet member. 
As the Chief of uKwangali explained, his homestead (palace) went through many 
difficulties during this period. He noted that his palace was attacked several times by the 
South African forces. The South Africa forces would approach his house with the 
intention of surveillance of the PLAN combatants’ visits to his palace. In some instances 
the SADF would be stationed at the road side and shoot at his palace. He alluded to an 
incident where close to six bombs were shot at his homestead over a long range but 
fortunately none of the shells hit his palace or injured people in the house, all the shells 
landed far away. One can deduce that all these attacks by the SADF forces were because 
of his visit to the SWAPO leader abroad. 
The main reason for the strict control over the Chief’s palace, according to 
Kasoma, was that he allowed PLAN combatants to infiltrate and operate in his tribal 
territory.142 Though this might have nothing to do with the permission of the chief, I 
believe that it was an attempt to retaliate against the chief’s relationship with PLAN 
cadres in uKwangali. Considering the safety and security of his life and the inhabitants of 
uKwangali people at large, this prompted the chief to seek help outside the country for 
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which journalists from the different parts of the world came to his palace in uKwangali to 
investigate the allegation that he (the chief) laid against the South African regime.  
This resulted in journalists from England, Geneva, and France coming to Mayara 
to his residence in uKwangali to witness what was taking place in his territory.143 He also 
mentioned that his action in inviting foreign journalists was not supported by the South 
African regime and the chief was accused of exposing internal matters to the international 
community. Thus the invitation to foreign observers indicates that the lives of the people 
in this area were at stake.   
He related that his invitation to foreign journalists also prompted a South African 
senior military officer who was based in Rundu to visit his palace to investigate the 
allegations the chief was making against the SADF who were operating in Kavango.  
Thus to legitimize this accusation, the South African military personnel based at Rundu 
were dispatched to the palace of the chief at Mayara to investigate all the allegations he 
made against the South African security forces. The military officer from Rundu whose 
task was to investigate stayed a full week at the Chief’s palace to investigate the 
accusations made against the SADF.144 The findings of the military officer which were 
similar to that of foreign journalists’ report saved him (the chief) from being accused of 
sabotage. 
The chief also explains that his personal life was at stake during this period. Every 
day once it is six o’clock he had to enter his bedroom and lock himself in, but he always 
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used to sleep with his pistol in his hand in case of emergency to protect his life. 
Fortunately what used to guard him were the dogs he owned which were very harsh and 
intimidated everyone coming to his palace. All the incidents which took place at his 
palace gave him sleepless nights during the armed liberation struggle of Namibia. Despite 
all these challenges the chief acknowledged that the inhabitants of uKwangali immensely 
supported SWAPO and its military wing PLAN. Chief Sitentu Mpasi concluded that 
recalling what his people and he himself experienced during the armed liberation struggle 
of this country is a nightmare for him, but he just gives thanks to God who protected him 
and all the inhabitants of his territory.145 
The account by Kasoma Paulus ‘Njege’, sharing the same sentiments as the chief, 
is a clear indication that the area was affected by the armed struggle intensively. As noted 
above, these according to Kasoma are not mere stories because he was among those 
Koevoet members who operated in the area, assaulting and harassing the vaKwangali 
civilians when extracting information. As a former Koevoet member, he says that what is 
disturbing even him is that though these people often sacrificed their lives to help the 
PLAN combatants, after independence the people in uKwangali district are marginalized 
and their effort during the armed struggle is not recognised.  
The Koevoet man also indicated that the increased infiltration of PLAN 
combatants in uKwangali district especially in the 1980s made the area one of particular 
concentration for the Koevoet operation. As a result the inhabitants of uKwangali were 
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exposed to daily intimidation, assaults and beatings.146 Though it was a concentrated 
security area, Kasoma recalls that it was difficult to extract information from the civilians 
of uKwangali and only certain individuals who were bribed and enticed with goods were 
providing them with information. Therefore the only means to glean information was to 
apply force. The basic strategy used was that of using batteries that were used for their 
radio for communication.147 Once the terminals of the batteries wires are clipped on to 
the victim’s ears, and the handle turned as if one is ringing the phone, it gave an electric 
shock. This according to Kasoma helped with many civilians who were interrogated to 
reveal information. For the children it was just a matter of giving them some slashes, but 
yet there were some children who were very stubborn and did not co-operate.   
Politically, many prominent figures in uKwangali became victims of frequent 
arrest and detention. Among them were a prominent businessman, Severinus Siteketa, the 
late Jaakko Kangayi the principal of Nkure-nkuru combined school, Jonas Hamukwaya, a 
teacher at Namutuntu who died after being interrogated and tortured by the Koevoet 
forces, and a number of principals, teachers and civilians who owned vehicles and were 
activists in the uKwangali district who were also subject to regular arrest and 
detention.148 
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Figure 1 
A photograph of Severinus Siteketa, a political activist in uKwangali district detained in accordance with 
the AG 9 Act for violating peace and security. (Source: © hmmilk “Kavango during the Namibian war of 
liberation,”http://kavango.info/Voito.htm. accessed on 2008/15/02). 
 
 The physical conditions in which political detainees were kept were very inhuman. The 
above image reflects the physical appearance of one of the political activists who was 
detained through AG 9.149 The treatment given to suspected SWAPO activists arrested 
was very bad. Nestor Mufenda noted the main problems was that once the SADF forces 
learned that one is collaborating with PLAN, such individuals were arrested for cross-
                                                             
149 hmmilk “Kavango during the Namibian war of liberation,” http://kavango.info/Voito.htm. 
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questioning and detention.150 In most cases those who were detained were kept at military 
bases. Therefore most of all those arrested in uKwangali were detained at Nepara.  
With AG 9 in place, suspected collaborators were arrested and detained for 30 
days without any trial.151 An extension of extra 30 days can be requested if the first 30 
days lapses and if a proper investigation was not conducted but it was just a measure to 
keep people in detention.  The most prominent activists in uKwangali who were victims 
of AG 9 Act of 1977 were the late Jaakko Kangayi, Severinus Siteketa, and Remigius 
Siyave, Nimrod Muremi, Silas and Mufenda Nestor.152 Mufenda recalls that all those 
who were arrested were taken to Osire at the time AG 9 was in full operation.  
Economically though the inhabitants of uKwangali paid a heavy price in terms of 
providing food. Inside Namibia, civilians were the only means through which PLAN 
combatants’ could obtain what they needed in terms of food, money, information and 
clothing. The PLAN combatants also used to come to homesteads which they knew well 
could be the house of the Chief, headman, or a teacher to provide the desired logistical 
support. This meant that some people’s economic status became depleted in the process, 
since PLAN combatants operated for a long period in the uKwangali district.  
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The safety and security of the inhabitants of uKwangali during the 
armed liberation struggle 
  
The political changes which took place during the eighties brought many social and 
political changes. The security and safety of the inhabitants of the uKwangali district was 
one of the big challenges the people had to deal with during this period. Untraceable 
disappearance of civilians was one thing to which the inhabitants of uKwangali were 
exposed. Jonathan Liu and Jonathan Shushe, both elder men from Kakuwa village in 
uKwangali in the western part of Kavango region, were abducted by security forces and 
were never seen again.153  
 It should be noted that “the police were under no obligation to release information 
on detainees held under AG 9”.154 The AG 9 Act was a tool which the South African 
security forces used to impose all these abuses inflicted on civilians. The AG 9 Act 
created a situation where up to date some individual’s whereabouts are not known by 
their family members or what has happened to them.  As mentioned in Chapter One the 
South African regime’s strategy of using the Reconnaissance “Recce” unit who operated 
as PLAN combatants in most cases during the night, dressed in the same uniform as 
PLAN combatants, walking barefoot, speaking Oshiwambo languages and carrying  AK-
47 automatic rifle made matters worse for the inhabitants of uKwangali district. 
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Growing up in uKwangali my experience of the Reconnaissance “Recce” unit is 
that these units used to visit people’s homestead during the night under the pretext of 
being PLAN combatants, while they were in fact SADF. Under the pretext of being 
PLAN cadres, community members provided food and other related assistance at all costs 
to help them to sustain their guerilla warfare.  
In most cases, the next morning the same forces who visited the homestead would 
come and harass and assault people in the homestead because they were hosting PLAN 
cadres and provided them with food. The South African forces would even say 
everything which happened a fortnight ago including the type of guns they carried, the 
type of help that was given and the total number of PLAN combatants who came the 
previous night, including everything discussed by them (PLAN cadres). This left civilians 
filled with doubt and mistrust as to what might happen to them. As Munguya stated, it 
was very bad during the day when one had to deal with the South African forces, and at 
night one had to provide food to PLAN cadres. This was very unsafe considering the fact 
that South African forces had their spies within the communities.155 The question which 
confused every inhabitant at the beginning was who was reporting them and how it 
happened. This situation led to most of parents in uKwangali district to teach their 
children not to tell their friends any information about the PLAN combatants’ visit to 
their homestead. 
The operation of the “Recce” unit complicated the life of the civilians. Selma 
Kadiva a resident at Gava explains that people were caught in between: if you are not 
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rendering any support to the PLAN combatants you are considered to be a South African 
security forces collaborator. To the contrary if one provides support to PLAN 
combatants, and the information reached the SADF or the Koevoet unit through their 
informants, the next morning these forces would come to interrogate, beat and abuse 
every member of the household.156  
 In this context the safety and security of the civilians was at stake every day. 
Thus the nature of the day was characterized by daily assaults and interrogations of 
people by the South African security forces. It was also unlikely that the Koevoet unit 
would visit a homestead without assaulting and abusing innocent civilians verbally and 
physically. Consequently this situation led to some schools in uKwangali district 
especially those in the remote bush area to be deserted since both parents and pupils 
deserted their villages for safety and security reasons. The situation also made some 
teachers to resign from teaching, fearing being implicated by the South African security 
forces for being the main suppliers of logistical and basic needs to PLAN combatants. 
Eric Hausiku a teacher at Gava resigned due to the insecure situation created by the 
armed struggle.  
Marital relationships were destroyed simply because those who were suspected as 
collaborators deserted their families for better security in township settlements such as 
Rundu. Some fled to look for employment on farms within the areas close to towns like 
Grootfontein, Otjiwarongo, Outjo and Windhoek. This was simply because the insecurity 
in the inland towns across the country was better as these areas were not heavily 
                                                             
156 Interview with Selma Kadiva, uKwangali district, Gava village, 25 July 2007. 
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controlled by the South African security forces. Families broke up due to the fact that 
many of the men were victims of daily assaults and arrest and in saving their life some 
deserted their homesteads, leaving their livestock and family behind, and some crossed 
the border into exile to join the armed struggle.  
The presence of the Koevoet units which established mobile stations in Kavango 
region and in uKwangali district in particular created insecurity in the daily life of the 
inhabitants. Unexplained disappearances, beating, torturing of civilians especially in the 
North and North Eastern part of Namibia in which uKwangali is located were common 
practices of the Koevoet unit for a decade in the Kavango region.157 All these were 
strategies the Koevoet unit used to instill fear among the local inhabitants.   
In fact the people in uKwangali were regarded as SWAPO collaborators. Kasoma 
Paulus a former Koevoet member stated that it was difficult to get information about 
PLAN combatant whereabouts from the civilians in uKwangali. This left them with no 
choice but to apply force to get information. He concluded that it was difficult to get 
information even from young children because they were taught by their parents not to 
say anything about the whereabouts of PLAN combatants in the area and were taught to 
keep quiet whenever being questioned. Thus the documentation of such local experiences 
and the unpacking of the micro-politics of the area is aimed at filling the gap in the 
national historiography of Namibia, so as to include the previously unexplored 
experiences and contribution of the vaKwangali people of Kavango during the Namibian 
armed struggle.   
                                                             
157 D. Herbstein, & J. Evenson, The devils are among us: The war for Namibia (London: Zed Books Ltd, 
1989), p.63. 
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 Conclusion  
The presence of the South African security forces in Kavango, the Bantustan homeland 
policy and the Pass Law system operating in Namibia during the period of study 
hampered PLAN activities in Kavango during the sixties. The geographical location of 
the region and the pass laws system which operated in Namibia during the selected period 
created a division where people in the Kavango region were unable to interact with other 
people from different ethnic homelands in particular between the North and the South. 
The independence of Angola in I975 marked the beginning of PLAN infiltration in 
Kavango region and in uKwangali district in particular PLAN cadre’s infiltration started 
in 1978.  
The propaganda of the South African military regime was meant to create 
disbelief and destroy the morale and image of SWAPO with its military wing PLAN. The 
operation of the South African military regime and its strategy of using terror tactics such 
as killing, torture and destruction of properties when seeking information and searching 
for PLAN fighters especially by the Koevoet unit created insecurity, mistrust and fear 
among the civilians. 
 The arrival of PLAN cadres in Kavango during the 1980s brought a new political 
atmosphere among the inhabitants of uKwangali. The armed liberation struggle had a 
social and political impact on the life of civilians. The most frequent sign of this was 
beatings, assaults and interrogation. The implementation of curfew in Kavango during the 
eighties was part of the South African strategy of cracking down on suspected SWAPO 
collaborators in Kavango and in uKwangali. The atrocities and brutalities which took 
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place are among the features which characterized uKwangali as a war zone in the 
Kavango region, which will be looked at in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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                                                 CHAPTER THREE 
THE IMPOSITION OF SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CONTROL IN 
KAVANGO AND UKWANGALI DISTRICT 1975-1989 
Introduction 
Chapter Three provides an account of the militarization of Namibia under South African 
rule from the 1970s, and of the Kavango and Ukwangali in particular. The chapter looks 
at the military situation which led to the declaration of the area as a war zone by the 
South Africans, with the intensification of activities of the South West African Territory 
Forces (S.W.A.T.F) and Koevoet units until 1989. The impact of the South African 
conventional and unconventional military strategies on the lives of the civilians will be 
analyzed with reference to the liberation struggle. The effects of the establishment of 
military bases namely Musese (905 Battalion), Nepara (55 Battalion) Nkure-Nkuru and 
Mauni (Battalion 906), in their attempt to combat SWAPO activities will be discussed in 
this chapter. The question of sexual violence by the South African military forces towards 
women will be look at in this chapter.  In conclusion the chapter will looked at both the 
success and failures of the South Africa’s military forces in the selected territory. 
 
The militarization of uKwangali district  
Ukwangali district is geographically located in the western part of the Kavango region, 
70 km west of the regional town Rundu.  Historically the South Africa military presence 
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started in 1915 in Namibia.158 Despite the prohibition by the United Nations (UN) not to 
establish military bases in the mandatory territory, South Africa violated the terms and 
conditions of the mandate and built major military infrastructures and bases country wide 
in Namibia in the late 1950s and early 1960s.159 The declaration of Ovamboland, 
Kavango and Caprivi in the 1970s as “security districts” under the control of the South 
African Defence Force (SADF) military rule resulted in the clearance of a 1000 metre 
wide “no man’s land” intended to prevent SWAPO infiltrations from Angola into 
Namibia.160 The declaration of these areas justifies calling uKwangali district a war zone 
during the 1970s.   
         The massive military build-up embarked upon by South Africa in Namibia during 
the 1970s, turned the territory (Kavango) into one of the most heavily occupied areas in 
the world in terms of the number of foreign troops relative to the local population.161 In 
terms of the South African Defence Force structure, Namibia was treated as an integral 
part of South Africa. In 1975 military battalions were formed in Namibia and among 
them were Ovambo (101Battlion) and Kavango (202 Battalion).162    
      In May 1979, martial law under Administrator General AG 9 Act was extended 
further from the northern “homeland” of Ovamboland, Kavangoland and Caprivi.163 The 
practical operation of this proclamation affected the inhabitants of the Kavango region. 
                                                             
158IDAF, Apartheids Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation (London: IDAF, 1982),p.5.  
159IDAF, Apartheids Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation (London: IDAF, 1982), 
p.5. 
160 IDAF, Apartheids Army in Namibia: South Africa illegal military occupation (London: IDAF, 1982), 
p.5. 
161Ibid, p.9. 
162Ibid, p.30.  
163Ibid, p.9. 
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The proclamation give police and any law enforcement agents and members of the SADF 
wider powers to arrest, search and detain people without trial and a numbers of 
restrictions which were imposed on the people included curfew and the banning of public 
meetings.164 This means that people in the declared operational areas were affected in 
very direct ways by the presence of South African militarization.  
    Militarily, Namibia was divided into three military zones. The operational areas were 
also divided into three military sectors namely Sector 10 (Kaokoland, Ovamboland), 
Sector 20 (Kavangoland, West Caprivi, Bushmanland) and Sector 70 (East Caprivi). The 
military headquarters were at Oshakati in Ovamboland, Rundu in Kavangoland and 
Katima in Caprivi.165 The pressure of SWAPO guerilla warfare that was taking root along 
the Kavango River in the 1960s, become a great concern for the colonial authorities.166 
This led to the establishment of the military bases along the Kavango River, for example 
202 Battalion and Sector 20 which were the two military headquarters in the Kavango 
region, were based 5km away from the administrative town of Rundu.167   
  In the east of the region, two of the bases were located at Mashare and Bagani, 60 
km and 200km respectively along the river east of Rundu. In February 1983 Musese 
military base located 90 km west of Rundu in uKwangali started with its full military 
operations.168 The base had a checkpoint, a fuel filling station, and a military watch tower 
                                                             
164Ibid, p.11.  
165Ibid, p.19. 
166 K.M. Likuwa, ‘Rundu, Kavango: A case study of forced relocation in Namibia, 1954-1972’ (MA thesis, 
University of the Western Cape, 2005), p32. 
167SWAPO Information Bulletin of December 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda: Angola), p.19. 
168 Interview with Alloys Gende, Sambyu district, Kayengona 27 December 2007. 
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which was occupied by soldiers with binoculars all the time to monitor the regular 
movements of people coming to the base both from inside Angola and inside Namibia.  
  A former Captain in the SADF from Kavango, Alloys Gende, explains that the 
first military bases in uKwangali were at Nkure-nkuru, Simanya, Mpungu, Nepara and 
Musese.169 He acknowledges that the biggest base in uKwangali was Nepara. This was 
because of its strategic location in uKwangali where the base had a borehole for water, a 
filling station supplying diesel fuel for helicopters and armoured military vehicles, for 
example Casspirs and Buffels. Nepara base also had an airfield strip and a radio which 
facilitated communication for the SADF military operation in the region, even to receive 
military orders from Pretoria (South Africa). 
  As from the mid eighties, Rundu the administrative town of Kavango was 
gradually transformed into one of the most heavily militarised places in Namibia.170 For 
example in 1986, the South Africa logistical capacity at Rundu went through an extensive 
reconstruction. Its airfield and runways were extended.171 This extension enabled the 
airfield to allow bigger helicopters which carried up to 20 soldiers to land and take off. 
The helicopters used to fly from Rundu to conduct military operations within the region 
and across in Angola. It should be noted that whenever the Koevoet members were 
tracking a PLAN guerilla fighter in the region, reinforcement by the South African Air 
Force (SAAF) Alouette helicopter gunship and a spotter plane was needed. The use of the 
helicopter gunships enabled the Koevoet trackers to track down PLAN insurgents easily. 
                                                             
169 Interview with Alloys Gende, Sambyu district, Kayengona 27 December 2007. 
170 SWAPO Information Bulletin of December 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda: Angola), p.15. 
171SWAPO Information Bulletin of December 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda Angola), p.15.  
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A helicopter called the Puma was only called in whenever the South African forces had 
experienced some heavy causalities. Apart from the Alouette helicopters, Mirage jets also 
used to be stationed at Rundu airfield on standby mode waiting for military orders. The 
extensive build-up of the South Africa forces in Rundu suggests that the region was 
heavily infiltrated by SWAPO fighters.  By the middle of 1986, the SADF installed huge 
guns, radar controlled and anti–aircraft guns around the whole perimeter of the Rundu 
military airfield172 (see Figure 3 of the airfield image). 
 
Figure. 3.3.1 
Figure 3 Airfield image at Rundu military bases (Sector 20) used by the South African military regime 
during the 1980s. (Source: A photograph taken during my field work research at Rundu military base 19 
December 2007). The airfield was used as a launching pad by South African Air Force. 
 
  This made Rundu military bases the launching pad of all the South African 
operations in the Kavango region, including those in Angola. The South African military 
build-up around Rundu was further reinforced with a big array of Casspirs, Buffels and 
                                                             
172 SWAPO Information Bulletin of December 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda: Angola), p.16. 
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other types of armoured vehicles.173  In September 1986, over 1, 000 military trucks 
arrived at Rundu carrying military equipments, hardware and other logistical supplies. 
Thus the extensive military build-up which was taking place at Rundu clearly signifies 
the military capacity of the South African forces which was based in Kavango and 
extended into uKwangali district to counter-attack infiltration by PLAN fighters. 
  As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Nepara was a strategic base in which all 
SADF military platoons assembled together before being dispatched to their military 
operations to smaller bases like Mauni and Kongo located west of the district between 
Kavango and the Ovamboland border. Infantry units used Nepara as a reinforcement base 
to recuperate when conducting their infantry patrols in uKwangali.174  
  The influx of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) into the interior 
of uKwangali in the 1980s was the main reason behind the establishment of the Nepara 
base which was located in the heart of the uKwangali district.175 To ensure successful 
military operations a new road was constructed in 1987 to link Nkure-nkuru, Nepara and 
Mpungu. The construction of the new road was to open a new operational zone between 
Nkure-nkuru, Simanya and Mpungu since that area was an open zone for the PLAN 
guerrillas to conduct their guerilla activities. This included holding meetings with 
civilians, recruiting the local people from the district and planning their guerilla attacks. 
  Apart from their military functions, the military bases were used as places where 
SWAPO collaborators were detained and tortured. According to Wellem Kandjimi who 
                                                             
173SWAPO Information Bulletin of December 1987, SWAPO Department of Information and publicity 
(Luanda: Angola), p.1. 
174 Interview with Alloys Gende, Sambyu district, Kayengona 27 December 2007. 
175 Interview with Alloys Gende, Sambyu district, Kayengona 27 December 2007. 
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was detained at Nepara, the treatment given to SWAPO collaborators was harsh and 
unbearable. He noted that every detainee arrested was tied and locked up in a room where 
a generator which provided power (electricity) to the base was kept. When he was 
arrested, Kandjimi was detained in the same room while his hands and legs were tied. He 
was seated on a chair and faced the exhaust of the generator. This punishment according 
to Kandjimi lasted for the whole night and it was terrible as he was tied up and was 
unable to move.176 All this treatment given to SWAPO collaborators was instituted just to 
break down PLAN’s influence and civilian support for PLAN combatants. Thus beside 
the military purpose, the bases were used to serve many other functions. 
  Unlike Nepara which was a strategic base, Musese military base had a road block 
which was the main checkpoint in uKwangali where every person travelling to Rundu 
was screened. Kasoma Paulus noted strict military controls were conducted by the SADF 
at Musese checkpoint to ensure that PLAN combatants were not infiltrating into the 
interior of Rundu.  
  At Musese road block, every vehicle and passengers passing through the 
checkpoint were searched.177 The targets were those people in possession of SWAPO 
politically-related documents. According to Kasoma, the main identification demanded at 
the checkpoint was an identity card, and those who were not in a position to produce 
identity cards were suspected as PLAN combatants.178 The suspected individuals used to 
be interrogated and accused of being among those who left the country for exile to join 
                                                             
176 Interview with Wellem Kandjimi, Gava, uKwangali district, 26 December 2007. 
177The presence of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the district indicates that it was a war zone. 
178Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
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the liberation war. For these reasons they were therefore allegedly not in a position to 
have South West African identity cards.   
  The checkpoint at Musese base was used to screen individuals and SWAPO 
collaborators coming to buy fuel and agricultural products like maize meal. For 
intelligence purposes, the SADF informers (spies) also used to report PLAN combatants’ 
related activities and operations at Musese military base.179 The strategy used was that 
those informers would come with the ostensible purpose of buying agricultural products 
and fuel but were coming to convey information to the South African forces, concluded 
Kasoma the Koevoet man.  
  The increasing presence of the PLAN cadres in uKwangali also led to the 
establishment of temporary military bases and military personnel at every South African 
administrative institution such as schools, tribal offices and agriculture extension offices. 
This was a measure taken to protect state property and the white staff members who 
worked at these institutions.180 Consequently temporary military bases and personnel 
were established at Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School and Kahenge tribal office in 
uKwangali. 
As indicated at the beginning of the chapter, Kasoma Paulus a Koevoet member 
echoed the same sentiment that the concentration of the SADF and Koevoet units in the 
western part of the Kavango was due to the development of the war in Angola between 
the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) the Angolan government forces and 
the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels under the 
                                                             
179 Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
180 Interview with Alloys Gende, Sambyu district, Kayengona village, 27 December 2007. 
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leadership of Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi.181 The war in Angola in which the MPLA 
forces collaborated with PLAN, enabled SWAPO and its military wing PLAN to 
established military bases in Southern Angola since 1975.182 Against this military 
background PLAN combatants were able to operate from their military bases in southern 
Angola into Ovamboland and into western Kavango. This makes uKwangali district the 
most infiltrated area of the Kavango with unprecedented numbers of PLAN cadres as 
compared to the other districts in the region.  
 
Hilka Leevi, a survivor of Cassinga, noted that militarily the eastern part of the 
Kavango region was not heavily infiltrated by PLAN combatants as compared to the 
western part of the region especially during the 1980s. This she argued was due to the 
military developments in Angola in which the eastern part of Angola was occupied by 
UNITA with its military headquarters at Jamba and Kakuchi, while the Western part of 
Angola was occupied by the MPLA forces. 183  
 
It should be noted that though the first war front which the PLAN fighters used to 
enter Namibia was through Caprivi, this front was later heavily controlled and this led to 
the strengthening of the Mpacha military base in Katima by the South African military 
regime. Thus the geographical occupation by the Angolan political movements enabled 
SWAPO which had political ties with MPLA to establish military bases in Southern 
                                                             
181 Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
182Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
183 Interview with Hilka Leevi, a survivor of Cassinga massacre, Rundu, Tutungeni, 16 December 2007. 
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Angola and set up its bases as a springboard to enter Namibia.184 Thus uKwangali district 
in the west of Kavango become a close destination where PLAN cadres could easily 
infiltrate into the Kavango region.   
 
The impact of the South African security forces in uKwangali district 
The complexities of the South African military occupation and the presence of PLAN had 
a tremendous impact on the life of the civilians of uKwangali district. The operations of 
the SADF and Koevoet and the military strategies used created a situation where hatred 
developed among the civilians in uKwangali. Consequently the presence of the two 
military forces created a division in the community where some individuals whose 
relatives left the country to join the armed struggle collaborated with PLAN combatants, 
while those whose relatives were recruited in the South African forces supported the 
SADF. 
The South African military forces used different conventional and unconventional 
strategies to create division and conflicts among the local people. While Chapter Three 
focuses more on conventional strategy, detailed analysis of the unconventional strategy 
used by the South African forces will be looked at in detail in Chapter Four. The use of 
terror tactics made the matter worse. As indicated in Chapter Two, the SADF had a 
special unit called the “Recce” which operated like PLAN cadres. The unit operated 
during the night, visiting villagers’ homesteads looking for food and other logistical 
needs in the guise of PLAN cadres, they wore the same uniform, spoke Oshiwambo 
                                                             
184 Interview with Hilka Leevi, a survivor of Cassinga massacre, Rundu, Tutungeni, 16 December 2007. 
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languages like Oshikwanyama. Under the pretence of being PLAN combatants, civilians 
who were the main SWAPO supporters were found out.  
In most cases this unit used to threaten to kill the civilians if they did not provide 
food. All these strategies were used to implicate PLAN fighters in a relationship with 
community members. The other strategy was that of recruiting the local young boys 25 
years of age in the SADF. According to Alloys Gende this recruitment used to take place 
at every Tribal Office.185 This means that even in uKwangali district some were recruited 
into the SADF.  
The former SADF instructor Alloys Gende noted that in 1976 and 1977 a total of 
fifty (50) able-bodied boys and especially school dropouts from every ethnic group were 
recruited into the SADF.186  We should not forget that within the same communities some 
youth left the country to join the armed struggle in exile. Thus the factions created 
conflicts of interest among the family members of those who joined the two different 
military forces namely SADF and PLAN.  
The South African Defence Force used the differences which emerged between 
the people as a strategy to segregate them politically and militarily to detect SWAPO 
collaborators. On this basis, civilians with personal motives used to report each other to 
the two forces which sometimes led to atrocities and death. The atrocities and brutal 
activities that were committed by the South African security forces form part of its 
unconventional military strategies which had a tremendous impact on the life of the 
                                                             
185 Interview with Alloys Gende, Sambyu district, Kayengona, 27 December 2007. 
186Interview with Alloys Gende, Sambyu district, Kayengona, 27 December 2007. 
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inhabitants.187 Veronika Shillinge who lived at Mukekete village in Mpungu constituency 
since the 1970s recalls that the arrival of the PLAN cadres in the region in 1978 
complicated the life of the civilians. This was especially the case in 1978 when PLAN 
combatants took a truck from the workers from the Department of Water Affairs who 
were fixing a water pump at Mukekete. The presence of SADF at Mukekete village gave 
the villagers sleepless nights and they were unable to live their normal life.188 Daily 
harassment and beatings by the South African forces were the order of the day.  
During this year, people’s life within the vicinity of Mukekete was not stable. 
This was simply because of the truck that was stolen by the PLAN cadres.  She 
mentioned even during the night the SADF would visit villagers’ homesteads asking 
them how the truck was stolen and accusing them of having knowledge of the incident.189 
The theft of the truck led to the establishment of the SADF military base at Mpungu. As 
from 1978 the main problems experienced by the inhabitants of Mukekete by the SADF 
were that of raiding their property, assaults and beatings. The beatings were not 
exclusively for the young, old people and women were equally beaten.190 The insecure 
situation which prevailed in Mukekete led to some homesteads (families) deserting 
Mukekete village in 1983. The same year Joseph Haindongo and his wife Hillia 
Haindongo were assassinated by an unidentified armed man. This incident forced some 
villagers to desert Mukekete, leaving their livestock and properties behind for better 
security and safety.191  
                                                             
187 Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
188Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007. 
189Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14December 2007.   
190 Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007.  
191Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007. 
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The question raised by the interviewees was why did this atrocity take place 
within one homestead? In her revelation Shillinge suspected that these atrocities were 
committed by the SADF members simply because the son of Josef Haindongo and Hillia 
Haindongo (the couple which was assassinated) had left the country to join the armed 
liberation struggle.192 She speculates that it was for this reason that their homestead was 
targeted by the SADF forces in Mukekete village. It can be argued that this incident was 
executed by the SADF as a strategy to instill fear among the villagers to make them 
refrain from collaborating with PLAN combatants.   
 Shillinge also claimed that though the armed men who committed these terror 
acts and atrocities used to wear PLAN combatants’ uniform, she maintains that they were 
SADF forces who used to pretend to be PLAN combatants to execute all these ‘evil 
deeds’.193 As noted above this was one of the strategies used by the SADF soldiers to 
achieve their military goals and to influence the local people to refrain from supporting 
SWAPO and its military wing PLAN. As from this date Mukekete was one of the villages 
in uKwangali district which was most heavily concentrated by both Koevoet and the 
SADF presence.194 The geographical location of the village which is closer to the former 
Ovamboland border is among the reasons which made it a nearer destination for PLAN 
combatants coming into the Kavango region.   
Apart from the married couple who were brutally killed, Fillip Kanguma, a senior 
member within the same family, was killed by an unidentified gunman at Mukekete. 
                                                             
192Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007.   
193Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007.   
194Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007.    
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Shillinge, the daughter of the late Kanguma household, explains that the death of 
Kanguma left a psychological effect on the entire family.  What she can recall was that 
the incident took place at night, they just heard dogs barking and later they heard the 
sound of a gunshot. That was the shot which killed him from the unknown armed man.195  
What troubled people was why were all these atrocities committed at night, which left 
civilians with uncertainty as to who was responsible for committing the atrocities. 
The atrocities which were committed by the unknown armed man, forced the 
entire family to desert Mukekete village and to settle at Mpungu village in November 
1983.196 Being a teacher, Veronika noted that when the entire family deserted Mukekete 
she stopped teaching and relocated with her family at Mpungu. The situation resulted that 
the school was later closed down as people were living in fear and were unable to go to 
school. She also noted that her colleagues whom she left behind also deserted the school 
and moved to Rundu. The school at Mpoto completely closed down during in 1983.197 
Teaching did not take place throughout the whole year at school and this led to some 
pupils dropping out completely from school. 
The presence of the South African forces had tremendous effects on the civilians. 
Kasoma a former Koevoet member explains that: ‘The inhabitants of uKwangali district 
experienced many problems during the late 1970s and early 1980s up to 1989 and during 
the first general election campaign’.198 For him being a Koevoet member he 
acknowledged that the inhabitants of uKwangali really experienced many problems from 
                                                             
195Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007.    
196Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007.  
197Interview with Shillinge Veronika, Ncancana, uKwangali district, 14 December 2007.     
198Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
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the South African military forces.199 He refers to the geographical location of the district 
which shares a regional boundary with Ovamboland, and the national border with Angola 
in the north. Because PLAN cadres operated from their nearer military bases in southern 
Angola to enter Ovambo and Kavango via uKwangali district, this led to the increased 
presence of Koevoet forces in Ovamboland and western Kavango with the aim to crack 
down on the infiltration of PLAN cadres. 
 The problems noted by Kasoma were the instability in people’s daily life. This 
was because people were not aware what the future for the next day or night held for 
them. They lived in doubts and fear of being brutalized or killed by the SADF and 
Koevoet.200 Kasoma also emphasizes that especially at night the situation was very bad. 
 In most cases villagers were not aware as who was coming to the house, whether it was 
PLAN cadres, SADF members or Koevoet, because all these forces also used to operate 
during the night.201 In some instances the PLAN combatants might give an advance 
notification that they were coming but instead of the PLAN combatants coming to the 
homestead, the SADF who were normally on infantry patrol would approach the house 
and this was very dangerous.202  
In 1983 a terrible incident took place at Gava where the SADF infantry unit 
ambushed a house, which was suspected of harboring PLAN combatants. Heavy military 
shooting took place, most of the people in the house were injured and five died on the 
                                                             
199Interview with Kasoma Paulus, a former Koevoet member, Rundu, Donkerhoek Location, 24 July 2007. 
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spot.203  This means that civilian’s life in uKwangali was put at risk by the presence of 
the South African forces in the district.204 Cattle herders were accused of deliberately 
destroying the foot prints of PLAN cadres. This means that villagers were not allowed to 
release their livestock for grazing in the field before 9H00 a.m. People’s fields of 
Mahangu crops (millet) were destroyed by Koevoet under the pretext that PLAN 
combatants were hiding in those fields. Fences and hedges of the fields were destroyed as 
well.205 All these acts were conducted to frustrate the civilians and make them refrain 
from collaborating with SWAPO fighters and to force them to desert their houses which 
was the only means of food for PLAN insurgents. 
During the above period under discussion, many people in the district lost their 
lives, their belongings and employment. This resulted in some children dropping out of 
school especially those who deserted their villages with their parents to live along the 
river bank. Those severely affected crossed the border to live in Angola where the 
situation was more conducive and returned to Namibia from Angola during the later 
UNITA war against MPLA forces.  
Wellem Kandjimi who lived at Gava in 1983 explains that one day PLAN cadres 
requested him to charge their battery as usual. The time when the PLAN cadres came to 
collect their battery, was also the same time the “Recce” unit who used to pretend to be 
PLAN cadres came to his house. A serious military contact took place and one boy 
‘David’ who ran out of the house for safety was shot dead.206 It should be noted that 
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especially from 1980, very few individuals had vehicles in the inland uKwangali villages 
whom PLAN fighters could use to charge their batteries, and this resulted in everyone 
who had a car being arrested for the services they used to provide to PLAN fighters.  
It should be understood that in terms of operations, SADF used more of 
conventional strategies and were a well-trained disciplined force. Although 
unconventional strategies were applied by the SADF, this was used by the recce unit in 
certain circumstances. This was to the contrary with the counter insurgency unit Koevoet 
which relied heavily on unconventional strategies whereby civilians were assaulted and 
harassed whenever the units were executing their operations. Thus the Koevoet unit was a 
militarized unit trained to eliminate guerilla insurgents. Against this background it can be 
argued that the two forces differed in their mode of operation. Thus the SADF operated 
under a regulated military code, unlike the Koevoet unit which had total control over of 
the law and committed all sorts of violence without being liable for it. 
The insecurity created by the South African forces resulted in many people 
deserting their villages to live permanently in Angola.207 Thus Kasoma relates that those 
individuals who deserted their villages were regarded by PLAN combatants as South 
African collaborators, while the SADF and Koevoet also regarded them as SWAPO 
collaborators. The situation was unbearable because people were caught in between and 
if one person within the family left the village, this created a problem in which the entire 
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village or family would be held accountable for the absence of such a person by the 
SADF forces and Koevoet alike.208  
For those who lived in the inland villages, it was a must that they had to be around 
their villages all the time. Kasoma explains that once any member of the family in 
particular males left the village for a month or three he was regarded by the South 
African forces as planning to leave the country into exile to join the liberation struggle. 
To the contrary the PLAN combatants also regarded them as South Africa security forces 
intelligence informers. The result was that local civilians were arrested and detained by 
the South African security forces.   
The presence of South African forces in Kavango had serious political 
implications for the life of SWAPO political activists. As from the beginning of 1980 
arrests of prominent political figures in Kavango region by the South African security 
forces became public. In December 1983 a group of more than 20 detainees were 
released amongst them were Rev. Heikki Hausiku, and Gideon Nestor.209 Among those 
released from uKwangali were Heikki Hausiku and Nestor Mufenda. 
The fate of suspected political activists was very bad and inhuman. In June 1984 
Severinus Siteketa a political activist in uKwangali was arrested at Mukekete and taken 
to Mururani control post along the Rundu-Grootfontein tarred road. At Mururani the 
Special Forces used the police station with its neglected four cells to keep detainees in 
solitary confinement, tortured them with electric shocks, denied them food or gave them 
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bad food.210 This treatment nearly killed Severinus Siteketa. After six months of this 
treatment Siteketa was released and returned together with Mpasi Hausiku and his 
brother. The second arrest of Severinus Siteketa was in accordance with the notorious 
Administrator General proclamation Act AG 27. Under this proclamation the 
Administrator-General, all commissioned and non-commissioned members of the South 
African security force, the military and the police were empowered to detain any person 
uncharged and incommunicado for up to thirty days for interrogation and the detainees 
had no right to know the reason for their arrest.211  
In spite of these regulations which contravened all civilised rules of law, the 
conditions of the second arrest of Siteketa were more tolerable than the first one. This 
time Siteketa was arrested while he was doing shopping at the ENOK shop in Rundu and 
was taken to Osire 600 km away from the Kavango. At Osire he was detained for four 
months before the security forces transferred him to Bethanie further in the South of 
Namibia. During this time he was with 40 other detainees from Kavango, including 
Jaakko Kangayi, Kaoko Nairenge and Gideon Mpasi. At Bethanie Siteketa was kept with 
12–15 other political detainees in the cell.212  Two weeks after his release in January 1986 
he was taken again by the Koevoet to the notorious torturing camp called “Bitter Soet” 
near Nepemba. This camp was hidden in the thick forest about 2 km east of the tarred 
road to Grootfontein, 30 km south of Rundu. Even amongst the military it was disguised 
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as a police training camp, sometimes referred to as “Malan`s Camp”213 In reality it was 
used as a detention camp by Koevoet and was equipped with torture facilities and far 
away from inhabited areas to safeguard undisturbed surroundings for the Koevoet 
henchmen. Kept in extremely harsh conditions, Siteketa suffered in the small cell made 
completely out of corrugated iron during the incredible heat of the days and under the 
exposure of the nights.214 Every detainee arrested in the region went through Bitter Soet 
for interrogation and torture, and some used to confess all their activities with PLAN 
cadres.   
Torture and mistreatment was part of the daily routine of the Koevoet soldiers 
who kept themselves unidentifiable. Siteketa even had to turn away towards the 
corrugated iron sheet when they opened the cell door to push in food. After another six 
month he was set free. After this systematic mistreatment the 43-year old Siteketa looked 
like an old, broken man, unrecognizable even to his family. The fate of Severinus 
Siteketa clearly projects the scale and the impact South African military forces and its 
intelligence had on individual political activists in uKwangali during the liberation 
struggle of Namibia and the Kavango region at large.  
Haindongo Risto from Mbandja in Southern Angola, who migrated and lived in 
Mpungu since 1959, explains that the presence of South African forces was a nightmare 
if he recalls what happened in Mukekete village. The South African forces used to take 
people’s properties and loot them without their permission. For example one day his 
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goats were killed by the South African forces without his consent.215 Looting people’s 
goods was a common practice by the South African forces, for example whenever they 
wanted meat, people’s livestock found in the field or road sides were shot.  
The negative part of this practice was that even five cattle from one kraal found 
on the road side would be shot and left on the road side. Some cattle were just heavily 
injured which forced the owners to kill them. This affected the social economy of the 
villagers since most depended on subsistence farming where livestock are important 
assets in terms of family resources.216 This was one strategy to frustrate villagers and 
instill fear among them.  
Haindongo further reiterated that the way they used to conduct themselves 
towards civilians was not good. They usually entered villagers homestead at any time, if 
they so wished. This could be during the day or at night, and they could enter people’s 
huts without any consent and this was very dangerous.217 He stated that this practice was 
carried out as a strategy to crackdown on PLAN and their collaborators and that they 
were looking for their enemies. The complexities of the presence of South African 
military forces in uKwangali had a diverse social and economical impact. Socially people 
lost their lives, properties, livestock and Mahangu grain. In some instances Mahangu 
grain was taken by the indigenous SADF members and some was burned in the Mahangu 
grain thatch huts.218  
 
                                                             
215 Interview with Haindongo Risto, Mukekete village, uKwangali district, 26 June 2007. 
216Interview with Haindongo Risto, Mukekete village, uKwangali district, 26 June 2007. 
217Interview with Haindongo Risto, Mukekete village, uKwangali district, 26 June 2007.  
218Interview with Haindongo Risto, Mukekete village, uKwangali district, 26 June 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 110
Sexual violence on women in Kavango by the South African forces 
during the armed liberation struggle  
Kavango was one area that was declared as a “security district” under the South African 
Defence Force (SADF) military rule in the 1970s.219 The martial law under AG 9 which 
was extended to the northern “homelands” of Ovamboland, Kavangoland and Caprivi 
affected civilians in all spheres of life. 220 This proclamation empowered any law 
enforcement agents and members of the SADF with wider powers to commit and conduct 
various forms of abuse and violence. Sexual violence was a common practice by the 
South African forces in Namibia during the armed liberation struggle. In respect of 
uKwangali, prevalence of rape cases hardly features in the existing literature of the 
Namibian armed struggle, or they had simply not been reported by the victims who were 
raped by the SADF and Koevoet forces during this period. 
Reading the journal article by Hinz, it is reported that rape cases were so 
prevalent in Ovamboland which was one of the declared war zone areas.221 The question 
one might ask is if this was the case in Ovamboland, why not in uKwangali if the same 
military forces who operated in Ovamboland were the same forces who operated in 
Kavango, or does it means that these kinds of violence were not committed by the South 
African forces operating in Kavango? If yes, why is this not recorded? This leaves one 
with no option but to speculate that it might be that the victims were not capable of laying 
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charges against the perpetrators. This means that the victims were unable to share their 
experience with their friends or next of kin. 
It can be argued that many cases of rape in uKwangali might have not been 
reported or made known by victims out of fear or shame of being raped by the Koevoet 
or SADF soldiers. Thus the absence of data related to rape cases in uKwangali gives a 
different picture of the forces who operated in uKwangali as to those operated in 
neighbouring Ovamboland. It can be concluded that the findings of this study might 
create a forum for which victims who are still living with their traumatic experience of 
sexual violence during the armed liberation struggle, might identify themselves.     
However, Lourenz Haupindi Kalipa who was a chairperson of the Kavango 
Legislative Council in 1974 explains that the South African forces used to rape people’s 
wives. He noted that this practice was very bad since the women were raped in the 
presence of their husbands and mostly by the infantry forces who used to patrol in the 
communities. 222 Kalipa noted that an incident of this nature took place at Bunya a village 
in Mbunza district whereby the South African forces entered a household and ordered a 
woman to have sex with soldiers, while her husband was watching them and one armed 
soldier pointed a gun to the husband. The former council member stated that this was a 
very bad practice by the soldiers, but these culprits were convicted and punished 
according to the South African military rules which Kalipa claims were very harsh.223 
This signifies that the SADF was a well-trained force which operated under a defined 
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military code unlike the Koevoet units. Though uKwangali district of the Kavango 
become a heavily concentrated militarized area in Kavango, the South African military 
forces did not impose total control over the district in the sense that PLAN cadres 
penetrated in the district and established relationship with civilians and some traditional 
leaders. The presence of the unprecedented number of PLAN guerillas in the district 
suggests that it was a fully-fledged war zone.  
 
Conclusion  
The massive build up by the South African military forces in Namibia in the late 
seventies led to the declaration of Kavango as a security district. This included the 
establishment of military basis in uKwangali namely Nepara, Musese, Mpungu, Nkure-
nkuru and at Kahenge and at Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School. The complexities of 
the South African military forces in uKwangali had a diverse social and economic impact 
on the inhabitants.  
 The extension of the martial law by the South African regime in Kavango which 
empowered the South African forces with wider power to commit and conducted all sorts 
of violence including sexual violence especially on woman had adverse effect on 
civilians. The presence of the South African military forces and the use of conventional 
and unconventional strategies among the civilians created insecurity, fear and mistrust 
among themselves.  
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The influx of PLAN cadres into the interior of uKwangali in the 1980s made it an 
area of concentration by the South African forces who imposed their diverse conventional 
and unconventional strategies on civilians. The atrocities and brutal activities that were 
orchestrated by the South African forces, in particular the Koevoet unit, was part of its 
wider unconventional strategy which had tremendous and adverse impact on the life of 
the inhabitants. Though the presence of the South African forces had this serious impact 
on the lives of the inhabitants, the operations of the South African forces failed to halt the 
increased collaboration of the inhabitants with PLAN.  
Militarily, the presence of the South African military forces in uKwangali left 
memories characterized by atrocities and brutality. Though Kavango region was heavily 
militarized by the South African military regime, the regime did not impose total military 
control over the region and in uKwangali district in particular. Whilst highlighting the 
conventional and unconventional strategies used by the South African forces in Kavango 
in Chapter Three, detailed analysis of the impacts of unconventional strategy on civilians 
and the micro-politics between civilians, South African forces and SWAPO will be dealt 
with in Chapter Four. 
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                                                      CHAPTER FOUR 
 
WINNING THE HEART AND MINDS? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
CIVILIANS OF UKWANGALI DISTRICT OF KAVANGO WITH BOTH 
SWAPO AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME DURING THE 1980s  
 
Introduction 
While Chapter Three discussed more conventional military tactics in Kavango, this 
chapter explores the unconventional tactics of the South African security forces in 
particular, and the micro-politics of the daily relationship between civilians and the 
SADF, and civilians and SWAPO. This chapter thus seeks to analyze the dynamics of the 
relationships which existed between the inhabitants of uKwangali district and both the 
South African military forces (SADF and Koevoet), and the South West African People’s 
Organization (SWAPO) with its military wing PLAN. The chapter looks particularly at 
how the selected area was affected by individuals who collaborated with these different 
military forces.  
This chapter describes how the people in uKwangali district coped with the 
challenges from each side and how this changed over time. The unconventional strategies 
imposed on the civilians, especially by the South African military forces to destroy the 
positive image of SWAPO, will be examined in detail. Chapter Four will also assess the 
effectiveness of SWAPO’s strategies to maintain and extend its support base among 
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civilians. A section dealing with the radio interviews of the three chiefs in Kavango on 
the political turmoil of 1989 will show just how complicated their position in relation to 
the interim regime remained during the final period of the liberation struggle, as the 
situation intensified. 
The civilian perception of the South African military regime 
The perception of the civilians in uKwangali district towards the South African regime 
was determined by the nature of the military strategies imposed by its regime. The 
propaganda used by the South African military forces and its intelligence service, was the 
most important aspect which influenced the perceptions of civilians of uKwangali during 
the 1980s. Anti-SWAPO pamphlets, papers and pictures portraying a negative 
representation of SWAPO used to be circulated by the South African intelligence services 
at night at schools and communities to deceive villagers against SWAPO and its military 
wing PLAN. Thus in return villagers were expected to co-operate and report PLAN 
cadres’ presence to the South African military forces.  
In order to win the minds and hearts of the civilians, the South African military 
forces embarked upon a number of conventional and unconventional strategies to 
transform the perception of the civilians of Kavango and of uKwangali district in 
particular. Thus local young boys twenty five years of age in every ethnic group were 
recruited to serve in the South African military forces (SADF and Koevoet). This strategy 
I believe was meant to implicate civilians whose relatives were recruited into these 
forces, and turn them against PLAN fighters.  
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Gende Alloys a former Captain in the South African Defence Force (SADF) in 
Kavango stated that in 1977 they (the SADF) recruited twice in the year and this was in 
line with the South African military strategy to recruit more army in Kavango.224 This he 
(Gende) said that militarily a platoon consists of two hundred and fifty men. This means 
that fifty recruits from each ethnic unit in Kavango will make up a platoon. This was also 
to give a balance in the representation of the people recruited from each ethnic district.   
It can be argued that the strategy was intended to create an impression that all 
traditional leaders in Kavango were loyal and collaborated with the South African 
military regime. The propaganda by the South African regime about the negative 
ideologies of communism with which SWAPO was associated, was one conventional 
strategy used by the South African forces to influence the civilian’s perception.  
The use of Reconnaissance (Recce) who pretended to be PLAN cadres who 
committed atrocities was thus meant to give civilians a negative image of PLAN 
insurgents.  It must be noted that during this period all the military forces the South 
African Defence Force (SADF), Koevoet and the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
(PLAN) which operated in uKwangali district were competing in influencing and gaining 
support among the residents of the district. Therefore every military force embarked upon 
different strategies to influence and maintain its relationship with the civilians. For 
example, some individuals were bribed and recruited as informers (spies) who provided 
the South African forces with information regarding individuals who collaborated with 
SWAPO insurgents. The spies who received allowances helped the military regime with 
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information which enabled them to crack down on suspected individual SWAPO 
collaborators.  
Though some individuals had little knowledge about the impact of the South 
African military regime, I believe that the residents of uKwangali district perceived the 
South African regime in both a positive and negative light. This was merely from the fact 
that the inhabitants were caught in the middle of the operational forces. Although the 
South African forces used to claim to maintain peace and stability in the district, they 
used to harass and assault civilians especially Koevoet.  In this context ordinary civilians 
were unable to resist against the South African armed forces. This means that whenever 
SADF and Koevoet in particular visited villages, individuals were expected to co-operate 
and to provide the (South African forces) with information through conventional and 
unconventional strategies.225 It was against these developments that the people of 
uKwangali perceived the South African forces in a negative context. 
As a measure to suppress the civilian’s support and influence the perception of 
PLAN guerrillas, Koevoet used to exhibit photographs of atrocities allegedly committed 
by PLAN combatants and publicly show corpses of PLAN guerillas killed in battle as 
anti-SWAPO scare tactics.226 The unconventional terror tactics used by the South African 
military forces were meant to create fear, tension, trauma and confusion among ordinary 
civilians during the 1980s.  
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Alexander and her co- authors McGregor and Ranger indicate that to counter-
attack guerrilla insurgents, unconventional tactics like poisoning campaign were used in 
Shangani (Zimbabwe) by the Rhodesian forces launched in 1976 as a source of fear, 
trauma and confusion.227 Thus to win the hearts and minds of the civilians in Rhodesia, 
the District Commissioner and the army held meetings around the district warning 
civilians against the brutality of terrorists and exhibiting photographs of atrocities said to 
be committed by the guerillas.228 This was meant to discredit the guerillas’ credibility 
among the civilians who were the main source of their support.   
The common unconventional strategy imposed on civilians of uKwangali by the 
Koevoet units was that of exhibiting dead corpses of PLAN combatants killed during 
operations. This strategy I believe was used to demonstrate the military strength of 
Koevoet to the civilians, hoping for the civilians to develop a positive perception of the 
unit. The counter insurgency unit (Koevoet) also resorted to intimidation, assaults, and 
destruction of property. Threatening civilians with military devices like a hand grenade 
was quite common.229 This meant that even the sound of a Casspir coming created fear 
among the civilians of uKwangali.  
           Reading the literature on the armed struggle on Namibia and that of Zimbabwe, I 
can argue that the unconventional strategies used by the Rhodesian forces to counter 
guerilla insurgents in Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) have similar features to that of 
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Koevoet, the counter insurgency unit which operated in Namibia in the 1980s. According 
to Alexander, civilians indicate that government forces in Rhodesia depended on a degree 
of violence.230 This can be related to the lack of professional training. In terms of 
brutalities, the paramilitary unit the District Security Assistance (DSA) in Zimbabwe was 
very rough and they were untrained in most cases.231 The paramilitary unit attacked 
civilians and their property, a trend similar to that of the Koevoet unit which operated in 
Namibia whenever they carried out raids or searched for SWAPO insurgents.   
       Unlike in Namibia the recruitment of the DSA was largely voluntary and the 
majority of the recruits were locals who were deployed within their home district where 
they operated among people they knew.232  Community development officers, dip tank 
attendants and forestry rangers were prominent members of the DSA in Zimbabwe.233 
Highly reputable whites were involved in the DSA command, the same structure which 
existed in the Koevoet force in Namibia whereby each Koevoet unit had white officers 
who gave orders to their black subordinates to abuse civilians. Hence the work by 
Alexander indicates that the primary motivation for joining DSA was financial gain. Thus 
I would contend that the cruelty of the DSA in Zimbabwe and Koevoet in Namibia had 
similar maniacal behavior in the sense that the same strategies of assaults and brutality 
were used in extracting information. This can be attributed to the level of the inadequate 
training given to them which was just that of handling a gun only. Thus means that they 
were not well trained to use conventional warfare strategies, but rather trained to 
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eliminate freedom fighters and gather intelligence. Therefore these paramilitary were not 
having any mercy with guerilla sympathizers and used violence and force at all costs to 
eliminate guerilla insurgents and collaborators.  
            It should be understood that Col Hans Dreyer the co-founder of the Koevoet unit 
in Namibia also operated in southern Rhodesia, today called Zimbabwe. The anti-guerilla 
combat techniques used in Rhodesia in 1967 by Dreyer (and Selous Scouts) which are 
similar to the techniques of Flechas used in Mozambique trained for the total elimination 
of guerilla fighters and gathering of information show similarities with the techniques 
used by Dreyer in Namibia.234 Thus the strategies of assaults directed against civilians in 
Namibia by Koevoet units are similar to those used by Selous Scouts in Zimbabwe, as 
well as the use of informers ‘spies’. Thus all these strategies imposed on civilians were 
intended to instill fear and transform the civilian’s perception towards guerrilla fighters.   
As indicated at the beginning of the chapter, leaflets containing propaganda 
information used to be dropped by the South African airplanes around the villages in the 
district. This method was used to portray the incapacity of PLAN combatants’ military 
strength toward the South African forces. Beating was a strategy used to instill fear and 
frustration among civilians to develop a negative perception towards SWAPO guerillas. 
Thus in return, civilians were expected to develop a negative perception accusing the 
PLAN combatants’ presence in their villages as being the cause of all the assaults, 
beatings and atrocities inflicted upon them by Koevoet.235 The propaganda by the South 
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African forces created a situation where the inhabitants of uKwangali felt insecure at 
their first encounter with PLAN. Militarily, civilians were indoctrinated through posters, 
cartoons, to develop a negative perception towards SWAPO.236 Though the South Africa 
regime used different military strategy to mislead the local people, the perceptions of the 
people towards the South African forces were characterized by fear, helplessness and 
resentment. This means that civilians especially those living in inland villages of 
uKwangali did not have any choice but were subject to all these strategies imposed upon 
them.  
In order to achieve all these military and political objectives, different 
methodologies were used by the South African military structure. The occupation army 
also used the pseudo-cultural organizations such as Etango in Oshiwambo or Ezuva in 
Kwangali and conducted shows for children in which they were indoctrinated with 
debased and anti-patriotic ideas through lectures, decadent videos and films as well as 
other immoral and anti-social activities.237  
The anti-patriotic ideas through lecturers were thus meant to transform children’s 
perception towards the South African regime. Thus I can confess that when I watched the 
film of the famine which hit Ethiopia, a sense of the inability of a black-led government 
was conveyed to school-going children which is incorrect. It can be argued that the film 
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was instrumental in shaping the understanding of school-going children to a certain 
degree.238    
The used of pseudo organizations like Ezuva (the Sun) and Mpungu Youth 
Organization which operated under the umbrella political party the Democratic 
Turrnhalle Alliance (DTA) helped to an extent to transform the perception of some 
civilians towards the South African regime into a more positive light.239 Alloys Gende a 
former SADF member who worked for this section of information and publicity in 
Kavango stated that they used to travel throughout the region showing video films and 
informing people on social issues.240  
Under Ezuva pseudo programs, Youth Camps were set up across the region where 
school pupils came together to compete in cultural dance and church songs. The Youth 
Camps were equipped with facilities such as a hall, accommodation for learners, a kraal 
for livestock e.g. cattle and goats which were slaughtered during the cultural festival 
days.241 During these festivals some learners use to be transported in the South African 
military trucks. All these attempts were done just to indirectly win the hearts and mind of 
the learners and for the learners to develop a positive attitude towards the South African 
regime. Among the activities run by the Ezuva organization to indoctrinate the youth, 
was that of showing learners video films about sport like boxing and social political 
transformation in Africa. The video programs used to draw huge numbers of the learners. 
                                                             
238 Personal experience based on the videos which were shown by the SADF at school in Kavango in the 
region in the mid eighties.1984-1987. 
239 Interview with Nestor Mufenda, Rundu, Kavango Regional Council, 28 December 2007.  
240 Interview with Alloys Gende, a former captain in the South West African Territory Force (SWATF), 
Sambyu district, Kayengona, 27 December 2007. 
241 Interview with Kamati Damasius, A district leader of the Leevi Hakusembe youth camp in Mbunza, 
Karangana, Mbunza district, 29.January 2008. 
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This was simply because very few learners had access to these facilities during this 
period and this offered the South African officials showing the videos the opportunity to 
influence them and indoctrinate them with anti- SWAPO ideologies.  
The most known video which was showed to the learners was the economic 
turmoil and hunger which took place in Ethiopia.242 The video film was influential in the 
sense that after viewing the film a lecture used to be presented by the South African army 
(a white soldier) asserting that every black led government was not capable of governing 
its own country.243 Thus he (the white soldier) emphasized that if the local people of 
Kavangoland (as it used to be called) were collaborating with SWAPO and its military 
wing PLAN it was possible that the same situation could happen in Kavango.244  
Under the pretext of Ezuva activities, the South African military section for 
information and publicity managed to brainwash the perception of the youth especially 
school-going learners. This video film even created a joke where learners used to refer to 
someone who was very thin as Ethiopia.245 This meant that the video had a strong impact 
on the understanding of the learners who were led to believe that SWAPO was incapable 
of governing the country.   
The activities of Ezuva were instrumental in influencing school-going pupils and 
school dropouts to develop an interest to join the South African Army. The other 
programme of Ezuva was that of training the youth with semi-military skills. Johannes 
                                                             
242 Personal experience based on the videos which were shown at schools by the SADF forces, 1984-1987. 
243 Personal experience based on the videos which were shown at schools by the SADF forces, 1984-1987. 
244 Personal experience based on the videos which were shown by the SADF at school in Kavango in the 
region in the mid eighties, 1984-1987.  
245Personal experience based on the videos which were shows by the SADF at school in Kavango in the 
region in the mid eighties, 1984-1987.   
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Songora a former learner at Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School recalls that every 
holiday all the boys who were ready for military conscription were selected in schools 
across the Kavango region to attend the semi-military training at Frans Dimbare, a Youth 
Camp.246 Frans Dimbare Youth Camp was located in Mbukushu district 200km east of 
Rundu. Thus the operation of this organization was not really cultural as it sounded, but 
was used as a strategy to achieve the South African army’s political-military agenda. 
Songora stated that the training which was given to the learners was similar to the 
one given to the recruited South Africans soldiers. During the week of the training, each 
learner was given a bag with all the first aid military training kit items.247 These included 
a map, foodstuffs, and a box of match, teabags and a compass. Most of the youth in the 
region who join the South African Army (SADF and Koevoet) were graduates from this 
semi-military training at Frans Dimbare.248 This strategy influenced the youth to develop 
a positive perception towards the South African military regime without knowing the 
political and military motive behind the Ezuva programme.  
Given the strategies of the South African military forces which used both 
conventional and unconventional methods, some people in the Kavango region become 
collaborators of the South African regime. Consequently some people became prominent 
members of the opposition political party DTA.249  In uKwangali district however the 
perception of the inhabitants towards the South African Army was not as satisfactory as 
envisaged. This was due to the unprecedented number of PLAN combatants who 
                                                             
246 Interview with Johannes Songora, Rundu, Engen new houses complex Location, 29 January 2008. 
247 Interview with Kamati Maurus, Rundu, Tutungeni Location, 28 January 2008. 
248 Interview with Kamati Maurus, Rundu, Tutungeni Location, 28.01.2008. 
249 DTA The first official opposition party after Namibia first democratic election.  
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operated in the district who were able to educate the inhabitants of uKwangali about the 
negative impact of South African colonialism. Even the youth camp which was supposed 
to be established in uKwangali at Katara did not materialize due to the threats posed by 
the presence of PLAN cadres in the district. The presence of the PLAN cadres in the 
district accorded them the opportunity to mobilize the inhabitants of uKwangali to 
develop a sense of nationalism and loyalty to their own country and fostered the desire to 
gain independence.250 It should be understood that during the 1980s if one was regarded 
as a collaborator of SWAPO, who were regarded as bringing instability in the region, it 
was bad news. Thus the support for SWAPO came at a price.  
The establishment of the Kavango Legislative Council in which the local 
traditional leaders were co-opted to serve as councilors and ministers was a tool intended 
to indirectly transform the perception of the local leaders into a more positive view of the 
South African regime. Thus the political developments of the 1970s for which traditional 
leaders served as members of the Kavango Legislative Council as stipulated by Act 54 of 
1968, influenced some traditional leaders in Kavango to have a favourable view of the 
South African regime.251   
The Legislative Council’s structure created a local political vacuum where the 
traditional leaders in the Kavango were unable to unite and act against any laws which 
were passed for endorsement. In this context, the South African administration had 
fostered its political relationship with certain chiefs in the Kavango region.252 Thus the 
                                                             
250 Personal experience based on the PLAN cadre’s operation in uKwangali district spreading the gospel of 
liberation to civilians in the villages, 1980-1989. 
251  For discussion of the Odendaal Commission see Chapter One. 
252L. Cliffe et al, The transition to independence in Namibia (London: Lynne Reiner, 1994), p.95. 
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chiefs and headmen in the Kavango Legislative were caught up in patron-client 
relationship in which they did not wish to jeopardize their financial position and 
dependency.253 
The strategy created by the Legislative Council to win over and isolate the chiefs 
will be described later in the chapter. The remuneration paid to the member of the 
Legislative Council motivated some members to have a positive perception to the 
military regime. In this context it is arguable that the above strategies implemented by the 
South African regime were aimed at gaining support from the local leaders and the 
civilians in order to turn their support away from SWAPO and its military wing PLAN.  
It should be understood that while the South African regime was implementing all 
its military strategies in uKwangali, PLAN combatants used a different methodology to 
win the support of the inhabitants of uKwangali.  Looking at the strategies used by the 
South African forces and the PLAN combatants on the other hand, political maturity was 
then needed by the civilians in uKwangali to deal with these two forces which were 
operating in the same area.   
Growing up in uKwangali during this period I can contend that especially for the 
civilians who lived in the inland villages of uKwangali, people did not have many 
choices as to how to deal with these forces (SADF, Koevoet and PLAN) which operated 
in uKwangali. As indicated in the previous chapters the main problem was the insecurity. 
The South African forces used to ambush civilian homesteads targeting PLAN cadres 
who depended on civilians for food. The danger was that if the two forces came into 
                                                             
253L. Cliffe et al, The transition to independence in Namibia (London: Lynne Reiner, 1994), p.95. 
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contact with each other in the same homestead and fighting broke out, the exchange of 
fire put the civilian’s life at risk.  Munguya Gabriel stated that civilian life was very 
difficult. For example during the day one can say it was better because you could see who  
was coming to one’s house, unlike at night where one did not know who was coming and 
was only alerted by the barking of dogs that people are coming to the homestead.254 This 
left civilians with uncertainty about who was coming and what to expect from their visit. 
In most cases, people had to deal with the South African forces during the day and at 
night with the PLAN cadres. This was the nature of day and night in this war.  
 
Perception of the chiefs towards political developments in Kavango 
during the 1980s 
During the political conflict of the 1980s, the traditional leaders in the Kavango region 
were caught in between. Thus under the Kavango Legislative Council, the traditional 
leaders especially the chiefs were expected to make laws and implement them as 
envisaged by the South African regime. In 1989, three chiefs in Kavango were 
interviewed over the Kavango Radio with regard to the political turmoil which prevailed 
in the region.255 The chiefs were that of Gciriku (Sebastian Kamwanga), Sambyu 
(Gothard Haininga) and of uKwangali (Sitentu Mpasi). 
                                                             
254 Interview with Gabriel Munguya, uKwangali district, Nepara village, 24 July 2007. 
255Interview programme presented on the Kavango Radio in 1989 where three chiefs in Kavango were 
asked with regard to the decision taken by the Council which mandated the South African forces to arrest 
and assault civilians wearing T-shirts written SWAPO and NANSO. 
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During the interview, the three chiefs were asked whether they had taken a 
decision which gave the South African forces the mandate to assault and arrest people 
wearing T-shirts bearing SWAPO and NANSO slogans. In response, three different 
accounts were presented by the leaders of Kavango over the Radio. Chief Kamwanga of 
vaGciriku district explained that it was not legal according to the customary law of the 
Gciriku to prohibit people to wear T-shirts, irrespective of what has been written on it.256 
Kamwanga stated that as the chief of the tribe he did not have any power to intervene in 
any military and political related activities.  
Chief Kamwanga said that those who were alleging that the chiefs have mandated 
the South African forces to arrest and assault people were not correct. He stated that for 
those who were wearing T-shirts let it be of DTA, Ezuva or any political party striving 
for the peace in South West Africa (Namibia), it was not a problem according to 
Kamwanga. The chief reiterated that what people must bear in mind is that as a chief, it 
was not in his capacity to intervene in any military activities of the soldiers. The power 
was vested within the soldiers themselves to act accordingly, if they realized that the 
situation was not favourable for security reasons.257 Thus people must not think that they 
(the chiefs) mandated the South Africa forces to assault and arrest people wearing 
SWAPO and the Namibian National Student Organisation (NANSO) T-shirts.   
While the chief of the Gciriku denied having any knowledge about the decision, 
Gothard Haininga of Sambyu acknowledged that the claim was true according to the 
                                                             
256Tape recording interview of Sebastian Kamwanga, the chief of the vaGciriku tribe presented on Kavango 
Radio during the 1989 political unrest in Kavango. 
257Tape recording interview of Sebastian Kamwanga, the chief of the vaGciriku tribe presented on Kavango 
Radio during the 1989 political unrest in Kavango. 
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decision taken during their Council meeting. From the recording on the Radio, the chiefs 
of Sambyu said that whoever found wearing T-shirt bearing SWAPO and NANSO 
slogans, must be brought to his palace to be punished accordingly. In addition the chief 
would ask those individuals who gave them the permission to wear T-shirt of this nature 
in his tribal territory. Thus he (Haininga) asserted that even the parents of those children 
would have caution about why their children were wearing T-shirts with writings which 
were not allowed and did not belong to the Kavango area.258 The chief of Sambyu 
concluded that any one in his tribal territory found wearing SWAPO and NANSO T-
shirts, must be brought to his palace to be tried and punished according to the Sambyu 
customary law.  
Though the account by Haininga suggests that the decision was taken during the 
council meeting, the chief of uKwangali, Sitentu Mpasi, responded in a defensive and 
opposing way to the question which was asked to him. The chief of uKwangali claimed 
that he was not present at the Council meeting when the decision was taken. Thus he was 
not well informed and was unable to give proper feedback to the question. Responding to 
the question, the chief noted that for those who were trying to implement the decision, he 
did not see any problems of people wearing T-shirts of that nature. This meant that every 
chief who implemented such a decision (that people must not wear those shirts) would 
land him/herself in a problem.  
Returning to the question, Sitentu Mpasi indicated that even those seeking clarity 
or those who wanted the chiefs to decide on the T-shirt issues, they must consider that 
                                                             
258Tape recording interview with Gothard Haininga, the chief of the vaSambyu tribe presented on Kavango 
Radio during the 1989 political unrest in Kavango. 
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they were the ones in power (the SA military regime). Therefore as a chief, even if he 
refused to adhere to their order or instruction or allowed people to wear those shirts, it 
could still lead him into a big problem.259 Mpasi noted that as mentioned earlier when the 
decision was taken he was not present, he was not part of that decision. He also stated 
that it was not part of his responsibility as a chief to tell people what to wear and what not 
to wear. These were the responsibilities of the soldiers, he emphasized. He noted that 
though they wanted the chiefs to enforce the decision, the soldiers or the military regime 
were the ones who were behind people wearing the SWAPO or NANSO T-shirts.260  
Mpasi reiterated that it seems where these T-shirts were produced, people were 
allowed to wear them.  If the people in Windhoek and the other parts of the country were 
wearing it, why should people in the Kavango not be allowed to wear these shirts he 
asked? This is not allowed according to Mpasi and yet the people are being assaulted. 
The chief of uKwangali noted that this law was only applicable in Kavango but for him, 
he can say that the five oxen261 of Kavango do not pull together in one direction. The 
proverb of the five oxen refers to the inability which existed among the five chiefs of 
Kavango to unite together or take a collective stand to oppose new laws imposed on 
them. Thus it is evident in the accounts presented by the three chiefs over the radio that 
unity did not prevail in the council. Mpasi stated that in his district if people were 
arrested because of wearing SWAPO and NANSO T-shirts, let those who arrested them 
                                                             
259 Tape recording interview with Sitentu Mpasi, the chief of uKwangali presented on Kavango Radio 
during the 1989 political unrest in Kavango. 
260 Tape recording interview with Sitentu Mpasi the chief of uKwangali presented on Kavango Radio 
during the 1989 political unrest in Kavango. 
261 The five oxen the chief refers to the five tribal chief in the Kavango region who does not co-operate 
tighter. 
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deal with it and punish them as he did not have the power to punish individuals wearing 
T-shirts with SWAPO and NANSO slogans.    
He suggested that the military personnel must take care of those problems. Thus 
he argued that if in Windhoek people were wearing these T-shirts, this meant that it was 
approved even by the court of law. The chief of uKwangali contended that even those 
who were being assaulted might not know the legal proceedings to take against those 
assaulting them. This he related that even if the chief happen to punish an individual who 
knew the legal proceedings and had a broader political knowledge, legal action could be 
laid against the chief. Thus he alluded to the fact that even the chief who is implementing 
this law in his territory can become a victim of this legal action. Thus Sitentu Mpasi 
believed that even a chief would be in a big problem.  
The chief of uKwangali asserted that he would not punish anyone. If such a case 
happened in his territory he would rather refer them to those who are behind it, the 
soldiers. The chief reiterated that what people should know is that these are political 
parties’ T-shirts. All those political parties are legally allowed and are approved to 
conduct their political activities, be it that of SWAPO, DTA or which ever organization. 
Lastly he cautioned that if people in Windhoek were wearing it but were not being 
arrested or assaulted, why should the people in Kavango be arrested and assaulted?    
Hearing the accounts by the three chiefs, one can conclude that the subject was 
discussed during the Legislative Council proceedings. It should be understood that in 
June 1985 a Transitional Government of National Unity excluding (SWAPO) was set up 
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in Windhoek, although the United Nations (UN) refused to recognise it.262 Though the 
interim government was not recognised by the United Nations (UN), its power was 
exercised in all the declared homelands.  
The question which needs clarity is whether the chiefs took a collective decision 
to implement the decision or to reject it. Thus under the interim government, the 
traditional leaders were expected to endorse and implement the laws from the central 
government. However if one listens the accounts of the chiefs, individual reactions 
towards the subject can be detected in their responses.   
The riddle mentioned by the chief of uKwangali that the five oxen in Kavango do 
not pull in one direction, simply suggests that under the Kavango Legislative Council, the 
chiefs were not in a position to unite under one forum to react to whatever laws which 
were imposed on them by the interim regime let it be politically or militarily. In this 
context, the Legislative Council was used by the South African administration as a tool 
intended to achieve their political and military objectives.   
Listening to the recorded version, Chief Kamwanga of Gciriku and Sitentu of 
uKwangali, a sense of diplomacy can be observed in their response to the question they 
were asked. This was unlike the account of Haininga of Sambyu who stated that the 
subject was discussed by the chiefs during their council meeting. Against these political 
developments it is not correct to generalize that all the chiefs in Kavango cooperated as 
the South African regime perceived the matter. Thus the responses of the chiefs clearly 
                                                             
262 http://www.iss.co.za/Af/ profile/Namibia/politics.html, accessed on 09.05.2008. 
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demonstrate that every chief in Kavango reacted in his /her individual capacity against 
South African rule during the 1989 transition period.  
 
The perception of the civilians of uKwangali district towards SWAPO   
In order to analyse and contextualize the armed liberation struggle in uKwagali district of 
the Kavango, select literature concerning guerilla warfare and government counter-
insurgency elsewhere in Southern Africa will be referred to here. Reading the work by 
Kriger on peasants and the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, I can contend that the 
interaction between the guerilla fighters such as the Zimbabwe People Revolutionary 
Army (ZIPRA) and civilians in Zimbabwe did not differ from that of the People 
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) who operated in Namibia and in uKwangali district 
in particular. 
Scholtz argues that because of their proximity in Southern Angola, PLAN cadres 
were in a position to infiltrate large bands of guerillas into Kavango as well as into the 
geographical centre of Ovamboland, thereby stretching the operational area to a great 
extent and threatening to overstretch the South African security forces deployed to 
counter them.263 Therefore PLAN cadres who came into Kavango entered the region via 
uKwangali district before spreading across the entire region.264 This system of infiltration 
in the region made uKwangali district the most influential area by the PLAN combatants 
                                                             
263S. Brown, “Diplomacy by other means”, in Leys and Saul: Namibia Liberation struggle: The two-edge 
sword (London: Ohio University Press, 1995).p.23.  
264S. Brown, “Diplomacy by other means”, in Leys and Saul: Namibia Liberation struggle: The two-edge 
sword (London: Ohio University Press, 1995).p.23.  
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and consequently undermined the spheres of South African influence in uKwangali.  The 
arrival of PLAN in uKwangali district which was the main entrance of the PLAN 
combatants in the late 1970s was perceived with mixed feelings at the beginning. This 
was due to the propaganda disseminated by the South African intelligence services and 
the inhabitants’ lack of political knowledge about SWAPO and its military wing PLAN.   
As indicated in Chapter Two, Ndeulitufa Kalomoh well known by the combat 
name Hakushinda and who was also called by the local name Kambare Kanazendeke,265 
explained that PLAN combatants’ infiltration in Kavango region started in 1978.266 
Kolomoh the PLAN commander who was designated to start a new military front in 
Kavango region said that the first group which came into the region was for 
reconnaissance. The first group was under the leadership of Commander Frans Hikunde 
Kapoko and Michael Cleo Hainyeko. This group came to see the geographical landscape 
of the region and to assess the attitude of the local people towards SWAPO.  
The group which came in November 1978 led by Hausiku entered the region via 
Wiwi a village close to Ovamboland in the Mpungu constituency.267 The reception at 
Abraham Nghilundilwa homestead was good and they were welcomed without any 
problems. From Wiwi this group of combatants proceeded to Katope Komugoro where 
they split into small units of four and five men each. Kalomoh noted that at their first 
appearance amongst the inhabitants of the uKwangali district, villagers perceived them 
                                                             
265 A ruKwangali description which means a hat dressed on the head one side like a soldier, 
266Archive for Anti-Colonial Resistance and Liberations Struggle (AACRLS) Interview by Aaron Nambadi 
with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to operate in Kavango, Rundu, 
Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
267 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
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with uncertainty. Most of the civilians were afraid of them and some deserted their 
homesteads claiming that the unidentified soldiers had come with the intention to kill 
civilians, civil servants and to confiscate their goods. This was in line with the South 
African regime’s propaganda.268  A practical example of this uncertainty was in February 
1978 when PLAN cadres came to Muparara village. On this day, the late Leena Katumbu 
Mpasi deserted her homestead out of fear of being killed by unknown forces when she 
saw them (PLAN) at Kasimba a village 5km north of Muparara.269 Mpasi Leena was the 
one who informed us (children at Karapo’s homestead) to desert the house for fear of 
being killed. The mother in-law of Mpasi Leena who deserted her house also out of fear 
and was later found by PLAN cadres at Karapo’s homestead hiding in a thatched house 
with her child clearly indicates that the people were very frightened.270  
Kalomoh stated that because of the uncertainty which emerged among the local 
people, the group did not proceed further throughout the region but instead went up to 
Muparara and Mpungu villages in uKwangali district and returned into the interior of 
Ovamboland.271  
Considering the political understanding of the people in Kavango especially in the 
late 1970s, it was difficult for them (PLAN cadres) to continue with their guerilla warfare 
operations. The PLAN commander said that at these homesteads they visited, a sense of 
fear could be detected on people’s faces. However, Kalomoh indicated that those who 
                                                             
268 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005. 
269 Personal memory on the first arrival of PLAN combatants at Muparara villages in uKwangali February 
1978. 
270 Personal memory on the first arrival of PLAN combatants at Muparara villages in uKwangali February 
1978. 
271Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
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knew some political background of SWAPO and PLAN, and especially those whose 
children had left the country into exile, were able to communicate with them and ask the 
whereabouts of their children abroad.272 For example the late Matjayi (a headman) at 
Gava whose son Mpasi went into exile was in a position to help the PLAN cadres, and 
even help them to influence other civilians not to fear but to help them as liberators. But 
those misled by the South African regime deserted their homesteads and settled along the 
Kavango river, fearing to be killed by the PLAN combatants.273  
The former PLAN commander asserts that though they stayed three days at Gava, 
giving political education lectures at the night, a sense of fear could be detected in the 
faces of these people showing that they were affected by the propaganda of South Africa. 
Thus the belief that SWAPO came with the intention to kill all the Headmen including all 
civil servants working in the South West Africa (Namibia) colonial government could be 
seen among some villagers. The insecurity, tension and fear which were detected within 
the villages prompted the commander to convene a meeting with Chief Sitentu Mpasi and 
his senior headman Alex Muranda.274  
The aim of the meeting was to brief the two senior traditional leaders about the 
political ideology of SWAPO. The two leaders of uKwangali were urged to tell villagers 
not to live in fear and to returning to their villages, homestead, fields and livestock since 
the PLAN combatants did not come to kill ordinary civilians.  
                                                             
272 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005. 
273 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
274Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.   
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The deliberation with the two leaders according to Kalomoh helped transformed 
the perception of the some civilians of uKwangali towards SWAPO and PLAN 
combatants. Kalomoh asserts that as from that time the perception of the people towards 
PLAN cadres changed and most people started retuning to their villages and the PLAN 
cadres did not experience any problem with the inhabitants of uKwangali apart from 
exceptional cases.275 These are common features in a liberation war zone area where 
civilian support is shared across the operational forces. The meeting with the two leaders 
transformed uKwangali district into an area accessible for PLAN cadres operation and its 
inhabitants started to co-operate with PLAN combatants.  
The complexities of the South African propaganda also prompted Kalomoh and 
his men to embark upon holding secret meetings at every household they visited during 
the night to educate the people about the main aims and objectives of SWAPO. Through 
this political education civilians were told that the aim of PLAN was not that of killing 
the ordinary citizens, but to liberate the country from the South African illegal military 
occupation.276  
The political education campaigns which they conducted enabled some people of 
uKwangali to render the necessary support. The other important aspect which convinced 
the people of uKwangali was the presence of the PLAN combatants who came from the 
district who had gone into exile and returned as PLAN cadres. Among them were Olli 
Kazungura, Voitto Jasson and Josef Shanyengana known as Himba who were from 
                                                             
275Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005. 
276Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
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Mpungu.277 The assistance provided by the inhabitants of uKwangali included medicine, 
information and accommodation. One can conclude that PLAN combatants felt to some 
degree at home when they operated in uKwangali echoed Kalomoh.  
           Medication and medical treatment were given by individuals like Sister Rosalia 
Nghidhinwa (the current Minister of Home Affairs in Namibia) and secretly given to the 
PLAN combatant’s medical officer to treat their fellow PLAN patients.278 The 
complexities of South African propaganda resulted in many PLAN combatants being 
deployed to operate in the Kavango region with the aim to educate and explain the 
objectives of SWAPO to the people. Thus the inhabitants of the region were urged to co-
operate and work hand in hand with PLAN cadres and to provide the necessary support. 
The political education conducted helped the PLAN cadres to contain the operations of 
the South African military forces.  
              Kriger argues that in terms of logistics guerilla fighters organized peasants, 
youth and the elite to meet their logistical needs for resources - food, money clothing and 
intelligence about the regime’s forces and informers.279 Like in Zimbabwe, the livelihood 
of PLAN cadres in uKwangali depended on the civilians offering help on an individual 
basis as compared with Zimbabwe where an effective system existed in the Tribal Trust 
Land. As in uKwangali, Kriger also argues that guerrillas used to contact selected 
individuals –those with nationalist histories or chiefs and headman for food and 
                                                             
277Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
278Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
279 J. N. Kriger, Zimbabwe Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices –African Studies Series 70 (Cambridge: 
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information, the trend similar to the one used by the PLAN cadres who operated in 
uKwangali. Moreover, the use of conventional and unconventional strategies by the 
government forces seems to have similar features in any guerrilla warfare country or 
district. 
          Contrary to the South African regime which used the pseudo-strategies, and 
unconventional strategy to gain support, PLAN cadres relied on political education using 
pamphlets and pictures to give civilians a progressive positive image of SWAPO in its 
military bases in exile.280 The political lectures which were conducted at night helped 
transform the perception of the civilians to render an effective support toward PLAN 
fighters.281 In order to gain support, the PLAN cadres relied mainly on enlightening 
people about the politics to liberate and fight for their rights and independence.  
            This political education, according to Kalomoh who operated in the region, was 
spread by singing liberation songs to civilians after the meeting and by giving them 
SWAPO badges.282 This motivated people to develop a sense of loyalty towards SWAPO 
as a political movement. The mode of singing liberation songs, learning slogans and the 
use of a political campaign reflects the similarity to the methodology used by ZIPRA the 
armed wing of ZAPU in Zimbabwe.  
          Political education was one of the most important tasks of the guerilla fighters in 
any warfare area to gain support and popularity. Kriger argues that the most important 
                                                             
280 Personal experience on PLAN cadres operation and interaction with villages conducting political 
education to civilians which took place during the night, 1980-1987. 
281Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
282Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
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interaction between guerillas and civilians took place at ‘Moraris’, usually held after dusk 
at a spot close to the guerrilla base and to protect them from easy access by security 
forces. The direct contact with civilians was an opportunity for guerillas to offer political 
education.283 Kriger also argues that at times a guerrilla would step into the centre of the 
circle formed by villagers, introduce himself, repeat slogans and lead a song glorifying 
the past. The strategy commonly used by guerrillas in any liberation war zone of singing 
slogans was an indication of solidarity. 
           In uKwangali the political education was conducted by PLAN cadres who 
operated in small units of four to five per group.284 Though this used to take place at night 
this form of political education was given to adults only who were told to tell children not 
to disclose any information about their whereabouts to the enemy. These interactions or 
gatherings used to take place outside the household to avoid being attacked by the 
enemies who used to ambush civilian homesteads. The nature of this type of interaction 
was due to the fact that the inland villagers’ homesteads were less populated as compared 
with Zimbabwe where community structures with committees were established in the 
Tribal Trust Lands to control the activities of the guerilla fighters. 
Logistic and other support from the local civilians  
In uKwangali communication (logistic support) was one important aspect needed for the 
success of the guerilla warfare on the ground. The need for batteries to enable the 
commander to communicate to their military bases to Luanda and in southern Angola 
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was a very important logistic need. The problem which confronted Kalomoh was where 
to get this help? According to Kalomoh teachers like Mr. Ngoma ‘Disco’ from Insu 
village, Wellem Kandjimi from Gava and Robert Karapo from Muparara who owned 
vehicles, with whom Kalomoh established a good relationship, were the ones he 
(Kalomoh) used to send to Rundu to recharge and buy new batteries. The same people 
were sent even when goods such as food rations were needed. 285 In this way the problem 
of batteries was attended to by the above teacher. 
              The PLAN commander also noted that during this period few people had cars. 
Among them were a man who used to work at Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) 
called Odja John, then Mr. Karapo, Mr. Ngoma known as Disco and Mr. Wellem 
Kandjimi. The logistical support given by the local civilians helped Kalomoh to establish 
his operational headquarters at a village called Nculi (see Appendix.1.the map of 
uKwangali district). This place was use as a meeting point where the PLAN commander 
met with all his men to discuss their operations.  It was also used as a warehouse where 
all ammunitions, food, money and the radio were kept. Thus all the radio he (Kalomoh) 
used for communication was gathered at the centre point at Nculi where it was easy to get 
this logistical assistance from those with cars.286 The headquarters at Nculi (see the 
attached Appendix.1.of the of uKwangali) were also an assembly point where PLAN 
combatants within the vicinity met regularly to brief themselves about the progress made, 
about which Kalomoh used to compile a report and communicate it to Luanda.  
                                                             
285 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.   
286Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
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           This means that as a commander his operation was just in a triangle from Nculi to 
Ncaucau and from Ncaucau to Kasimba and from Kasimba to Muparara with the aim to 
have easy access of water and logistical help whenever his battery was flat and needed to 
be recharged. The PLAN commander also asserted that if the inhabitants of uKwangali 
were not having a positive perception towards PLAN cadres, the guerilla warfare could 
have failed and could have not even lasted for a year.287 Thus he believes that the meeting 
with the chief at Namungundo was instrumental because if the people resented rendering 
support, the PLAN cadres could have died of hunger and sickness.   
           In terms of logistics, it was not easy for Kalomoh to operate far from those who 
had cars to help him charging his batteries. He asserted that even some of the military 
materials which they used during the armed struggle were still within the vicinity of 
Nculi. This headquarters at Nculi was well demarcated under a huge big tree. It was in 
general a good site. In some cases to avoid being trapped at one place by the enemies, 
Kalomoh used to transfer his moveable headquarters from Namungundo to Muparara and 
Ncaucau, and if he was leaving the vicinity of Nculi his headquarters were relocated to 
Tondoro at Kapumburu’s area at Kambumbu, a village in the inland of uKwangali.  
             This kind of logistical support of providing batteries was in fact dangerous. This 
resulted in some individual teachers being arrested by the South African military forces. 
In 1983 for example Wellem Kandjimi and Robert Karapo both teachers were arrested 
because of this logistical support given to PLAN combatants.288 However, the PLAN 
                                                             
287 Interview by Aaron Nambadi with Kalomoh Ndeulitufa, the former PLAN commander designated to 
operate in Kavango, Rundu, Tutungeni, 13 May 2005.  
288 Karapo Robert and Wellem Kandjimi were among the individuals arrested for providing logistical 
support to the PLAN commander Kalomoh who operated in uKwangali. 
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commander asserted that they never encountered any problems from the above teachers 
collaborating with the South African regime. Thus he can claim that despite all the 
problems they were exposed to they were reliable SWAPO supporters.289 All the 
assistance they got from the inhabitants of uKwangali demonstrated the positive 
perception they developed during their stay and through the operations of the PLAN 
cadres in uKwangali.   
             The assistance provided by the above teachers such as food, information and 
batteries enabled them to operate effectively and communicate with Luanda and nearby 
bases in Southern Angola.290 Water and food shortages were experienced, mainly during 
the spring season. Moreover the local people assisted PLAN in this regard and due to this 
support, it was difficult for the South African military forces to easily track down the 
guerrillas.291 The vegetation of uKwangali was one factor which affected the operations 
of the South African military forces, because the area is subtropical and was suitable for 
guerilla tactics. This forced the military regime to destroy the area with veld fire and as a 
result the whole area from Mangetti was cleared and most wild fruits which were also a 
source of livelihood were destroyed. 
Kalomoh hence indicated that one major problem which affected the PLAN 
combatants operation was hunger.  He recalls that in 1983 there was a great drought 
which hit the Kavango region, and life was very difficult during this year. Thus he asserts 
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that as soldiers they only relied on eating the Mangetti nuts supplied by some villagers 
who had insufficient food. This became a burden as they always visited those homestead 
for a meal. However, with the help of a successful business man, Rudolf Ngondo, they 
were provided food through his shops at Tondoro, Kahenge and Nzinze which were all in 
uKwangali area.292  
In most cases a reliable individual was entrusted with the task to load foodstuffs 
on a sledge from the above shops. The person who was entrusted would collect the food 
as if it was for personal consumption while in fact it was meant for PLAN cadres. 
Kalomoh also noted that the same foodstuffs which were given to them were partly used 
to supply other PLAN combatants who operated in inland places like Mangetti, 
Grootfontein, Otavi and other places within the country.293 The revelation by Kalomoh 
reveals that the problem of food shortage was solved collectively and with the input by 
Rudolf Ngondo. This is a clear indication that it was because of the good will of the 
civilians of uKwangali that the armed struggle a success.   
Kasoma Paulus a former Koevoet member, well known as ‘Njege’ asserts that the 
perception of the vaKwangali people towards PLAN fighters was very good.294 He stated 
that the vaKwangali people assisted the PLAN combatants as family members and 
liberators.  The former Koevoet member noted that the relationship which existed 
between the inhabitants of uKwangali with PLAN cannot be compared with the rest of 
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the people in the Kavango region, though PLAN cadres operated in the whole region.295 
This he claims made uKwangali a concentrated war zone area in the whole Kavango 
region. 
The former Koevoet member also acknowledged that for the period of fifteen 
years he served in Koevoet, most of his major operations or military contacts with PLAN 
cadres were conducted in uKwangali unlike in the eastern part of the region. The account 
by the former Koevoet member demonstrates the scale of the South African military 
concentration in uKwangali as compared to other parts of the region. 
  It is against this warfare background that Kasoma claimed that the perceptions of 
the people in the eastern part of the region were not similar to those in the western part in 
uKwangali. The vulnerability of the inhabitants of uKwangali made the area conducive 
for operations by PLAN cadres and also enabled PLAN combatants to plant landmines 
and ambush South African military bases.296 The positive perception of the some 
civilians in uKwangali towards PLAN combatants helped them to sustain the Koevoet 
pressure. This was necessary because they were not having enough food and in most 
cases their food got finished on the way from the military camps in Angola.297  
As stated by the former commander above, the former Koevoet member 
concluded that if the inhabitants of uKwangali could have developed a negative 
perception towards the PLAN, the guerilla warfare of the PLAN combatants could have 
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not lasted even for a year in uKwangali district.298 The support provided by the villagers 
was vital to the PLAN combatants’ daily operations since their livelihood depended on 
the people. He hence indicated that as from 1981 when the armed struggle intensified 
most of the people who lived in the hinterland deserted their homesteads and only very 
few individuals were able to stick it out in this situation. This was mainly due to the harsh 
unconventional methods of Koevoet used in extracting information. This included 
assaults, intimidation, destruction of property and military action, while beating was a 
daily exercise.   
Among those who did not desert their villages were Wellem Kandjimi, Karapo 
Robert, Dipi and Mafuta. Kasoma describes Mafuta as one man who was not afraid of the 
white Koevoet officials. This Kasoma stated that at times Mafuta used to retaliate 
physically against the Koevoet unit leader’s beatings and harassment, especially with 
Constable Le Roux nickname “Reru”.299 The above-mentioned individuals were prepared 
to sacrifice their lives and provided the necessary support while most villagers deserted 
their houses in the hinterland of uKwangali. The situation indeed forced some to cross 
over into Angola because of the situation which prevailed in uKwangali. Although some 
individuals deserted their villages, their interaction with PLAN suggests that the 
inhabitants of uKwangali developed a positive perception towards SWAPO and it 
military wing PLAN.300  
  Karora Erastus a former PLAN combatant born in uKwangali district at Simanya 
also stated that the perception of the local people in uKwangali district was very good. 
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This was simply because the majority of those who went into exile during the 1970s were 
from the uKwangali district. This he claims made it easy for the local people to perceive 
them as sons and daughters and provide any assistance needed by the PLAN 
combatants.301   
Food was a necessary basic need for PLAN combatants because in the guerilla 
warfare soldiers did not have time to cook food. The fact that the guerilla warfare is 
normally conducted on an infantry basis made it impossible for the PLAN cadres to carry 
food. This made the local civilians their main source of providing food.302 It should be 
noted that this food was only provided at night thus it was very difficult for them to cook 
as they were pursued by their enemies. Given this support, Munguya noted that the 
interaction between PLAN cadres and the majority of the civilians of uKwangali was 
good. This Munguya claims that it can be confirmed with the former PLAN cadres who 
operated in uKwangali.     
Apart from the food which was provided on a daily basis, medication was also 
given by the staff members who worked at Mpungu and Nepara clinics.303 Hence 
Munguya echoed that those who owned vehicles played a significant role in supporting 
the PLAN combatants. This meant that those having vehicles were not even allowed by 
the South African forces to have a cuca-shop. This was due to the fact that these cuca-
shops were regarded as the place for food storage for the PLAN combatants.304 In cases 
where a PLAN combatant got injured during combat, people used to provide the different 
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modes of transport this included the use of horses or donkeys. This was due to the fact 
that using vehicles was not safe due to mobile roadblocks staged by the South African 
(SA) forces whenever they got information about PLAN insurgent’s movements and 
operations.   
One indication of the positive perception of the vaKwangali people can be 
inferred from the total number of youths who left the district to join the armed struggle in 
exile. Elina Hausiku from Zigizi recalls that among those who went in exile were the late 
Fiina Hausiku, Linna Nakale, Esthera Nakare, the late Voitto Jasson, Lucia 
Nghilundilwa, Shati, Sikwetepo Haindongo, Olli Kazungura from Mpungu, Erastus 
Karora (Simanya), Mfana boy (Namungundo), Petrus Siyepo from Kasimba, Elina 
Sikongo, Likuwa, Wellem Mpasi, Namporo (Nepara), Regina Zakamungwa (Nepara), 
Timo, Abraham, Gerson Nghilundilwa, Jackson Nzamene Karupu, Olga from Mpungu, 
and George Mutakati.305 All were from uKwangali.  
The majority of these youths who left for exile were learners at the Mpungu 
mission station, a Lutheran Church hostel in uKwangali district. Looking at the total 
number of the youth who left the district, it can be argued that PLAN cadres established a 
good relationship with the civilians in uKwangali and this enabled the PLAN cadres to 
recruit the youth into exile to join the armed struggle. 
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Conclusion 
Chapter Four critically highlighted the unconventional military tactics, pseudo military 
programm and the micro-politics of the relationship which existed between the civilians 
of uKwangali and the South African regime. The propaganda used by the South African 
forces and its intelligence service was instrumental in influencing the perception of 
civilians. The anti-patriotic ideas conducted through lecturers under the South African 
pseudo-cultural political organization transformed the perception of school-going 
children towards the South African regime. The pseudo-cultural organizations used by 
the South African regime motivated many of the youths and school dropouts to join the 
South African army.  
In addition even the majority of those who joined the South African forces (SADF 
and Koevoet) were graduates from the Ezuva pseudo cultural programs. Thus it can be 
argued that all the unconventional strategies used by the South African forces were an 
attempt meant to win the hearts and minds of the civilians and help transform the 
perception of the youth in particular. In addition the use of unconventional and 
conventional methods by the South African regime demonstrated that the district 
constituted a severe threat to the South African forces.Thus the pseudo-cultural political 
organizations like Ezuva used by the South African regime was aimed to achieve their 
political and military objective.  
The Kavango Legislative Council created a vacuum where traditional leaders in 
Kavango were unable to unite and act collectively. Chiefs and headmen under the 
Kavango Legislative Council were caught up in a patron-client relationship. The accounts 
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by the three chiefs presented over the radio during the 1989 political turmoil shows that 
though the Kavango Legislative Council was a colonial tool which the regime used to 
create differences among the chiefs, its strategy as it was envisaged failed. The proverb 
uttered by the chief of uKwangali district shows that unity did not exist between the five 
ethnic leaders. Thus the structure’s purpose was to prevent them (chiefs) from reacting 
collectively against the interim regime. Though the South African regime used different 
strategies to mislead people, the sentiments of the local people of Kavango towards South 
African forces were mostly characterized by fear, helplessness and resentment.  
 The infiltration of PLAN cadres in uKwangali for the first time in 1978 created 
fear and insecurity. For SWAPO to gain support, PLAN cadres relied on political 
education politicizing the civilians about the politics of liberation and to fight for their 
rights.  The political education conducted by PLAN cadres helped motivate some 
civilians in Kavango and in uKwangali in particular to provide enormous support and 
develop a sense of loyalty to SWAPO with its military wing PLAN. The mode of 
political education used by the PLAN cadres destroyed the spheres of South African 
influence in uKwangali and made it in some senses a liberated zone. The logistical and 
other support provided by the inhabitants of uKwangali assisted PLAN to sustain their 
struggle and contain the South African military forces.  
The accounts by the former PLAN combatant, a Koevoet member and civilians, 
which are echoing the same sentiments, bear testimony to the positive image that the 
inhabitants of uKwangali had towards the PLAN cadres. Thus it can be concluded that if 
the civilians of Kavango in general and in uKwangali in particular were conniving with 
the South African military regime to render support, the armed struggle could have not 
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lasted for a long period in Kavango. This would have given the South African forces a 
greater opportunity to take full military control. The presence of the two military forces 
made the district one of the war zones, but with its own characteristics. Despite all the 
military and political developments outlined above, the district has been largely excluded 
in the main nationalist narratives of Namibia’s historiography. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND NAMIBIA’S FIRST DEMOCRATIC ELECTION 
(1989) 
Introduction 
 
 Chapter Five looks at the transition period and the United Nations supervised election of 
1989. The activities of SWAPO as a political party in Kavango and in uKwangali district 
will be analyzed. The chapter sheds light on the political activities between SWAPO, 
DTA and other political parties prior to the 1989 elections.  A section dealing with 
photographs and posters as sources of mobilization and campaign material by the 
political parties form part of Chapter Five. The role of the student militant group NANSO 
which was the backbone of SWAPO’s campaign during the 1989 election will be 
assessed in this chapter. The chapter provides an insight into the election process of 1989 
and the political parties which participated in the election. The election results obtained 
by each political party in Kavango will be analyzed to highlight the nature of the support 
of the people of Kavango for the different approaches to Namibia Independence. 
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The transition period and the United Nations supervised election of 
1989 
In February 1984 a cease-fire was agreed in Lusaka, Zambia and a joint commission was 
established to monitor the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola.306 In return, 
the Angolan government promised not to permit SWAPO or Cuban forces to move into 
the vacated areas although SWAPO indicated that it would continue its armed struggle.307 
The cease-fire agreement of 1984 marked the beginning of the transition period which led 
to Namibia’s first democratic election.  
 Though the cease-fire agreement was signed, South Africa continued to explore 
the option of independence without South West African People Organisation (SWAPO). 
In June 1985 a Transitional Government of National Unity excluding (SWAPO) was set 
up in the capital city Windhoek, although the United Nations (UN) refused to recognise 
it. In 1986 the South African troops violated the ceasefire agreement and penetrated deep 
into Angola to counter attack the SWAPO fighters.308 This means that though the cease-
fire deal was agreed upon the South African regime did not support the idea and still 
wanted to occupy the territory for its economic and security benefits.  
The intensive diplomatic and political campaign by SWAPO of 1987 convinced 
the United Nations (UN) Security Council to initiate negotiations between SWAPO and 
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South Africa to end South African illegal occupation of Namibia.309 On 29 September 
1988, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 435 which established the United 
Nation Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to supervise a cease-fire and monitor the 
decolonisation of Namibia.310 The resolution provided a phase of decolonization based on 
a ceasefire, the demobilization of SWAPO and the South African armed forces, and a free 
and fair election. 
The implementation of Resolution 435 was meant to provide a grace period for 
the withdrawal of the South African troops from Namibia by 1 April 1989 before the 
general election. In addition the resolution was to ensure that PLAN combatants report to 
their respective assembly points and for the repatriation of refugees into Namibia be 
completed. The Resolution also made provision to deploy 7 500 UNTAG troops into the 
country but ‘this was reduced to 4 650’.311 The deployment of the UNTAG troops was 
then in line with the UN Security Council’s task of facilitating the peace process in 
Namibia. This saw the arrival of UNTAG in the country as from February 1989.   
On 1 April 1989 large numbers of PLAN fighters unexpectedly swept across the 
northern border from their bases in Angola.312 The reaction of the PLAN fighters 
prompted the United Nation (UN) Special Representative, Martti Ahtisaari to authorize 
the South African forces to hunt them down and at least 300 PLAN fighters were killed in 
the operation plus dozens of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and Koevoet. 
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After this, however, the situation was brought under control and the transition process 
went relatively smoothly. The elections were held peacefully in November.  
While many predicted a SWAPO landslide victory, it gained only 57% of the 
votes, in part because of voting along ethnic lines, and in part also because it may have 
been weakened by revelations of human rights abuses in the camps SWAPO controlled in 
Angola.313 With the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, SWAPO bases in 
Angola were dismantled and the elected constituent assembly duly drew up a constitution 
for a multi-party democracy, with an executive president who could serve only two five-
year terms. In November 1989 SWAPO won the majority of the seats to the assembly and 
was charged with writing of a constitution for an independent Namibia.314 SWAPO’s 
main opponent in the constituent assembly was the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
(DTA). In February 1990 the constituent assembly, under the presidency of Sam 
Nuyoma, unanimously adopted a draft constitution. 
  In uKwangali, Nkure-nkuru area was one of the UNTAG regional major 
monitoring  bases which was responsible for monitoring the transition period in the 
district up to the general election of 1989. The establishment of the UNTAG centre at 
Nkure-nkuru was necessitated by the degree of political instability which prevailed in the 
district mainly between SWAPO and DTA supporters. During the transition period, 
Namibia was characterized by a number of political activities ranging from meetings, 
rallies, campaigns and voters’ education. The political activities prior to the 1989 general 
election will be presented later in the chapter. 
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SWAPO party in Kavango and uKwangali during the 1989 election 
‘The challenge for SWAPO in 1989 was to build up a viable machine in a very short 
period and also to weld together its very disparate memberships with their radical 
experiences and styles of work and with little knowledge of each other’.315 It should be 
understood that during this period SWAPO as a political party embarked on strategies to 
integrate the two separate section of its party. One section represented those returning 
from exile and the other those emerging from the internal repression.316 The quote by 
Cliffe and his co-authors suggest that the strategy implemented by SWAPO as a party to 
unite its membership was based on the impact of the South African propaganda which 
divided people in all the declared war zone areas in Namibia on an ethnic basis.   
In order to gain the majority of the inhabitants in Kavango, SWAPO party made 
use of its manifesto with its blueprint based on three principles, that of solidarity, 
freedom and justice.317  Using the rationale behind its manifesto, SWAPO party was able 
to mobilise and conduct its political campaign based on the said principles within a short 
period of time.  In Kavango SWAPO organization had begun growing stronger in the 
mid-1980s and the school boycotts of 1988 heightened the political awareness which was 
initiated by teachers and the Namibian National Students Organization (NANSO).318 In 
this context, the popularity of SWAPO spread widely in Namibia during the transition 
period up to the 1989 general election.  
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As noted by Cliffe, the arrival of 500 returnees at Kafuma on the 3 August 1989 
in the western part of Kavango at Nkuru-nkuru strengthened the image and support of 
SWAPO in uKwangali district.319 (See figure 5.5.1 below).  It was against this 
background that SWAPO cadres and returnees were thus able to build upon the existing 
internal political structure during their campaign notably in the western side of 
Kavango.320 Cliffe thus argues that SWAPO support was thought to be stronger in the 
Kwangali area of the western Kavango around Nkure-nkuru known as the ‘red area.’321 
This was the centre of sphere of SWAPO activities in uKwangali district. 
 
 
Figure 5.5.1  
The image above is a gathering of people at a welcoming celebration of 500 returnees at Kafuma near the 
SWAPO office at Nkure-nkuru in the western Kavango (Sources: ©hmmilk “Kavango during the Namibian 
war of liberation,”http://kavango.info/Voito.htm. accessed on 2008/02/24).  
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Figure 5.5.1 shows a crowd of approximately 2000-3000 people which was addressed by 
Severinus Siteketa ‘standing on the pick-up’ during the welcoming celebration for 
returnees at Kafuma, in western Kavango which strengthened the influence of SWAPO 
party in uKwangali.322 In front of the car seated were the late Jaakko Kangayi, Heiki 
Ausiku, the chief ‘Hompa’ Daniel Sitentu Mpasi and the late Alex Muranda. 
Looking at the crowd in figure 5.5.1 above, the mass of the people at the occasion 
portray the popularity of SWAPO in uKwangali. These suggest that uKwangali was one 
of SWAPO strongholds in the Kavango region. The backdrop of the pictures indicates 
that the people of uKwangali were jubilant during the occasion. Cliffe argued that the 
chief of uKwangali supported SWAPO. Hence he noted that this was the district in which 
PLAN guerrillas were active in coming into Kavango from the Ovambo region and 
engaged in political education as well as in guerrilla activities.323 Following Cliffe’s 
argument it can be added that the majority of the inhabitants of uKwangali under Chief 
Sitentu Mpasi supported SWAPO during the armed liberation struggle for Namibian 
independence. Thus the legacy of the armed struggle in uKwangali created a strong 
influence of SWAPO in the district 
During the 1989 campaign, political parties produced posters, placards, T-shirts, 
flags and banners in their respective party colours that were worn and flown on houses, 
rooftops, trees and cuca shops.324 The production of these political materials was used by 
political parties for mobilization purposes. It can be argue that posters and placards were 
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used to popularize the party among the masses. T-shirts worn by individuals were a sign 
of declaring one’s political identity. In Kavango, the use of posters by political parties 
was a psychological approach in the sense that it was a way to appeal and influence the 
minds of the masses so as to direct the political support to their parties.325 Posters and 
placards were used by DTA and SWAPO as a useful tool in promoting their party 
candidates during election. It helps to display images of the political party candidates 
during the election because visual images were more powerful than words which can be 
forgotten.326  
Though SWAPO struggled more in the production and distribution of posters and 
placards as compared to the DTA, SWAPO enjoyed an enormous majority of support 
compared with the DTA in Kavango. It is arguable that its support among the youths and 
teachers during the 1980s seemed to have been reinforced partially by the patronage 
politics enforced by DTA party.  Some supporters had special outfits in party colours 
which were worn at rallies and political occasions. These ranged from umbrellas, scarves, 
caps, decorated beads, etc. Yet visible signs of party allegiance led to unpleasant 
incidents such as beatings especially by Koevoet members.327  
The work by Cliffe indicates that in Kavango for example a SWAPO supporter 
was detained for six days for burning a DTA flag to replace it with a SWAPO flag 
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outside his house in October 1989.328 Tension was very high between the two political 
contenders DTA and SWAPO. This resulted that in cases were even refusing to respond 
to a party salute of the DTA supporters, could lead to trouble.          
As a political organization SWAPO was able to conduct its political rallies and 
meetings to inform its supporters using its political manifesto. During this period the 
regional branch of SWAPO in Rundu organized rallies throughout the region. Every rally 
of SWAPO was accompanied by its music band known as “Ndilimani” performing 
liberation song lyrics. The most common song sang was “Sema Ou li peni” with its 
chorus “Otse aakwiita Ya Sema Nujoma kondjeni inamu sholola sigo twa sindana.”329 
This was the most common song performed by the Ndilimani cultural troupe. This music 
band added powerful vibes to all SWAPO rallies and drew masses of people to attend 
and listen to the speech given by SWAPO leaders who most people used to hear over the 
radio. The rallies of SWAPO were different from those of DTA which was accompanied 
by a free braai and drink, yet each rally of SWAPO was attended by a huge number of 
people.  
The campaign of SWAPO during the late 1980’s enabled the party to gain 
considerable support in Kavango. In order to mobilise the masses, a section in the 
SWAPO election manifesto based on the draft Constitution of 1975, was highlighted. It 
makes provision for a bill of fundamental rights, the structure of state organs, citizenship 
requirements and the fundamental characteristics of the future Namibian state under the 
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principle of “justice and equality for all”.330 The use of this section in the draft 
constitution of 1975 enabled the party to gain support and recognition. The use of the 
constitution was meant to correct the South African propaganda against SWAPO and to 
redefine the image of SWAPO. This was necessary in the sense that it would remedy the 
anti-SWAPO propaganda spread by the South African regime among its supporters.   
The 1989 general election was characterized by political rallies and campaigns. 
UKwangali district which was one of SWAPO’s strong holds in Kavango had fully-
fledged political rallies and campaigns with the opposition DTA. Apart from the interim 
political alliance the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, other political organizations which 
competed in the 1989 general election were the United Democratic Front (UDF), 
SWAPO–Democrats (SWAPO-D), Federal Convention of Namibia (FCN), National 
Patriotic Front (NPF), Namibia National Front (NNF), Christian Democratic Action 
(CDA) and Namibian National Democratic Party (NNDP) which competed against the 
South West African People Organisation (SWAPO).331  
The increased number of political organizations created tension among the 
inhabitants of uKwangali. Physical fighting between SWAPO supporters and its main 
opposition DTA was a common thing whenever these people came together. Violence 
and intimidation were prominent during campaigns in Kavango as in Owambo.332 It is 
arguable that the types of physical and verbal abuses, violence, assaults, beatings and 
insecurity inflicted by the Koevoet on civilians during the 1980s might have been the 
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main reason which created the hatred between the two major political opponents SWAPO 
and DTA.   
The political transformation of the late 1980 created a situation in which learners 
used to add to daily political unrest in the region. Especially in 1988, daily closure of 
schools was the order of the day and almost every week learners deserted schools and 
classes.  During the late 1980s while I was in grade 8 at Kandjimi Murangi Secondary 
School, the struggle was extremely tense. It should be understood that during this period 
people started wearing their T-shirts publicly and this accorded the Koevoet thugs the 
opportunity to use their defensive strategy to assault the student militant group NANSO. 
 
Political activities and the 1989 general election in Kavango and in 
uKwangali 
In the history of Namibia, the 1980s marks the peak of national resistance and the final 
stage towards independence. The same period 1984 witnessed the launching of the 
students militant organization, the Namibian National Student Organization (NANSO).333 
It should be understood that all the political activities which emerge during the 1980s 
were part of the broader struggle for national independence. 
In the case of SWAPO, local activists distributed posters and other SWAPO 
materials to its supporters during meetings which were considered an illegal act 
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according to the colonial authority.334 Thus organizing political activities of SWAPO in 
Kavango during the 1980s was not an easy task. This was simply because the area was 
heavily militarized by the South African forces. Thus under such restrictive 
circumstances SWAPO images were hardly displayed in the public arena.  A little bit of 
freedom by SWAPO party and its supporters in Rundu was only seen beginning 1987 to 
1989 during the political campaign leading to the independence of Namibia on the 21 of 
March 1990.335 It should be understood that during the earlier 1980s, almost every 
secondary school in the Kavango region had teachers who were soldiers working within 
the state security apparatus.336 The presence of the soldiers in secondary schools made it 
possible for students and teacher activists in SWAPO to be easily apprehended.  
Against this background, the social and political atmosphere of the 1989 general 
election was characterized by tension and hostilities as from April 1989 up to the 
Independence Day 21 March 1990. The political campaigns and activities of SWAPO 
and DTA which were the two main political contenders were characterized with violence 
and intimidation.337 The climate of violence certainly haunted the election process.  
Assaults, throwing of hand grenades, beatings and even assassination fueled the political 
campaign of 1989.338 Detailed examples of the events of the 1989 will be presented 
below in this chapter. It is therefore important to explore how far this violence was a 
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matter of excess in the political campaign by supporters of different political parties,339 
which can be attributed to the long years of the previous tension and mistrust.   
As indicated in Chapter Four, structural intimidation was one strategy the South 
African security forces used to patronize the political relationship which existed between 
the regime and the traditional chiefs.340 Structural intimidation imbedded in the social and 
the ethnic political structure set up by the South African administration, had fostered its 
political relationship which existed with certain chiefs in the Kavango region.341 Thus 
people who got jobs from a particular ethnic administration were caught up in a patron-
client relationship indebted to officials, chiefs and headman in various ways who might 
not wish to vote in any way that would jeopardized their situation.342 In this context 
certain members who were employed in the South African forces, police, the chiefs, and 
headman and former members of the Kavango Legislative Council voted for the DTA to 
secure their employment.  
As indicated by Cliffe earlier in the chapter, the challenge experienced by 
SWAPO in 1989 was that of welding its membership together, this was to the contrary 
with the DTA which was in a better position and had experience in contesting 
elections.343 DTA had very considerable resources in terms of funds, vehicles and 
supplies. Almost all its meetings, activities and offices were characterized by free food, 
elaborate publicity material and music.344 Its personnel, finance, equipments and 
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transport were supplemented by the inputs obtained from South Africa and its security 
forces.  
DTA carried out its activities openly with full protection of its activities by the 
colonial authorities but this was not the case with SWAPO.345 In this way the system 
allowed the DTA party to continuously encourage voters to vote for the DTA party 
during the election of 1989. The work by Cliffe indicates that in Kavango, one of their 
team noted two jeeps with young white occupants providing support to the local DTA 
cadres.346  His work also indicates that there was almost open conflicts in Kavango for 
instance between the thug elements that had increasingly built up the constituent ethnic 
parties which were dependent more on patronage and on status.347 
Being a learner at Kandjimi Murangi secondary school in 1988, I can contend that 
learners under their militant organization NANSO were used as the main tool to mobilise 
the masses and carry out the gospel of SWAPO towards their parents and members of the 
communities. It should be understood that SWAPO also used certain strategies to 
influence school-going children promising them free education, and free hospital medical 
treatments which is not the case in the post independence Namibia.348 These promises by 
SWAPO motivated school-going children to influence their parents to vote for the party.   
Growing up and attending my school in uKwangali, daily political meetings and 
rallies were the main activities of the day by all the political parties which participated in 
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the 1989 general election. During this period under discussion, intimidation and different 
forms of violence by the Koevoet were thus the order of the day.349 Physical fighting 
between the NANSO members and South African soldiers were common activities in the 
region especially in secondary schools which were NANSO’s powerhouses.   
The most effective protest staged by NANSO in the region was the one organized 
at Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School whose impact ended up at Rundu technical 
college.350 In this context NANSO was used by SWAPO to stage protests, boycotts and 
marches. Moreover NANSO branches were established throughout the secondary schools 
in the region. The student’s organization was instrumental in destabilizing the effect of 
the Transitional Government of National Unity through staging peaceful demonstrations 
and organizing stay-aways from schools due to the presence of the Koevoet forces who 
raided and harassed learners in the school premises. In order to counter attack the South 
African security forces NANSO the student organ was then instrumental in organizing 
protest and boycotts in schools across the region.  
As mentioned above, the political activities of 1989 in uKwangali district were 
characterized by violence and fighting. During this period, it was not safe for school-
going children to move freely out side the school premises.351 This was similar even if the 
South African forces came in to the school premises. The result was that every student 
found wearing a NANSO T-shirt, even refusing to salute an opposition sign, was beaten 
or chased with a Casspir.   
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In 1989, a former member of the South African Defence Forces (SADF) Reginald 
Ndara offered a lift to one female teacher Elizabeth Shako Ngondo who was teaching at 
Kandjimi Murangi Secondary School. Considering the political atmosphere of the late 
1980s, learners were always on the lookout for unknown visitors. During this year I was 
in standard six the current grade 8.352 What created tension and fear among the learners at 
the school was the prior notification information which reached the school that the South 
African forces were planning to bomb the school. Thus while the learners were still living 
in expectation of the event according to this, it was the same time Reginald Ndara, a 
former SADF member, came to the school.   
When students learned that a SADF member was on the school premises, this 
prompted all the learners to circle the teacher’s house under the pretext that maybe he 
was one of those whom the learners believed were  coming to bomb the school. This 
incident took place around 8h00 o’clock in the evening. It should be understood that 
within the structure of NANSO the student organization which was launched in 1984 it 
had a unit called the “Namibian Police”. The Namibian police under NANSO was tasked 
to maintain law and order and was instrumental in updating learners with the daily 
developments and information from other branches across others secondary schools in 
the region.353 At the teacher’s house, the “Namibian Police” under the auspices of 
NANSO impounded the house where the Namibian police insisted to find out about the 
visits of the SADF member. The sudden meeting between the female teacher, and the 
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“Namibian police”,354 almost resulted in chaos where learners who were impatient 
wanted to attack the man’s vehicle which was parked in front of the house with stones 
and clubs. When the SADF member left the teacher’s house, he opened the boot of his 
car. Out of fear, all the learners who surrounded his car dispersed, thinking that he was 
taking a gun. Many learners sustained injuries when they dispersed for safety.355 This 
accorded him the opportunity to leave the scene and he drove out of the school premises.  
Teaching at school was disrupted on a daily basis whenever a boycott was staged 
by learners. In this context, learners were used as the tools to disorganize the interim 
government administration. This situation meant that some learners even quit school due 
to the insecure situations which prevailed in schools especially in the late 1980s.  
One should not forget that by this time the South African police were in charge of 
maintaining law and order in the region. This situation created anxiety in school-going 
pupils who might desert school whenever they heard that the South African forces were 
planning to visit such a school. In 1988 I can recall three times where we deserted the 
school when we heard that Koevoet was planning to bomb the school. The reaction of the 
Koevoet and the police I believe was part of the South African regime’s strategies to 
intimidate learners for supporting SWAPO. This was unlike the general reason used by 
the South African forces that learners were involved in political activities which had 
nothing to do with their education. 
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The rationale behind the 1989 political campaign was that of winning the support 
of people at all cost. As indicated above, the main competition in uKwangali was 
between SWAPO and DTA. In uKwangali district, the main competition between the two 
rivals was supplemented by the number of individuals who served in the SADF and 
Koevoet alike. Thus though other political parties conducted their campaign in the 
Kavango region, the main competition was between SWAPO and DTA.  This can be seen 
by the pictures elsewhere in this chapter.  
The demobilization of the South African forces was not the end of the atrocities, 
assaults and brutalities by the South African security forces. During this period the South 
African security forces still had the power to arrest and detain SWAPO activists. Those 
caught accused of destabilizing peace were subject to assault and interrogation by the SA 
forces. In 1988 a former SWATF known by the local name Sibungo Matheus went by a 
secondary school in Rundu called Dr. Romanus Kampungu Secondary School to visit his 
girlfriend. When learners heard that he was around the school, Sibungo was beaten by 
SWAPO supporters just because of being a former SADF soldier.356 Being severely 
beaten, Sibungo reported the incident to the sector 20 military base which is 5km along 
the tarred road to Grootfontein.  
In retaliation, the next morning Sibungo was dropped by the Military Police (MP) 
vehicle armed at around six o’clock. While learners were busy having their breakfast, 
Sibungo out of anger started firing towards the hostel and out of fear learners started to 
run out of their dormitories afraid of being shot at.   
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When learners started running out of the hostel, this granted Sibungo the 
opportunity to do some damage where some school-going children were hurt by the 
bullets.357 After the shooting spree, Sibungo was picked up by the Military Police car 
which dropped him before and he was taken to the Sector 20 military base. No charges 
were laid against Sibungo.358 Thus the SADF enjoyed continued impunity regarding their 
treatment of SWAPO supporters during the late eighties.   
In 1989, there were over 40 active political parties in Namibia. While many of the 
parties were tribal or ethnic based, having been sponsored by South Africa in an attempt 
to create internal settlement, to sideline SWAPO, others were set up specifically to 
participate in the election.359 However the registration requirements of the 1989 election 
reduced the number of the political parties to six alliance and four parties. And out of the 
40 parties, only seven made it to the constitutional assembly.360 These were the Aksie 
Christelik Nasionaal (ACN), Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), Federal Convention 
of Namibia (FCN), Namibia National Front (NNF), National Patriotic Front (NPF), South 
West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and United Democratic Front (UDF).361   
The campaign of the 1989 general election was characterized by political tension 
and fighting between supporters of different political parties.362 Thus in order to gain 
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support political movements embarked upon a massive political campaign country wide 
to mobilize people and to encourage them to vote for their respective political parties. 
Apart from DTA and SWAPO, other political parties which participated in the 1989 
general election were UDF, SWAPO-D, FCN, NPF, NNF, CDA and NNDP.363  
Though other parties participated in the election, the main rivalry was between 
DTA and SWAPO who were the main contenders during the election which was 
scheduled for 7-11 November 1989. During the 1989 political campaign, different 
political parties which participated in the election operated throughout the Kavango area 
conducting their political campaign and mobilizing people to vote for their parties.  The 
pictures underneath portray the state of the political campaign and rallies in Rundu which 
was the regional centre of all the political parties. 
 
Figure 5.5.2 
The picture above is the march of the SWAPO youth organization NANSO, celebrating the 1989 
independence victory of SWAPO at Rundu, 1989 (Source: Courtesy of Faustinus Wakudumo, one of the 
activists of the SWAPO youth league in Kavango during the 1989 political campaign).  
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Figure 5.5.3 
The picture above shows one of the marches conducted by the student youth group under the leadership of 
NANSO during the 1989 transition period. (Source: Courtesy of Faustinus Wakudumo). 
 
With a close look at the above pictures, the role of NANSO the student’s organization 
during the 1989 political activities can be witnessed. Thus the student’s organization was 
very instrumental in mobilizing the masses in the region during the 1989 campaign. A 
look at the picture gives one a sense of political will among the NANSO supporters in the 
Kavango. If one looks closely at the Figure 5.5.2, students can be seen holding a big flag 
of SWAPO party, with its main colour which is red, blue and green. The other students 
hold a white banner with the portrait of the former head of state Dr. Sam Nuyoma. A 
placard written “viva comrade president” written with red pen can be seen. In the picture 
students are seen wearing T-shirts, scarves, and caps in SWAPO colours.  
For SWAPO the use of English on the posters and placards was a strategic 
ideology. The party makes use of English by convincing its supporters especially 
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NANSO that English was the language recognised globally and not Afrikaans, which is 
accurate. This enabled the party to gain support as well. 
 
Figure 5.5.4 
Figure 5.5.4 shows one of the biggest DTA street marsh rallies which took places in Rundu in Kavango on 
the 27 May 1989. (Source: Poster collected during field research work in Rundu). 
 
Apart from SWAPO, DTA was one of the political parties which had huge 
support in Kavango. This can be seen in the images above. The use of Afrikaans on 
posters by the DTA I believe was meant to communicate its messages to its audience 
especially the Afrikaans speaking communities who live in the south of Namibia in 
places like Rehoboth, Mariental, and Keetmanshoop and at the coastal area. It should be 
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noted that Afrikaans was the medium of communication during this period. As noted by 
Cliffe DTA scored more votes in the south of the country.364  
However Karangane Flory a DTA mobiliser who was designated with his team to 
operate in uKwangali during the 1989 general election campaign explains that it was a 
great challenge for political parties other then SWAPO to gain support in western part of 
Kavango. This perception started from school-going children to elderly people.  
 Karangane stated that though their party was well funded by the South African 
regime to hold well sponsored campaigns and rallies it was not easy for them to gain 
huge support in uKwangali district. He asserts that though DTA party gained support in 
uKwangali, this can not be compared with the support DTA gained in Rundu (see figure 
5.5.4 above) and in the eastern part of Kavango.  Karangane noted that during their 
campaign it was difficult for them (the DTA) to convene a rally which was attended by 
more than 100-200 people. Thus he asserts that DTA rallies in uKwangali were mostly 
attended by those whose relatives were employed in SADF and Koevoet alike.365 The 
former SADF member explains that the political campaign of 1989 was very challenging 
and tough. He emphasized that it was not that easy to convince the inhabitants of the 
uKwangali district to support DTA.  
Karangane claims that for his team which was designated to campaign in 
uKwangali district one can tell that the majority of the people were SWAPO 
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supporters.366  This sense of support might have been instigated by the hatred developed 
by civilians during the late 1980s due to assaults and harassments inflicted by the South 
African military forces on civilians. He stated that especially in the vicinity of Mpungu it 
was very difficult for the DTA to convene meetings to be attended by more then fifty 
people and this made it impossible to conduct their political campaign in these areas.367 
The trend developed by the inhabitants of uKwangali district for not attending DTA 
rallies in big masses, meant that the DTA changed their strategy of campaign.  
Thus he ‘Karangane’ state that whenever they were having a rally, people were 
brought from Rundu to attend the rally especially if the rally was in uKwangali district.  
This strategy was part of its broader campaign to deceive people and the 
international community that DTA was really representing the masses of the Namibian 
people.368 This was not the case in reality Karangane concluded. The former mobiliser 
reiterated that in the eastern part of the Kavango it was easy for the DTA to campaign 
and hold mass meetings.  In this context the eastern part of the region was the main area 
where DTA had its mass. Thus Karangane argued that his claim can be verified by 
looking at the statistics of the 1989 general election in Kavango region.  
Haindongo Risto who lives at Mukekete in Mpungu district explains that the 
people of uKwangali supported SWAPO. Thus he related that the people supported 
SWAPO simply because of the assaults and beatings they experienced from the South 
                                                             
366 Interview with Flory Karangane, former member of the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) 
Force No. 87879900, Otjomuise Windhoek, 25 January 2008. 
367 Interview with Flory Karangane, former member of the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) 
Force No. 87879900, Windhoek, Otjomuise, 25 January 2008. 
368Interview with Flory Karangane, former member of the South West Africa Territory Force (SWATF) 
Force No. 87879900, Windhoek, Otjomuise, 25 January 2008. 
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African security force especially Koevoet.369 Haindongo also noted that the presence of 
PLAN cadres in uKwangali who used to give political education to the civilians might be 
one reason which enlightened the inhabitants of uKwangali to have a broader 
understanding of SWAPO as a political organization representing the interests of the 
Namibian people. 
The account by a former SADF member and community member indicates that 
the people of uKwangali district supported SWAPO during the 1989 general election. 
Haindongo stated that during the first general election the majority of inhabitants of 
uKwangali area voted for SWAPO. He also claims that during the 1989 general election 
DTA scored more votes in the eastern part of the region as compared to the western part 
of the Kavango region.370  
Haindongo argued that the people in the eastern part might have voted for the 
opposition party due to the fact that the presence of PLAN cadres was less intensive in 
the eastern part of Kavango as compared to those PLAN cadres who operated in 
uKwangali.371 This meant that the majority of the inhabitants of the eastern part of the 
region did not receive adequate political education as compared to the residents of 
uKwangali. He also strongly emphasized that there were very few DTA collaborators in 
the uKwangali district. This means that uKwangali district contributed immensely during 
the 1989 general election. In this context the claim by Haindongo might be correct, but 
what should be understood is that in every district in Kavango, there were certain 
individuals who served in the South African forces SADF and Koevoet. Thus regarding 
                                                             
369 Interview with Haindongo Risto, Mukekete, uKwangali district, 26 June 2007.  
370 Interview with Haindongo Risto, Mukekete, uKwangali district, 26 June 2007.  
371 Interview with Haindongo Risto, Mukekete, uKwangali district, 26 June 2007. 
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the question of supporting political parties, one can argue that it was based on each 
individual’s perceptions and understanding. Thus to claim that the whole uKwangali 
supported SWAPO does not reflect the states of the election of 1989.  
The 1989 General Election in Namibia 
After a lengthy period of the armed liberation struggle, Namibia conducted its first 
general election under UN supervision from 7-11 November 1989.  From 701 483 
registered voters, a total of 670 830 valid votes were cast countrywide.372 The 1989 
general election was the first of its kind which gave Namibians an opportunity to exercise 
their democratic right by participating in a free and fair election supervised by UNTAG. 
During this year the inhabitants of Kavango witnessed the transition in which different 
political organizations were competing in a general election to take control of the country 
aiming for the common goal which is independence.  
Prior to the 1989 general election, different political parties embarked on the 
process of voter education. Thus if the voters’ education is not properly conducted it can 
have significant impact on the election integrity.373 The voters’ education addressed the 
voters motivation and preparedness to take part in the electoral process, as voters need to 
know as which political parties were participating in the election in order for them to 
exercise their right to vote.374 The days, time, venues of the polling days needed to be 
communicate to voters in advance. The voters needed to know about the offices that were 
                                                             
372, G.K.H. Totemeyer et al, Elections in Namibia (Windhoek: Gamsberg MacMillan Publisher, 1996), 
p.81.  
373NSHR, Namibia disputed elections 2004. Monitoring National and presidential election (Windhoek: 15 
December 2004), p.13  
374NSHR, Namibia disputed elections 2004. Monitoring National and presidential election (Windhoek, 15 
December 2004), p.14. 
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being contested and how to mark valid ballot papers as well as where to register and to 
vote.375 It was also important for the potential voters to be aware of the type of the 
documents they will have to bring and so forth to register to vote. This is why the 
dissemination of neutral, impartial, credible, balanced and objective voters’ information 
was indispensable.  
In total ten political organizations participated in the 1989 general election. 
Among the ten were the DTA, SWAPO, UDF, SWAPO-D, FCN, CAN, NPF, NNF, CDA 
and NNDP. In order to determine the input of the people of Kavango region the summary 
of the electoral district result statistics of 1989 will be used to portray the input of the 
region. (see table 1.A. below). Thus out of the 670 830 valid votes casted nation wide, the 
Kavango region performed as follows. Looking at the results, one can see that SWAPO 
won against other parties which contested against it in the Kavango electoral district. 
                                                             
375 NSHR, Namibia disputed elections2004. Monitoring National and presidential election (Windhoek, 15 
December 2004), p.14. 
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Table 1.A. Summary results by the Electoral district 
Electoral 
district 
No. 
Name 
 of district 
ACN  CDA DTA FCN NNDP NNF NPF SWAPO- 
D 
SWAPO UDF Rejects Total  
votes  
cast 
Total 
valid 
votes 
1 Bethanie  301 32 1314 55 4 8 15 16 461 87 44 2337 2293 
2 Damaraland  175 28 2579 34 9 109 62 25 4204 7838 152 15215 15063 
3 Gobabis 1940 158 11684 173 50 391 377 59 2458 442 379 18111 17732 
4 Grootfontein 1606 115 8818 236 32 66 376 51 6417 1319 566 19602 19036 
5 Hereroland  68 89 9880 193 33 705 1935 40 2353 100 209 15605 15396 
6 Kaokoland  64 91 8180 120 70 48 2480 24 1330 71 316 12794 12478 
7 Karasburg  4820 54 10068 367 30 40 152 39 2378 739 126 18813 18687 
8 Karibib 406 24 1989 67 2 56 161 14 2244 1533 86 6582 6496 
9 Kavango  527 449 24817 401 179 151 497 319 30755 1336 1995 61426 59431 
10 Keetmanshoop 1458 100 9249 335 58 432 209 113 5496 1518 301 19269 18968 
11 Luderitz  521 17 2138 89 14 218 67 26 7753 390 45 11278 11233 
12 Maltahohe  388 15 668 161 13 8 14 9 848 383 71 2578 2507 
13 Mariental  1467 85 7665 403 26 77 101 29 3024 1036 169 14082 13913 
14 Okahandja  672 42 3295 56 9 81 334 23 3718 1142 30 10380 10350 
15 Omaruru  213 40 2959 48 5 206 318 24 1281 589 89 5772 5683 
16 Oos-caprivi 104 168 13786 436 44 44 687 93 10415 556 673 27006 26333 
17 Otjiwarongo 699 49 5213 81 12 134 114 19 4020 1835 142 12318 12176 
18 Outjo  765 37 3072 88 3 31 52 13 1197 1483 163 6904 6741 
19 Owambo 465 489 10745 150 214 95 505 1706 225621 5167 3014 248171 245157 
20 Rehoboth  127 66 7746 5010 84 304 243 48 3015 462 251 17356 17105 
21 Swakopmund 1271 32 5931 395 5 241 145 64 14123 1736 140 24083 23943 
22 Tsumeb  922 36 4028 96 11 46 72 57 7254 1202 148 13872 13724 
23 Windhoek 4749 279 34730 1458 77 1853 1777 350 44202 6910 749 97134 96385 
  Grand totals 23728 2495 191532 10452 984 5344 10693 3161 384567 37874 9858 680688 670830 
 
Table.1.A Represents the electoral district of Kavango district highlight in bold in the table will differentiates between SWAPO and DAT.      P. 64 
 
 
 
 
 180
In order to determine the contributions and input of the people of Kavango in general and 
in uKwangali district. The above table providing the summary of the electoral districts of 
1989 will be used to examine the position of Kavango district. It should be understood 
that during the 1989 general election, Namibia was not divided into regions; instead the 
country was divided into 23 electoral districts. Kavango district was one of the twenty 
three electoral districts created during the 1989 election.  
Looking at the 1989 general election statistic, it can be argued that the main 
competition in Kavango was between DTA and SWAPO based on the votes each party 
obtained. The total number of votes cast in Kavango district was 61 426. Out of the 61 
426, a total of 30 755 valid voters voted for SWAPO while 24 817 voted DTA.376 Against 
the above statistic it can be seen that the people in the Kavango district responded 
positively towards SWAPO as compared to other parties. As noted above that during the 
1989 election the country was not yet divided into regions and constituencies. This makes 
it impossible in my studies to distinguish the election results scored by SWAPO in 
uKwangali as compared to the rest of the areas in Kavango during the 1989 election. 
Thus the above table projects overall results of all the inhabitants of Kavango who fall 
under the Kavango district.  
Munguya Gabriel claimed that the inhabitants of uKwangali strongly supported 
SWAPO as a party during the political campaign. Thus he asserts that even those who run 
the political campaign in uKwangali will agree with him that uKwangali area did not give 
them any problems or produced a situation where people refused to attend their organized 
                                                             
376G.K.H. Totemeyer et al, Elections in Namibia (Windhoek: Gamsberg MacMillan Publisher, 1996), 
p.208. 
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meeting and rallies.377 The claim by Munguya suggests that the inhabitants of uKwangali 
district supported SWAPO. 
The claim by Munguya can be correct as indicated by Cliffe that ‘SWAPO 
support was thought to be strongest in Kwangali area of the western Kavango around 
Nkure-nkuru, known as the “red area”.378 This was the main centre of SWAPO activities. 
Cliffe also argues that the chief of uKwangali supported SWAPO. Thus this was the area 
in which PLAN guerillas were actively coming into Kavango from Ovambo region, and 
engaged in political education as well as in guerilla activities. The arguments by Cliffe 
supplemented by the interviewees testimonies, indicates that the district was one of 
SWAPO’s strongholds in Kavango during the 1989 election. It is against this background 
I can argue that uKwangali did contribute to SWAPO victory immensely during the 1989 
general election. 
 
Conclusion  
The cease-fire agreement of 1984 in Lusaka Zambia marked the beginning of the 
transition period which led to Namibia first democratic election. The adoption of 
Resolution 435 in 1988 was meant to establish UNTAG to supervise and monitor the 
decolonization of Namibia. In addition the Resolution was set to provide a grace period 
for the withdrawal of the South African troops from Namibia before the election, the 
assembling of PLAN combatants at their respective assembly points, the repatriation of 
                                                             
377  Interview with Gabriel Munguya, Nepara village, uKwangali district, 24 July 2007. 
378 L. Cliffe et al, The transition to independence in Namibia (London: Lynne Reiner, 1994), p.295. 
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refugees and the deployment of the UNTAG troops in Namibia.  1989 marks the 
beginning of the transition period which culminated in Namibia’s first democratic 
elections supervised by the United Nations Security Council through UNTAG. The 1989 
election witnessed different political parties using their political manifestos as a blueprint 
to politicise the inhabitants of Kavango to vote for their parties. 
Tension between SWAPO and DTA was very high during the 1989 political 
campaign. During the 1989 campaign, political parties produced posters, placards, T-
shirts, flags, scarves, badges and banners in their different parties’ colors which were 
worn by supporters. The political materials were used for mobilization and to promote the 
identity of the party and its candidates during the election process. Posters and placards 
were a psychological tool used in the sense that it was a way to appeal to and influence 
the minds of the masses so as to direct the political support to their parties.  
For pensioners and the illiterate, the images on posters and placards, helped to 
communicate and display the party candidates to the voters. Visual images were more 
powerful as many people could easily identify the message more easily than as the 
written texts which were mostly in English. The visuality of the party colors enabled 
supporters to differentiate between different parties. In this context the posters and 
placard were meant to popularize the party among the voting masses through the display 
of the party colors, sign and slogans on posters and banners. 
Political activities prior to the 1989 election mark the peak of national resistance 
and the final stage towards independence. In Kavango the political activities of SWAPO 
were heightened by the political awareness initiated by teachers and NANSO the student 
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organization. The student organization NANSO was used by SWAPO as its backbone to 
mobilise and spread the gospel of SWAPO to the masses. The political transformation of 
the late 1989 created a situation in which learners were   used to disrupt the daily political 
unrest in the region. The political strategy used by SWAPO promising school-going 
children free education, free hospital medical treatment motivated the pupils and their 
parents to vote for SWAPO. 
Unlike SWAPO, DTA carried out its activities openly with full protection and 
elaborate publicity. Thus the DTA party enjoyed continued impunity over SWAPO 
during the political campaign of the 1980s. Political violence and intimidation 
orchestrated by the DTA supporters resulted in daily physical fighting between SWAPO 
and DTA supporters in Kavango. The failure of the South African military propaganda 
aimed at winning the hearts and minds of civilians contributed to the DTA inability to 
gain overwhelming victory over SWAPO. The geographical proximity of UKwangali 
where the district shares a regional boundary with the former Ovamboland, the presence 
of the unprecedented number of PLAN cadres during the 1980s, and the return of 500 
returnees at Kafuma on 3 August 1989 and the form of assaults and violence committed 
by Koevoet units led to increase votes for SWAPO party in uKwangali district.  
The results that SWAPO party obtained in Kavango during the 1989 election 
testify that the district was one of the SWAPO strongholds in Namibia. Thus out of the 
total of 61 426 votes cast in Kavango, 30 755 voters voted for SWAPO while 24 817 
voters voted for the DTA, while the remaining voters were shared by the remaining 
parties. It can be concluded that despite being exposed to different forms of violence, 
assaults and atrocities, the people of Kavango stood firm and had a tenacious support for 
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SWAPO as a political party. Against these political developments and the election result 
of 1989, it can be concluded that although the people of Kavango were caught in the 
middle, they had loyalty to SWAPO and were instrumental in politicizing the ideology of 
the party. 
 
CONCLUSION 
South West Africa (Namibia) was a mandated territory under South Africa from 1921, up 
to Namibia’s first democratic election in November 1989. The Odendaal plan of 1962 
was aimed at separate development on ethnic grounds. In respect to Kavango the 
Odendaal Plan created five separate ethnic units namely vaKwangali, Mbunza, Sambyu, 
Gciriku, and Hambukushu. Politically, the creation of the legislative council was 
therefore seen as a pertinent pretext through which the South Africa regime would 
implement all the Odendaal Commission plans. Though the Odendaal Plan was a 
developmental programme, the Commission did not achieve its intended objective as 
envisaged by the South African colonial administration. It can be concluded the Odendaal 
Commission did however have social and political impacts on the lives of the inhabitants 
of Kavango.  
The Kavango legislative structure established under the apartheid regime in 
accordance with the Native Act No 54 of 1968 of South Africa had a political impact 
where the local people were used to serve the interest of South Africa. The power 
invested in the elected and nominated traditional leaders to run the political affairs in 
their territories under the guidance of the South African State President and the 
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government was meant to impose control over the Legislative Council. The study argues 
that though the Kavango Legislative Council gained its self-governance, it never got its 
real independence from the South African colonial administration. The acts passed during 
the Legislative Council proceedings were passed on condition that it was in line with the 
apartheid ideology.  
The rules and laws which were instituted by the Union of South Africa to avoid 
unauthorized matters in the legislative council which were deemed to destabilize peace 
and stability were used to neutralize the relationship between the traditional leaders and 
South African regime in the designated homeland. The reactions of the traditional leaders 
were affected by the power of the Native Act 54 of 1968. Thus all the acts prohibited the 
traditional leaders from discussing any political, nationalist and specifically SWAPO 
related matters. 
The political developments of the late seventies and eighties in Kavango created a 
vacuum in which the traditional leaders were caught between the two military forces of 
SADF and SWAPO in uKwangali district. The infiltration of PLAN cadres in uKwangali 
in the eighties made the district one of the most heavily concentrated military areas by the 
South African forces. The operation of the recce unit complicated the relationship 
between PLAN cadres and the civilians.  The operation of the recce unit in uKwangali 
district created a situation in which the inhabitants of the district lived in fear and 
insecurity day and night. Though some traditional leaders were passively persuaded to 
promote the interest of the South African interim government, some leaders reacted more 
radically towards the South African envisaged pseudo-political agenda. The vulnerability 
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of some traditional leaders meant that their reactions towards the SADF and SWAPO 
varied.   
The presence of the South African security forces in Kavango, the Bantustan 
homeland policy and the Pass Law system which operated in Namibia during the 1960s 
affected PLAN cadres’ activities in Kavango. The geographical location of the region and 
the pass laws system which operated in Namibia during the selected period created a 
division where people in the Kavango region were unable to interact with other people 
from different ethnic homelands in particular between the North and the South.  
The independence of Angola in I975 marked the beginning of the People’s 
Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) infiltration in Kavango region and in uKwangali 
district in particular. The propaganda of the South African military regime was meant to 
create disbelief and destroy morale and the image of SWAPO with its military wing 
PLAN among the inhabitants of Kavango. The operation of the South African military 
forces, using terror tactics such as interrogation, torture and destruction of property when 
extracting information and searching for PLAN guerillas especially by the Koevoet unit 
created insecurity, mistrust and fear among the civilians. 
The armed liberation struggle had social and political impacts of the life of 
civilians. The most frequent impact was beatings, assaults and interrogation from the 
South African forces. The implementation of curfew in Kavango during the eighties was 
part of the South African military force strategy of cracking down on suspected SWAPO 
sympathisers in Kavango and in uKwangali. The martial law under the Administrator 
General AG 9 was extended to the northern “homeland” of Ovamboland, Kavangoland 
and Caprivi, and affected political activists in Kavango. The proclamation gave police 
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and any law enforcement agents and members of the South African Defence Force 
(SADF) wider powers to arrest, search and detain people without trial. 
The massive build up by the South African military forces in Namibia in the late 
seventies led to the declaration of Kavango as a security district. The extension of the 
martial law in Kavango which empowered the South African forces with a wider mandate 
to commit and conduct all sorts of violence including sexual violence on women had 
adverse effects. The establishment of military bases in uKwangali namely Nepara, 
Musese, Mpungu, and Nkure-nkuru and at Kahenge and at Kandjimi Murangi Secondary 
School suggests that it was a war zone. The complexities of the South African military 
forces in uKwangali had a diverse social and economic impact on the inhabitants. The 
presence of the South African military forces and the use of conventional and 
unconventional strategies among the civilians created insecurity, fear and mistrust among 
civilians themselves.  
The influx of the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) into the interior 
of uKwangali in the 1980s made it a concentration area by the South African forces who 
imposed their diverse conventional and unconventional strategies on civilians. The 
atrocities and brutal activities that were orchestrated by the South African forces in 
particular the Koevoet unit was part of its wider unconventional strategy which had 
tremendous impacts on the lives of the inhabitants. Though the presence of the South 
African forces had a tremendous impact on the lives of the inhabitants, the operations of 
the South African forces failed to halt the increased collaboration of the inhabitants with 
the People Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN).    
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Militarily, the presence of the South African military forces in uKwangali left 
memories characterized by atrocities and brutality. Though Kavango region was heavily 
militarized by the South African military regime, the regime did not impose total military 
control over the region and in uKwangali district in particular. It can be argued that 
though the area was heavily militarized, SWAPO cadres penetrated and establish 
communication links and relationships. 
The propaganda used by the South African forces and its intelligence service was 
instrumental in influencing the perception of civilians. The anti-patriotic ideas conducted 
through lecturers under the South African pseudo-cultural political organization 
transformed the perception of school-going children towards the South African regime. 
The pseudo-cultural organization used by the South African regime motivated many 
youths and school dropouts to join the South African army. It can be concluded that the 
majority who joined the South African forces were graduates of the Ezuva programs.   
The unconventional strategy used by South African forces was an attempt meant 
to win the hearts and mind of the civilians and help to transform the perception of the 
youth in particular. The use of unconventional and conventional methods by the South 
African regime shows that the district constituted a severe threat to the South African 
forces.Thus the pseudo-cultural political organization like Ezuva used by the South 
African regime was aimed to achieve the political and military objective of the regime.  
The Kavango Legislative Council created a vacuum where traditional leaders in 
Kavango were unable to unite and act collectively. Chiefs and headmen under the 
Kavango Legislative Council were caught up in a patron-client relationship.  The 
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Kavango Legislative Council was a colonial tool which the regime used to create division 
among the chiefs, though its strategy failed as it was envisaged. The proverb made by the 
chief of uKwangali where he say that the five oxen379 of Kavango do not pull together in 
one direction,  shows that unity did not existed among the five ethnic leaders. Thus the 
aim was to prevent them (chiefs) from reacting collectively against the interim regime. 
Though the South African regime used different strategies to mislead people, the 
perceptions of the local people of Kavango towards South African forces were 
predominantly characterized by fear, helplessness and resentment.  
1978 marked the beginning of PLAN cadre’s infiltration in uKwangali district for 
the first time. For SWAPO to gain support, PLAN cadres relied on political education 
politicizing the civilians about the politics of liberation and to fight for their rights.  The 
political education conducted by PLAN cadres helped to motivate some civilians in 
Kavango and uKwangali in particular to provide enormous support and develop a sense 
of loyalty to SWAPO with its military wing PLAN. The mode of political education used 
by the PLAN cadres helped to destroy the spheres of South African influence in 
uKwangali and made significant PLAN operations possible. The logistical and other 
support provided by the inhabitants of uKwangali assisted PLAN to sustain and contained 
the South African military forces.  
It can be argued that if the civilians of Kavango in general and in uKwangali in 
particular were conniving with the South African military regime to render support, the 
armed struggle for the PLAN cadres could have not lasted for a long period in Kavango. 
                                                             
379 The five oxen the chief mentions refer to the five tribal chiefs in the Kavango region who did not co-
operate more tightly with each other. 
 
 
 
 
 190
This would have given the South African forces a greater opportunity to take full military 
control.  
In 1984 the cease-fire agreement was signed in Lusaka Zambia which marked the 
beginning of the transition period which led to Namibia’s first democratic election 
supervised by the United Nations Security Council UNTAG. The diplomatic and political 
campaign by SWAPO of the 1980s led to the end of the South African illegal occupation 
of Namibia. The adoption of the Resolution 435 in 1988 was meant to establish the 
UNTAG to supervise and monitor the decolonization of Namibia.  
The implementation of the Resolution 435 provided the phase for the withdrawal 
of the South African troops from Namibia from 1 April 1989, the assembling of PLAN 
combatants to their respective assembly points, the repatriation of refugees and the 
deployment of the UNTAG troops in Namibia. The 1989 election witnessed different 
political parties using their political manifestos as a blueprint to politicise the inhabitants 
of Kavango to vote for their parties. Tension between SWAPO and DTA was very high 
during the 1989 political campaign.  
During the 1989 campaign, political parties produced posters, placards, T-shirts, 
flags, scarves, badges and banners in their different parties’ colours which were worn by 
supporters. The political materials were used to mobilize and promote the identity of the 
party and its candidates during the election. Posters and placards were used as 
psychological tools in the sense that it was a way to appeal to and control the minds of 
the masses so as to direct the political support to their parties. Posters help voters to 
identify party candidates during the election process. This was important to voters in the 
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sense that visual images were more powerful and many people could easily identify as 
the written words were mostly in English. The visuality of the party colours enabled 
supporters to differentiate between different parties. 
Political activities prior to the 1989 election marked the peak of national 
resistance and the final stage towards independence. In Kavango the political activities of 
SWAPO were heightened by the political awareness initiated by teachers and NANSO 
the student organization. The student organization NANSO was used by SWAPO as its 
backbone to mobilise and spread the gospel of SWAPO to the masses. The political 
transformation of late 1989 created a situation in which learners were used to contribute 
to the daily political unrest in the region. The political strategy used by SWAPO 
promising school-going children free education, free hospital medical treatment 
motivated the pupils and their parents to vote for SWAPO. 
Unlike SWAPO, DTA carried out its political campaign activities openly with full 
protection and elaborate publicity. Thus the DTA party enjoyed a continued advantage 
over SWAPO during the political campaign of the 1980s. Political violence and 
intimidation orchestrated by the DTA supporters resulted in daily physical fighting 
between SWAPO and DTA supporters in Kavango, with impunity for DTA supporters. 
The failure of the South African military propaganda aimed at winning the hearts and 
minds of civilians contributed to DTA inability to gain an overwhelming victory over 
SWAPO.      
The geographical proximity of the UKwangali district, the infiltration of the 
unprecedented number of PLAN cadres during the 1980s in the district, the return of 500 
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returnees at Kafuma on 3 August 1989 and the assaults and violence committed by 
Koevoet units on civilians led to the increase of votes for SWAPO party in uKwangali 
district.  
  Thus out of the total of 61 426 votes cast in Kavango, 30 755 voters voted for 
SWAPO while 24 817 voters voted for the DTA and the remaining votes were shared by 
the remaining parties. The election result shows that the area was one of the SWAPO 
strongholds during the 1989 elections.  It can be concluded that despite the being exposed 
the different forms of violence, assaults and atrocities, many people in Kavango stood 
firm and had a tenacious loyalty to SWAPO as a political party. Against these political 
developments and the election result of 1989 it can be concluded that although the people 
of Kavango were caught in the middle, they had fidelity towards SWAPO and were 
instrumental in politicizing the ideology of the party which culminated in the party 
winning more votes as compared to the main opposition DTA. 
In conclusion I want to argue that the used of unconventional and conventional 
strategies embarked upon by the south African military regime shows that the district 
constituted a severe threat to the south African military forces. Against this background it 
is undeniable to argue that uKwangali district is one of the forgotten war zones in the 
Namibian liberation struggle, the central question the study has addressed in the thesis.  It 
is important to highlight my personal observation during my field research. Among all 
the participants interviewed I can confess that everyone wanted his/her voice to be heard. 
Some even made remarks saying that our district suffered the expense of the war though 
we are completely forgotten after Independence. The question one now asks is, how are 
these people forgotten? Is it politically or socially?  
 
 
 
 
 193
Though some respondents boast of their tremendous contribution, elements of silence can 
be detected throughout their responses. The elements of silence were noted in some 
informants especially those who lost their relatives, loved ones and property during the 
period, who were not in a position to elaborate in more detail.  This means that the sense 
of losing their loved ones is still engraved in their memory which I believe has affected 
them psychologically, socially and politically. Thus some individuals were not in a 
position to narrate aspects of their experience which affected them emotional or 
politically.  
On can conclude that their oral narratives might be shaped by the nature of the 
current post independence political developments in the country. For example a sense of 
being forgotten by the government is articulated by most of the respondents. As pointed 
out by one informant, eighteen years after independence the western part of Kavango 
lacks proper infrastructure like tarred roads, inland villages do not have schools, clinics 
and water which are the basic human needs. These are social and political rights which 
some of the informants have articulated.   
An old Mukwangali-speaking proverb says: ‘A trees dies, a tree sprouts again!’ 
The proverb simply makes a metaphoric example of the lifespan of the tree with that of 
the state. Though we are now eighteen years after independence many seem not to have 
lost hope that their tireless contribution and participation will be recognized and still hope 
that righteous life will be rewarded for their input during the armed liberation struggle. 
But this looks not forthcoming. 
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